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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation I argue not only that queer ecology is a legitimate and
important next step for ecocritics and queer theorists but also that its literary application
does a great amount of good in exploring and dismantling the natural/unnatural binary
and exposing the ecological impact of the choices humans make everyday. I take as my
method a combination of queer and environmental theory and literary criticism, as well as
the foundational queer ecocritical works and include important historical and political
perspectives influencing the emergence of the environmental and gay and lesbian
movements. Through this dissertation, I legitimize more recent American literature,
namely that of the 1960s. My reinvented canon includes works traditionally read as
either environmental texts or queer texts so my task will be to claim each work for both
the queer and environmental side, as well as a combination of both. Also, I argue that the
importance of contemporary literature to queer ecology lies in its historical, social, and
political situations.
My first chapter, on Ken Kesey’s Sometimes a Great Notion, the author’s second
novel, explores the deep and abiding homosociality present in the story of the Stamper
family, a logging clan in Oregon. I frame my argument about the homosocial (and
homosexual) activities of communities of male loggers in the Northwest by addressing
the primary homosocial relationships in the novel—those between Joe Ben and Hank
Stamper (despite the fact they are both married) and Hank and his brother Leland. Kesey
uses these relationships to dismantle and discount the presence of heterosexuality and
iii

reproduction in the novel. While the physicality displayed by the men of the logging
community is often read by critics as Kesey’s way of reinscribing a macho, pioneer
mentality into an American literature populated by flaccid men, I read these moments
erotically, underscoring their occurrence in the space of the forest as a necessary to the
enactment of homosociality. In the second chapter, on Isherwood’s A Single Man, I show
how George, the novel’s main character, acts a barometer for the ecological destruction
enacted by the “breeders”—the families and their children—who surround him. While
mourning the sudden death of his longtime partner, George critiques the functioning of
heterosexual couples, their offspring, rampant growth and construction, and the general
environmental destruction occurring in California at the time. While the novel is
traditionally read as a text that empowers and normalizes a gay man in a long-term
relationship, I argue that these critics are ignoring the environmental signs spread
throughout the novel. Isherwood reverses the paradigm of queerness as unnatural by
making reproduction unnatural, but instead of imposing new binaries in the narrative,
Isherwood introduces touching and play as a way of dissolving boundaries. Jane Rule’s
Desert of the Heart, which comprises my third chapter, centers on Evelyn, a woman who
travels to Reno to seek a divorce from her husband. While there, she meets, falls in love,
and has an affair with a young woman named Ann. Despite Evelyn’s admission that the
younger Ann makes her feel like a “mother,” the two have a sexual relationship which
simultaneously confirms and erases this familial relationship. Like in A Single Man,
Desert of the Heart contains moments of play and touch which seek to reinforce the
iv

importance of sexual exploration across seeming boundaries as well as normalize and
bolster same-sex relationships. Also, as with Isherwood’s novel, the current criticism on
Desert of the Heart tends to highlight the politics of Ann and Evelyn’s relationship.
While the focus on the sexual politics of the lesbian relationship is not remiss, it ignores
the pivotal environmental factors that Rule includes. It is the Nevada landscape that
often affords the pair the freedom to escape and love without the policing eye of the
casino in which Ann works, the ranch where they live, and the other divorced women
there. Rule equates the barrenness of the desert with the couple’s animality, revising the
narrative of ecological barrenness by including in the couple’s rich and totally naturalized
love affair. The fourth chapter focuses on Margaret Atwood’s first novel, The Edible
Woman. Atwood presents the narrative of Marian, a woman in rebellion. On the surface,
Marian buys into the heteronormative narrative of marriage and childbirth, but her body
tells her otherwise. What occurs in The Edible Woman is a series of strange bodily
incidents in Marian—she runs (read: escapes) senselessly from her nearly-fiancée,
retreats into the “womb symbol,” the space beneath the bed, finds her tongue and
stomach turning against her as she increasing is unable to eat, and then enacts another
escape from her future-husband. All of these things add up to a rebellion against
marriage and the consumerism tied up to it. While the novel is often read as a protofeminist novel in which Marian is punished with an anorexia forced upon her by
narcissistic men and patriarchy in general and then “fights back” by the cannibalization
of the cake shaped like a woman, I read the novel as a critique of not only the marriage
v

system and a narrative that reinforces the Mother as the Ultimate Woman (embodied in
the novel by the perverse, unmarried Ainsley and the married, distracted Clara) but also a
forced and destructive system of “Production-consumption,” as Duncan explains, a
system which forces its unnatural food products on consumers. I read Marian’s gradual
starvation as a deliberate challenge to the rotundity and productiveness of pregnancy.

vi

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated Mama & Daddy, Irene & Paul, Don & Mary.
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INTRODUCTION
QUEERING ECOCRITICISM AND GREENING THE NON-NORMATIVE
Above all, remember that planned, well-spaced children will starve, or
vaporize in a thermonuclear war, or die of plague just as well as
unplanned children.
–Paul Ehrlich, The Population Bomb, 1968
Only in America would a housewife hop into a two-ton vehicle and drive
downtown to buy the thumbtacks she forgot to buy on her regular
shopping trip.
–Vance Packard, The Waste Makers, 1960
The threat homosexuality poses to heterosexuality is its own
contingency, and open-endedness, its own tenuous hold over the
multiplicity of sexual impulses and possibilities characterizing all human
sexuality. Its own un-naturalness, its compromise and reactive status.
Queer pleasures show that one does not have to settle for the predictable,
the formulaic, the respected, although these too are not without their cost.
—Elizabeth Grosz, “Experimental Desire”

A COLD WAR CONTEXT
Queer ecology is a critical framework that explores the interrelatedness of both
queer theory and ecocriticism. Readings in queer ecology tease out meanings of the term
“natural” and open up the potential for reimagining the value of both the other-thanhuman world and queer sexualities. When applied as literary criticism, queer ecology
1

investigates notions of heterosexism, family formation, and human manipulation of the
environment. The postwar period in America is a particularly abundant in images of the
valorized nuclear family and the ravaged countryside, along with socially and
governmentally sanctioned depletion of resources and the persecution of homosexuals
and any other “queers.” Literature of the period is also rife representations of both
human-created environment disaster (see Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring or even Dr.
Seuss’s The Lorax) as well as the remarkable if at times unstable or fraught nuclear
family (see Sloan Wilson’s The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit or Grace Metalious’s
Peyton Place).
The period after World War II, as many historians have observed, was a time of
unprecedented expansion in the population as well as the economy in the United States.1
With men returning home from the warfront, the demand for comfortable homes outfitted
with the latest laborsaving devices increased. The G.I. Bill not only helped those men
buy homes and start businesses of their own but also encouraged them to go to college at
the government’s expense, allowing many to pursue careers that might not have been
available to them otherwise. The suburbs spread, and the personal automobile became
the most popular form of conveyance. The average age of marriage dropped
significantly,2 with men and women often marrying right after high school, while the

1

See Alexander Wilson’s The Nature of Culture for an in-depth look at North American cultural
interpretations of the natural world in the years after the Second World War. In it, he calls for a
consideration of how we should “build landscapes that heal, connect and empower, that make intelligible
our relations with each other and with the natural world: places that welcome and enclose, whose breaks
and edges are never without meaning” (17). Wilson makes this call because of his recognition that the
period after World War II brought about unprecedented ecological alteration.
2
In the preface of a 1960 home economic textbook entitled Personal Adjustment: Marriage and Family
Living, Judson and Mary Landis reveal the textbook caters to readers who are marrying younger. The
section titles uncover the narrative in which the textbook’s authors are invested: “Understanding Yourself
and Others,” “Dating,” “Looking Toward Marriage,” “When You Marry,” and “When You Become a
Parent.” Notice the use of the term when in relationship to marrying and childbearing. To be fair, the
2

Baby Boom, typically placed between the years 1946 and 1964, represented a marked
increase in the birth of babies.3 Contraception in the form of The Pill was marketed
specifically to married women beginning in 1960, highlighting the importance of wellplanned and chosen children to a stable marriage. Women were again relegated to the
domestic space, and children were raised in Dr. Spock’s idiom of treating them as selfactualized individuals with needs of their own. Consequently, the nuclear family with
their home, automobile, and consumer products became the emblem of the prosperous
and proper American way of life.
The suburban nuclear family of the 1950s, i.e. Mom, Pop, Dick, Jane, and Spot, is
characterized in popular imagination by an almost unquestioned valorization.4 In the
world of the archetypal nuclear family, typified by television families such as the
Cleavers, the Nelsons, the cartoonish Jetsons, no one ever goes hungry, raises their voice,
or worries about the threat of nuclear warfare. Every problem is easily resolved within a

Landises do not explicitly encourage marriage at an early age, but they do provide several quizzes
throughout the chapters to help readers decide whether they are ready to be married. And, indeed, as
Friedan suggests in The Feminine Mystique, in the magazines marketed toward women in the postwar
period the “happy housewife heroines seem strangely younger than the spirited career girls of the thirties
and forties. They seem to get younger all the time—in looks, and in a childlike kind of dependence” (93).
3
I have not forgotten about the advent of birth control in the form of The Pill in the late 1950s and early
1960s. I think it is important to point out that birth control was only available to married women starting in
the 60s; unmarried women did not have free access to the Pill until the 1970s. (The same thing applied to
the diaphragm, causing unmarried women to borrow wedding rings in order to trick doctors into giving
them diaphragms and showing them how to use them.) This highlights a telling disparity in the rhetoric of
birth control: it was supposed to be used only by women in socially sanctioned unions for the purpose of
solidifying those unions through sex as well as with the intention of careful and stable family planning. As
Elaine Tyler May so aptly puts it: “contraception in the postwar years encouraged scientific family
planning, rather than premarital sexual experimentation or alternatives to motherhood for women”
(Homeward Bound134). In other words, early uses of the Pill only reinforced the larger cultural narratives
rather than upsetting them and creating alternatives. The Pill created a narrative of super-heterosexuality,
giving the opportunity for potentially procreative couples to give free reign to their desires. See also May’s
America and the Pill: A History of Promise, Peril, and Liberation, and for a discussion about the history of
the United State government’s involvement in sex education and the dissemination of other forms of birth
control, see Alexandra M. Lord’s Condom Nation.
4
See Carolyn Herbst Lewis’s Prescription for Heterosexuality for a discussion about the way the medical
profession, headed by the American Medical Association, constructed, reinforced, and perpetuated a
“healthy heterosexuality” in public discourse.
3

reasonable and comfortable amount of time to the satisfaction of all concerned.5 But, in
The Way We Never Were, Stephanie Coontz reveals that the nuclear family of popular
imagination has no basis in social reality. It thrived not only because of policies of
containment but also “partly a result of the media’s denial of diversity” (31). Coontz
argues that the nuclear family was a “historic fluke” enabled after the Second World War,
a period in which wages, spending, and therefore consumption increased.6 Many factors,
combined with the government’s ability to distribute “educations benefits, housing loans,
highways and sewer construction, and job training,” “encouraged early marriage early
childbearing, expansion of consumer debt, and residential patterns that required long
commutes to work” (28-9). As Coontz points out, the postwar years in the United States
were a period of unprecedented family building, consumerism, and domestic insulation.
Despite her admission that the nuclear family of Ozzie and Harriet’s ilk is the stuff of
myth and clever marketing, Coontz’s acknowledgement of the “historical fluke” does
uncover an important truth—the coincidence occurred, nonetheless, and one can find
some truth to the ideology behind the nuclear family if only in the fact that the model was
5

For discussions on the representations of 1950s fictitious television families and their impact on American
culture and society in general, see Ella Taylor’s Prime-Time Families: Television Culture in Postwar
America and Nina C. Leibman’s Living Room Lectures: The Fifties Family in Film and Television.
6
The “Sixties Family,” David Steigerwald argues, was losing its “primary function,” that of the “nurturing
of children in a private environment isolated from the processes of production and commerce” (251). The
children remained the focus of the 1950s family and became fully enmeshed in the marketplace, according
to Steigerwald, since “[t]he fifties cult of the family was not truly a revival of family the nineteenth-century
cult of domesticity: in the earlier form, the woman was to find fulfillment in subordinating herself to her
husband’s will; in the fifties, fulfillment was gained vicariously, through the development of the children”
(251). W.T. Lhamon’s Deliberate Speed: The Origins of a Cultural Style in the American 1950s articulates
a similar position—the 1950s, at least artistically and culturally, was not a period of wholesale consensus.
Rather, he argues for a reading of 1950s culture as “deliberately speeding”—moving ahead, yes, but at a
careful and plotted pace. He accounts for this deliberate speed through “poplore,” the combination of
folklore and pop culture, the melding of white and black cultural modes, the restructuring of tradition, and
the prevalence of new technological media, including readily available recording devices and the television.
With a similar premise that the 1950s was not a decade of unquestioned consent, Alan Petigny likewise
argues that the “consumerist ethos” of the postwar period “encouraged American to yield to the influence
of the popular culture, and in doing so, take less of their cues from their neighbors and family” (8-9). The
result, according to Petigny, is that the country turned “away from the repressive worldly asceticism that
had long undergirded a conservative world outlook” (9).
4

so readily embraced and normalized in the dominant discourse during the Cold War
years. Securing one’s future (and the future of the country) depended upon building up a
population of healthy, stable and entirely “normal” American citizens. 7
But besides actually (re)producing those citizens, Americans had another
responsibility to their country—engaging in the postwar economic climate by buying and
consequently disposing. An examination of studies from the period reveals varying
concerns with the intersection between the Baby Boom, the proliferation of the nuclear
family, its buying habits, and the impacts on the environment. It is not just the sheer
number of children being born during the period at stake here but also their families’
attitudes toward resource usage, land management, and the creation of waste. An explicit
link between the growing population and the increasing pressure put on land and natural
resources is evident in various authors’ calls to action. As early as 1948, Fairfield
Osborn, in Our Plundered Planet, urges readers to remember the “cardinal principle in
7

Joyce Johnson’s 1983 memoir Minor Characters describes her life in 1950s and 60s New York City and
her relationship with the king of the Beats, Jack Kerouac. Sheltered as a child by an overprotective parents
and forced into piano lessons by her thwarted mother, Johnson justifies her need for rebellion and escape
into her own non-materialistic home and the company of the Beats. In the beginning of the memoir,
Johnson portrays her parents’ home in 1950s New York City as a kind of domestic hell full of stilted
dreams and too many meaningless objects. Thinking “painfully, of a room,” the living room specifically,
Johnson describes the “the terrible poignancy of this room of gratifications deferred, the tensions of
gentility. It’s as if all these objects—the piano, the rug, the portrait—are held in uneasy captivity, hostages
to aspiration. It the slipcovers ever came off, if the heavy drapes are drawn aside letting in the daylight,
everything that has been so carefully preserved will be seen to have become frayed and faded away” (13-4).
I include this description (although there are countless others I could have chosen) to illustrate the effect
that consumerism and the overprotective nuclear family of the 1950s could potentially have on the children
of that generation. Johnson’s discomfort stems from her parents’ material objects, their expectations, and
the containment she feels while at home. I do not think Johnson’s example is an extreme one but merely
representative of the burgeoning youth movement that began to solidify in the mid-50s. In fact, Coontz
counts the institutionalization of the youth culture during the 1950s and early-60s as one of the
contradictions of the traditional 50s nuclear family (38). For a discussion about the youth movement’s
representation and role in 1960s television programming, see Aniko Bodroghkozy’s Groove Tube: Sixties
Television and the Youth Rebellion. Bodroghkozy highlights televisions ability to bring the world to the
viewer, making them more sophisticated citizens, at the same time it promoted isolation and “family
togetherness.” He also shows how, once the youth rebellion of the later 1960s began and the youth, who
were raised in front of the television, began to reject television as a legitimate medium, networks worked to
bring baby boomers back in front of the screen by including images and representations of the
counterculture and hot political issues.
5

the recently developed science known as ‘conservation’”—namely, “[a]ll the component
parts in the machinery of nature are dependent one upon the other” and that when human
beings, “the new geological force,” fail to recognize this, they are treading in dangerous
and destructive territory, not just for themselves but also the natural world. His primary
concerns lie in the implied effects of “the children of the earth,” because “each day in
every land they come, insistently in such numbers, the daily host reproducing the human
species the world over” (3). In 1960 Marion Clawson and others published Land for the
Future in which they undertake the task of figuring out how best to “reconcile the
demands that an advancing and dynamic civilization makes on land, within the
framework of a still spacious but no illimitable natural endowment” (18). “The Tragedy
of the Commons,” Garret Hardin’s 1968 essay, explores human beings’ hubris and the
embedded belief that they have the right to exploit and use up the earth’s resources and
space without much consideration for the far-reaching implications of that belief. Hardin
insists, “To couple the concept of freedom to breed with the belief that everyone born has
an equal right to the commons is to lock the world into a tragic course of action” (1246).
That is, to populate the earth with human beings who inherit the implicit belief that each
and every one of them has a birthright to a fixed and certain quantity of resources is to
intrinsically destroy an already limited cache.
These connections between population and environmental damage during the
postwar period are not incidental or even sporadic. 8 Of the period’s studies that connect
8

See also: William Vogt’s 1948 Road to Survival, Georg Bergstrom’s Too Many, published in 1969 and
The Hungry Planet, published in 1965. And for an extensive history of the various social and political
implications of population control around the world, see Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control
World Population by Matthew Connelly. The discussion of the population “problem” was also intimately
bound up in the controversy surrounding birth control methods, particularly the Pill. For a thorough
discussion on the history of birth control, see Lara V. Marks’ Sexual Chemistry: A History of the
Contraceptive Pill.
6

the marked increase in population with the destruction of the environment, arguably the
most famous and controversial is Paul Ehrlich’s 1968 The Population Bomb. The
population bomb was the idea that overpopulation—the fault of too many people
breeding more people exponentially—was the originary cause of the world’s
environmental problems. 9 The argument was in vogue in the years following the Second
World War. By using the word “bomb” in its title, Ehrlich encouraged a marked anxiety
toward the specter of too many people, invoking dire and absolutist nuclear imagery.
Consequently, biologists, sociologists, and historians presented a seemingly simple
solution to overcrowding and destruction of natural resources: curbing the world’s
population. This would assuage the damage being done to the planet and ensure that the
world’s food supplies would be able to sustain an already out of control global
population. In fact, 1972’s The Limits to Growth presents a mathematical model of
exponential population growth and resource usage in order to conclude: “If the present
growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, food production, and
resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached
sometime within the next one hundred years” (Meadows, et al. 23). More recent scholars
point out that the connection between population and resource scarcity is an
oversimplification of the matter, and expressing an anxiety about too many people often
borders closely on reinforcing elements of eugenics.10 Indeed, these are problems, but

9

For a discussion about the debate between Paul Ehrlich and Barry Commoner about the source of
environmental destruction in that period and the absurdity of even finding a “root cause,” see Jeffrey C.
Ellis’s “On the Search for a Root Cause: Essentialist Tendencies in Environmental Discourse.” For a
contemporary look at the feud, see Constance Holden, “Ehrlich vs. Commoner: An Environmental Fallout.”
10
Ehrlich answers the eugenics question in the section of the book entitled “What Can You Do?” by
accusing people who bring up eugenics as being eugenicists themselves. He advises that if anyone brings
up the eugenics question, namely the question of the “right” kind of people—the smart ones—being
allowed to breed, one should answer, amongst other things: “Anyone really concerned with raising the level
of intelligence in our population should fight to raise the environmental component. We know that drastic
7

despite everything Ehrlich misses in The Population Bomb, he does target Americans’
general material comfort, an inclination established during the postwar economy, and
their unending appetite for more and more as a large part of the globe’s environmental
problems:
We, of course, cannot remain affluent and isolated. At the moment the United
States uses about one-third of all the raw materials consumed each year. Think of
it: less than 1/15th of the population of the world requires about five times its ‘fair
share’ to maintain its inflated position. […] So, besides our own serious
population problem at home, we are intimately involved in the world crises. We
are involved through our import-export situation. We are involved because of the
possibilities of global ecological catastrophe, of global pestilence, and of global
thermonuclear war. (129)
I cite both Ehrlich’s and Meadows’ studies as representative of the rhetoric set forth in
the 1950s and 60s and carried on into the 1970s. At their most basic levels, both
examples illustrate the intermingling of concerns about reproduction and resource
(over)usage, and even if the direct correlation between population and dwindling
resources is currently uncertain, the present work values the contemporary debate,
opinion and scientific discourse as a means of uncovering the historical moment when the
issue became prescient. Perhaps the terms have changed, but the ideas about
sustainability remain prescient in our time. And if the specter of total annihilation was
prominent during the period, it was not necessarily always the threat of nuclear war that
increases can be made in one generation by improved home and school situation and in some cases
improved diet” (172). Focus on improving people’s environmental conditions now since worrying about
the intelligence of future human beings is futile. He also attempts to avoid the eugenics question by stating
that the relationship between birth rate and death rate is the most critical solution to the problem. If enough
people just die off, then we do not even have to worry about curbing our reproduction.
8

concerned commentators.
But Ehrlich’s mention of America’s affluence brings another important element
into the conversation about population and the environment—production and
consumption. In fact, the middle-class nuclear family of the postwar economy was often
centered around consumption.11 The period of unprecedented economic growth and
spread of American families after the Second World War exacerbated the problem of the
use of resources and the production of consumer products. It initiated the full embrace of
what Vance Packard in 1960’s The Waste Makers calls the “throwaway spirit.” 12 Much
of the problem of a consumer society, one in which all citizens are expected to participate
fully, is the residual effects. This means that consumerism is merely one component in
an entire cycle. After an item has been produced, the persuasion of the consumer leads to
the purchase of the item, after which, according to Packard, comes the waste.13 Packard
argues: “If you are a producer, and most families already own your product, you are left

11

For a recent study about the ecological impact of consumption in economies and ecosystems around the
world, see Peter Dauvergne’s The Shadows of Consumption.
12
Interestingly, Packard’s solution to the “throwaway spirit” and the rapid depletion of resources is to
return to a sense of prudence and restraint in purchasing and value the quality of consumer goods over
quantity and disposability—both actions urged by contemporary sustainability initiatives.
13
Vance Packard’s earlier study, 1957’s The Hidden Persuaders exposes the underlying consequences of
consumerism in the Cold War period—consumers are often “tricked” into buying more and more by the
producers, leading to the waste of more and more. The premise of The Hidden Persuaders is that the
people in charge of advertising “are systematically feeling out our hidden weaknesses and frailties in the
hope that they can more effectively influence our behavior” (5). Packard identifies the eight “hidden
needs” to which advertisers attempt to appeal when they target consumers. Among these “needs” are:
“emotional security,” “reassurance of wealth,” “a sense of roots,” and “immortality” (72-81). I highlight
these particular needs because they clearly appeal to people who seek security and containment. Packard’s
indictment of the “hidden persuaders” housed within the advertising industry paints a picture of consumers
who are under the duress of clandestine controls. Advertisements for the latest kitchen gadget or
automobile appeal to a consumer’s sense of self-worth and need to participate as a citizen in a consumer
society. Packard also published The Sexual Wilderness in 1968. He prefers to call the “normlessness” of
heterosexual relationships in the 1960s a “sexual wilderness” as a opposed to the “sexual revolution”—a
telling modification. Amongst the factors that Packard recognizes as changing the sexual landscape for
young heterosexuals is the prevalence of technology in everyday lives. This caused the homes to shift
“from being a production center to being a service station,” in which “many homemakers are hard put to
consider themselves fully employed unless they follow the models in the television ads and keep their
floors and glassware gleaming, or unless they get heavily involved in chauffeuring children” (23).
9

with three possibilities for making further sales: You sell replacements; you sell more
than one item to each family; or you dream up a new or improved product—or one that at
least seems new or improved—that will enchant families that already own an ‘old’ model
of your product” (12).14 The cycle of persuasion, purchase, use, and disposal is selfperpetuating and seemingly never-ending. “New and improved” is an inevitable step in
the process and the urgency presented alongside various products made families believe
immediate ownership was imperative. In other words, growing families required
(needed? merely desired?) the latest and best products—automobiles, refrigerators,
furniture, clothing, televisions, and infant accoutrement—for their homes.15 Production
and use of these items required resources and energy, and once they were used up, they
had to go somewhere.
But the cycle of consumption and waste did not merely relate to the production
and sale of consumer products. It also applied to the move into the suburbs and the use
of land. As families grew, they required space, and the move into the suburbs influenced
how the actual landscape was transformed. In The Squeeze, published in 1960, Edward
Higbee argues that suburbia, which has the one advantage of the “saving grace of space,”
“has put the city’s rootless ones back in contact with their own pieces of the bulldozed
land” (89). Without much irony, Higbee suggests:

14

Environmentalist Wendell Berry identifies the problem of consumption as such: “But our waste problem
is not the fault only of producers. It is the fault of an economy that is wasteful from top to bottom—a
symbiosis of an unlimited greed at the top and a lazy, passive, and self-indulgent consumptiveness at the
bottom—and all of us are involved in it” (127). We are implicated in the processes of waste, from
government to producer to consumer, and escaping this cycle of waste appears to be impossible. See also
Kenneth Boulding’s essay 1966 “The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth” for a discussion on the
ecological implications of “closed” and “open” (or “spaceman” and “cowboy”) economies.
15
Historians have suggested that the prevalence of the automobile in the postwar period took courtship out
of the home and into the back alleys, parking lots, and drive-in movies. The ubiquitous backset became a
cultural marker of sexual awakening and initiation. This suggests, then, a further connection between
heterosexual sex, technological progress and the resulting pollution.
10

suburbia is essentially the nation’s year-round residential nursery, riding high on
the bottom of human multiplication and the protective instincts of parents who
want to give their spawn a sporting chance. It is today’s response to the age-old
nesting urge which, from the beginning of time, has been the important business
of living things. Newly married parents stick to fundamentals. Instinctively
discounting world-shaking threats of holocaust each young couple seeks a plot of
earth on which it may rear its own. That is the essence of suburbia’s popularity.
(89-90)
Here is the enactment of Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons”—these newlyweds embody
humanity’s supposedly innate desire to possess and manipulate a piece of earth. From
Higbee’s point of view, the suburbs provided security for the “spawn” of the newlyweds.
They also sought containment, to invoke Alan Nadel’s phrase, both physical and
psychological, away from the threat of nuclear holocaust and even diversity, since the
“residential nursery” of the suburbs bred sameness and stagnancy. The focus here was on
the children, their health and maintenance as well as their proliferation. The suburbs
were built specifically to house these efficiently breeding couples and all of the stuff they
brought with them or purchased while there.
The politically sanctioned (and culturally applied) policy of containment is the
focus of Nadel’s influential Containment Culture. Nadel argues that the idea that “[T]he
American Cold War is a particularly useful example of the power of large cultural
narratives to unify, codify, and contain—perhaps intimidate—the personal narratives of a
population” (4). Nadel further suggests that certain narrow tropes do much of the work
of perpetuating these larger narratives. These tropes are invasive and persistent, and
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assist “narratives that by virtue of their repetition seem ‘natural,’ like clichés, and, like
‘common sense,’ refer to what everyone ‘knows’ is true” (8). Nadel’s use of the term
“natural” should not be taken for granted here. It represents a recognition that in the Cold
War period certain cultural narratives came to be accepted as the standard and went for a
time without serious questioning or revision. Acquiescence to narratives about sexuality
and the environment indicated a larger moment of delusion. To normalize narratives of
sexuality, i.e. heterosexuality within marriage as the only acceptable form of sexual
expression, and of the environment, i.e. land and natural resources were limitless and
exclusively existed for consumption by humans, means the foreclosure, or at least the
quieting, of dissenting points of view. Significant to my project, Nadel uses the trope of
the closet to describe “a nuclear gaze” which sought “the difference between dangerous
and nondangerous activity, universal and specific jurisdiction, containment and
proliferation” and resulted in a prohibition of “actions with ambiguous motives” (24). In
these estimations, security is bound up in the nuclear gaze, obsessed with
heteronormativity, domesticity, and the attainment of possessions without much
examination of the environmental impact. Narratives of insecurity and apocalypse, then,
centered on distrust of those who refused to participate in what May recognizes as the
“civic duty” of consuming and reproducing. These dominant narratives, Nadel
concludes, ultimately fail because the pairs within the marked binaries they reinforce are
always aware of and dependent upon each other.
Despite the seemingly ubiquitous presence of the Mom, Pop and all the Little
Ones and their tendency to waste, the discourse presented by these Cold War scholars
reveals a telling dissension in the often-unquestioned dominance of the nuclear family of
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popular imagination. For these reasons, I find the Cold War era a particularly fruitful
period in which to investigate the intersections between America’s population boom, the
proliferation and establishment of the contained nuclear family, and the environmental
problems that came about as a result of the population increase and the embrace of a
consumer attitude. Despite the voices that spoke out against overpopulation and
environmental damage and because of the need for security (whether real or imagined) in
the postwar world, the nuclear family, headed by its heterosexual, companionate couple,
remained the dominant paradigm of suitableness and social acceptability. Elaine Tyler
May, in her influential Homeward Bound, aptly points out that procreation in Cold War
America “symbolized hope for the future” as well as reinforced a heterosexual couple’s
participation and endorsement of “civic values” (120). Parents participated in what May
calls “domestic containment” as a means of strengthening governmental and socially
sanctioned narratives of “the consumer choice model” that in turn valued multiple
children and copious consumption of products (140). Girding one’s loins against the
onslaught of communism and nuclear war is done through an embrace of social
normativity and the purchase of goods. “A home filled with children would create a
feeling of warmth and security against the cold forces of disruption and alienation,” with
sexual nonreproduction and homosexuality (though not necessarily the same thing)
among these dangerous forces (17). May’s suggestion that the “thwarted expectations”
of parents often played into family planning is a significant one. Procreation was state
sanctioned, in other words—acceptable and expected.
But the use of consumer products is not the only sort of environmental destruction
that took place in the postwar period; the abuse of land was apparent and other natural
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resources were widely affected too. Adam Rome’s 2001 The Bulldozer in the
Countryside addresses the questions of land use both historically and materially by
tracing the roots of the environmental movement in America. He argues that the
movement is a direct response to population growth, a rise in affluence, and the new
construction techniques in construction experienced in the years after World War II.
Rome demonstrates that the postwar housing and baby booms involved a seemingly
endless, destructive method, wherein one’s lifestyle encompassed all manner of
environmental disruption, so that “the single-family home with a full complement of
consumer goods had become the most common image of ‘the American way of life.’ Yet
the image of a mass consumer culture could only become reality with mass production of
housing” (37). “Because the cheapest and largest tracts of land lay at the urban fringe,”
suburban sprawl became primarily responsible for the leveling of wilderness spaces and
landscapes, the disruption of natural flows of water, the pollution of groundwater from
complex sanitary systems, and the demand for new energy sources, strip mining
specifically. Sprawl also brought an onslaught of automobiles and the highways as well
as other disposable household good into some considered untouched countryside (42).
Rome aptly points out, suburban sprawl because of the “unprecedented demand of new
families for space, the concern to smooth the return of veterans to civilian life, the fear of
a postwar depression […] To preserve social order, to give the average work a chance to
own property, to provide a healthy environment for children, and to stimulate the
economy” (34). That means all aspects of this environmental destruction were socially
and governmentally sanctioned. More people meant the need for more housing, leading
to the destruction of more land and the use of more resources. As I see it, this correlation
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between the proliferation of the nuclear family and the spread into “virgin” lands equals
the recognition by queer ecocriticism of the destruction of natural resources and abuse of
the land itself.

THE (UN)NATURALNESS OF BEING
Therefore, as the dominant narrative, heteronormativity served in this period as
the only “natural” form of sexual expression, and the church, the government, and
popular culture openly sanctioned and supported it. Its opposite in the binary, its
“unnatural” twin, was homosexuality, and homosexuals were increasingly visible after
the Second World War.16 The open policing, punishment and persecution of
homosexuals were some of the main reasons for their increased visibility, and the “threat”
they posed to national security, the nuclear family, and the production-consumption
narrative is significant to considerations of queer ecology.17 Both queer theory and
ecocriticism have something to contribute to this discussion of Cold War
heteronormativity and environmental disaster. Queer ecology works to challenge the
connection between homosexuality and unnaturalness at the same time it critiques the
normalization of heterosexuality. Although the two phrases are not interchangeable,
“normal” and “natural” share a deep-seated relationship with the interplay of the
16

In fact, as Jonathan Ned Katz indicates, shortly after their invention, the terms “heterosexual” and
“homosexual” both indicated pathologies in the early twentieth century. “Heterosexual” was invented to
define nonprocreative sex between two people of the opposite sex. The debate about the term grew in the
1940s and 50s when “sex-liberals strove to expand the heterosexual ideal to include within the boundaries
of the normal a wider-than-ever range of gender ideals and nonprocreative, premarital, and extramarital
behavior” (96).
17
Andil Gosine illustrates that “overpopulation” caused by the reproductive sex between non-white people
and sex between men as a way of uncovering three elements of the discourse of hegemonic, white
heteronormativity: “their commitment to projects of white nation-building; their use of linked arguments
about public safety and morality to make claims about the dangers that non-white heterosexual and
homosexual sex pose to nature; and their denial of the erotic, through their insistent nonrecognition of
sexual desire and of sexual acts as pleasurable” (150).
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nature/culture divide.
From the efforts to find the “gay gene” and consequently some biological
explanation (justification?) for homosexuality to the religious and social debate about
whether homosexuality is somehow “against nature,” the idea of a normal or natural
sexuality even exists reveals what is at the heart of the nature-culture debate in
ecocriticism: whether or not the “natural world” even exists outside of the cultural
construction.18 Or, as Jeffrey Weeks points out, “Sexuality is as much about language as
it is about the sexual organs” and the “paradox of sexual identities is that they are both
artificial and essential, arbitrary but forceful, invented categories that nevertheless
provide the basic directions by which we navigate the shoals of personal need and social
relationships” (3, 5). Put another way, Roger N. Lancaster, addressing evolutionary
psychology’s attempts to “explain the emergence of supposedly universal human
characteristics,” makes this argument: “‘Human nature,’ it would seem, actually admits
the most variegated of practices—even for those societies supposedly nearest the baseline
of human origin stories. There is no reason to suppose that this splendid variety is not the
real plotline of a plausible story of human evolution” (49, 51). 19 In other words,
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It is not my intention nor do I have the space here to trace the different distinctions between biology and
culture. For discussions about the scientific attempts at uncovering the “gay gene” and questions about
what “makes” people homosexual, see: Dean Hamer’s The Science of Desire: The Search for the Gay Gene
and the Biology of Behavior, Simon LeVay’s Queer Science: The Use and Abuse of Research into
Homosexuality and Timothy Murphy’s Gay Science: The Ethics of Sexual Orientation Research. For a
critique of biological determinism and the need to find a “gay gene,” see Dorothy Nelkin’s and M. Susan
Lindee’s “Creating Natural Distinctions.” Additionally, for discussions about the prevalence of
homosexual or queer behavior in the other-than-human world, see: Bruce Bagemihl’s Biological
Exuberance: Animal Homosexuality and Natural Diversity and Joan Roughgarden’s Evolution’s Rainbow:
Diversity, Gender, and Sexuality in Nature and People. For a critique of the heterosexist tendencies in
sexual studies of biology, see Bonnie B. Spanier’s “‘Lessons’ from ‘Nature’: Gender Ideology and Sexual
Ambiguity in Biology.” Noreen Giffney’s and Myra J. Hird’s essay collection Queering the Non/Human
also takes on the intersections of queerness, questions of normativity, and studies of the non-human.
19
Weeks further explains that the cultural meanings of different sexualities and perceptions of sexualities
are so diverse that “it is pointless discussing questions such as, what are the origins of homosexual
oppression, or what is the nature of homosexual taboo, as it there was a single causative factor” (15).
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perceptions of sexualities and of naturalness are always bound up in both constructed and
intrinsic definitions, often having to do more with fear stemming from unfamiliarity than
with any real threat.
What queer ecology works against is the intrinsic containment of either ecologies
or sexualities. Katie Hogan argues for the existence of an “everyday eugenics” that
often flows from protectionist discourses of nature and the environment, it is vital
to analyze the ideologies and cultural myths informing representations of rural
and urban nature and environments. Such work broadens our understanding of
who and what deserves environmental freedom, so that queer bodies, sexualities,
and cultures are seen as worthy of ecological and cultural protection on par with
urban national parks and wilderness areas. (245) 20
Protection is key here. The phobias that originate from anxiety of the uncontained, and
the inestimable boundaries presented not just by the nature world but by queerness go a
long way in revealing and enforcing the recognition of naturalized and normalized ways
of being. The fear associated with both the wild, natural world and the “unnaturalness”
of queerness stems from fear of the very spontaneity that makes the fluidity and
reinterpretation of these definitions possible. For centuries in America, fear of the natural
world stemmed from ideas of the wilderness, that space out there, the other than human,
dark and unknown. The wilds—the forests and rivers, mountains and open plains—were
a source of anxiety for some inhabitants and motivated them to attempt to actively
Rather, Weeks suggests an interrogation the specific forms of the regulation of sexualities because this get
at the heart of the debate over what caused some societies to accept homosexuality and others to police it.
20
In “Sex at the Limits,” an article about the normalizing discourse used in environmentalist thought,
Catriona Sandilands highlights the way rhetoric about population management is tied into “globalizing
environmentality, and that enrivonmentality is inextricably linked to capital” (90). This is reason, perhaps,
that “if the problem of population is simply one of ‘too many people’, then why not encourage a greater
variety of non-heterosexual, non-reproductive sexual practices?” (91).
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contain that which was not human. Rigid definition of the natural world cannot and does
not exist. The unpredictability of natural forces, e.g. the weather, makes certain that
humans are constantly challenged in their approaches to containment.21
Likewise, queerness often resists definitive borders. Queerness’s main
characteristic is its flexibility and ability to take on varying features. Whether this
involves non-normative (non-monogamous, non-heterosexual) or gay and lesbian
sexualities, queerness represents a gamut of activities and identities that does not
necessarily fit neatly within the nuclear family model of companionate marriage. 22 The
distrust of that which is uncontrollable, i.e. the panic associated with the non-procreative
“spread” of queerness and the relaxed barriers associated with openness of variable
sexualities, is represented by queerness’s permeable boundaries. Guy Hocquenghem’s
characterization of the fear of homosexual desire is “the ungenerating-ungenerated terror
of the family, because it produces itself without reproducing. Every homosexual must
thus see himself as the end of the species, the termination of a process for which he is not
21

Bill McKibben’s influential The End of Nature argues that the idea that nature “takes forever” is
essentially incorrect. He cautions that this “reassuring sense of a timeless future” is a “delusion” (5). What
McKibben is getting at is that we are speeding up the destruction of nature, and “[o]ur comforting sense of
the permanence of our natural world, our confidence that it will change gradually and imperceptibly if at
all” is a fatal mistake on our parts (7-8). McKibben echoes Rachel Carson’s idea that time is scarce in the
modern world and that “the contamination of man’s total environment” offers just as much threat at nuclear
warfare (Silent Spring 8). McKibben recognizes that invention of nuclear weaponry as the “beginning of
the end of nature,” because it gave humankind that ability to “overmaster nature, to leave an indelible
imprint everywhere all at once” (66).
22
Some scholars have even gone so far as to suggest that monogamy, defined as one individual mating
exclusively with only one other individual, goes against human beings’ “natural” state. David Barash’s The
Myth of Monogamy uses examples of promiscuity in the animal world in order to illustrate that there is no
“natural” model for human’s monogamous behaviors. Barash ultimately concludes, “there is no evidence,
either from biology, primatology, or anthropology, that monogamy is somehow ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ for
human beings,” at the same time “human inclinations may be able to fit whatever matrimonial patterns
exist in the society they happen to experience” (153). An interesting proposition, yes, but the major flaw in
Barash’s research lies in his reinforcement of the nature/culture split. Therefore, according to Barash,
primates are animals, animals are symbols of the natural world, and primate are not monogamous, therefore
the natural world does not support patterns of monogamy. There is much to be said for the normalizing
and naturalizing effects of dominant, hegemonic culture, I think, and we should not ignore them in order to
uncover patterns of “normalness” represented in the natural world. See also the more recent Sex at Dawn:
The Prehistoric Origins of Modern Sexuality by Christopher Ryan and Cacilda Jetha.
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responsible and which must stop at himself. […] The homosexual can only be a
degenerate because he does not generate—he is only the artistic end to a species” (107-8,
my emphases). That is, homosexuals (and queers) are threatening because they
proliferate but not through the “natural” avenues of procreation. Moreover, the way
Hocquenghem articulates a spatialization of homosexual temporality is through the idea
of the “non-limitative horizontal relations” rather than the “hierarchical succession” that
implies heterosexual reproduction (109). Erotophobia, homophobia, and ecophobia, all
of which are defined briefly below, are all born from this exact narrative—the narrative
of unrestrained and “messy” movement from one generation (i.e., creation) into the
next.23
The “messiness” of the natural world and queer is manifested theorizations of
queer ecocriticism, and before applying it in its critical scope, I lay the groundwork of the
brief history of queer ecology’s theoretical qualities. The thing that appears to link each
theoretical framework centers on the idea of fear. The link between the devaluation and
subordination of women, nature, and queers is one of the discourses that rule on
heteronormativity, and it affects the ways in which narratives about the environment and
sexuality are conveyed. Greta Gaard, in “Toward a Queer Ecofeminism,” suggests that a
“democratic, ecological society envisioned as the goal of ecofeminism will, of necessity,
be a society that values sexual diversity and the erotic” (22). Gaard argues that a
regularized valuation of masculinized and normative human desires over natural
23

Another contemporary commentary on sexuality and its “naturalness” lies in John McPartland’s 1947 Sex
in Our Changing World. McPartland identifies the “prime functions” of human sexuality, with the desire
to produce children foremost amongst them. Birth control, McPartland argues, disrupts these perfectly
“natural” functions and replaces them with “pseudofunctions”: “physical satisfaction, the gratification of an
emotionally erotic complex which may be principally infantile, and an artificially evaluated form of the
third prime function—that of selection and competition” (110, 111). His further argument that birth control
produces a “third sex”—“women who are sexually desirable, but who do not bear children”—echoes the
rhetoric of homosexuality as being a third gender (111).
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processes has resulted in the subordination of a feminized and sexualized earth. The
subordination justifies erotophobia, which in turn reinforces the “natural/unnatural
dichotomy.” Gaard notices that “[a]ttempts to naturalize one form of sexuality function
as attempts to foreclose investigation of sexual diversity and sexual practices and gain
control of the discourse on sexuality,” making these attempts at naturalization the
manifestation of combined homophobia and erotophobia (29).
Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands takes Gaard’s concept of erotophobia one step
further by relating it “to the regulation of sexual diversity; normative heterosexuality,
especially in its links to science and nature, has the effect of regulating and
instrumentalizing sexuality, linking it to truth and evolutionary health rather than to
pleasure and fulfillment” (“Desiring Nature” 180). Suggesting a solution to the issue of
erotophobia, Sandilands sees touch as “non-teleological, more part of a disruption than a
continuation. As a central practice of an erotogenic ethics, touch is both transgressive
and creative. […] it ignites a knowledge of the other that is profoundly different from
vision” (186). Erotophobia, then, denies other modes of physical contact by possessing a
preoccupation with a death that can be remedied by procreation. The “de-eroticization”
and “heterosexualization” of both the human and natural world, according to MortimerSandilands, is the chief obstruction to free sexual expression, and the solution is an
emphasis on touch, “an erotics of play, spontaneity, and disruption” in which “teleology
gives way to unpredictability, and a naturalized normative heterosexual penetration to a
desire to multiply queer the everyday world of tactile sensibility” (187).24 This emphasis
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Connecting this spontaneity to the natural world, Chaia Heller identifies a “principle of differentiation”
that constitutes “a “flexibility, spontaneity, and creativity which allows organisms to deviate from
established patterns or norms” (126). The principle, one of the elements of the “eco-erotic,” moves toward
a “process of spontaneous complexification” that emphasizes a process of becoming (127). Beings do not
20

on touch without reproduction and the currency of the deployment of touch introduces
the possibilities of a complex matrix of desire. Queer touch, that is, touch that does not
result in reproduction, is concurrent with the instability and volatility of nature, featuring
possibilities outside the paradigm of what is considered “natural” and “unnatural.”
Additionally, Simon Estok suggests a study of ecophobia, which is related to
homophobia in the recognition that “ecophobia is rooted in and dependent on
anthropocentric arrogance and speciesism, on the ethical position that humanity is outside
of and exempt from the laws of nature” (217). I would argue that much of this
“anthropocentric arrogance” is tied into a widespread naturalization of consumption and
reproduction, which not only assumes that a consumer lifestyle and the production of
offspring is desirable, logical, and normal but also often ignores the environmental
impact and strain put upon resources which is directly formed by the aspiration to own
stuff and make the future generations which consumer and reproduce in an endless cycle.
But an easy equation between heterosexuality/ procreation/ overpopulation/
environmental destruction and homosexuality/ non-procreation/ population control/
environmental friendliness is decidedly not the answer. Instituting these binaries is not
only counterproductive to the project of queer ecocriticism because it is too confining but
it is also destructive. Opening up enquiries requires opening. Rigid divisions between
people who procreate and those who do not or cannot draw false lines between the
“right” acting environmental players and those who do not control their procreation.
Ecocriticism has already identified a politics of becoming, a productive and creative
means of reproducing without reproduction. Becoming erases the restrictive boundaries

then have to reproduce through traditional means, i.e. vaginal penetration. Becoming, then, is the
continuing process by which queerness is linked with the spontaneity and possibility of the natural.
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of heteronormativity at the same time it does not fully foreclose those possibilities.
One way of opening up enquiries is through literary criticism. For decades,
ecocriticism and queer theory have been used separately as points through which to
examine literature, and the move to unite them ensures promising readings in the future.
But up to now, there have been few extensive studies of queer ecocriticism and its
applicability as literary criticism, leaving a large gap in the nascent theory’s treatment.
For this reason, I reveal the tropes that make a literary reading using queer ecocriticism
possible. The most basic element of a queer ecological reading, as I have already
illustrated, comes down to challenging the naturalization and normalization of certain
dominant, cultural narratives and the institution of fear of otherness. The means of
achieving this general questioning of normalized and naturalized narratives are diverse,
and the main expression comes in the valorization or at least acknowledgement of the
legitimacy of other forms of sexuality that fall outside of the model of monogamous,
heterosexual activities that results in reproduction. One way of imagining alternative
modes of creative reproduction is through recognition of family and social units that
deviate from the standard nuclear model.25
A queer ecocritical reading also takes into account not just homosexual behaviors,
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In fact, Margaret Mead, in a chapter entitled “Our Complex American Culture,” makes an important
observation: experiences are so diverse within American families that we cannot and should not draw
definitive lines about genuine or expected American familial experience. No two families behave alike nor
have the same habits and opinions nor does the child “see any such harmonious, repetitive behaviour”
(251). In other words, when it comes to families, diversity and difference appear to be the norm. Further,
Mead observes, “The behaviour of each American is itself a composite, an imperfectly realized version, of
the behaviour of many voices and many ways, not a single model—expressed in many voices and many
ways, but still a single model—but a hundred models, each an individually developed style, lacking the
authenticity, the precision, of a group style” (252). Lacking in “precision” and “authenticity,” according to
Mead, the American family takes whatever form it sees fit. Mead’s evaluation of the American self as a
multi-layered and many-voiced amalgamation echoes not just the American melting-pot, an idiom widely
accepted in popular thought, but also the idea that the institution of the family, the family unit itself,
functions (or should function) in much the same way—as a unit with a hundred examples on which to
model itself (or from which to deviate and redefine) rather than a singular one.
22

which are most closely associated with the term queerness, but also heterosex that does
not necessarily result in procreation. Play, touch, and erotic contact fall into this category
because, as mentioned above, they suspend the boundaries between varied and separate
experiences. Also under consideration here are homosocial associations, those
relationships that might foreclose heterosexuality but do not inevitably result in sexual
activity. Queerness’s fluidity lends itself to the readings of the varying modes of
sexuality, and at the same time considerations of ecocriticism, which examines the
interdependency between the human and other-than-human worlds, can easily dissolve
rigid definitions.
Because queer ecocritical readings acknowledge the presence and acceptability of
the modes outside of heterosexual reproduction and sometimes even question the
necessity of reproduction, there is an acknowledged diminution in the valorization of the
production of biological children. Queer ecocriticism’s concern with children centers on
the rigidity of the pattern of reproduction and futurism. 26 The cyclical motion of birthmarriage-reproduction-death signifies a “natural” sequence, but it is also restrictive in
many ways. The heteronormative, dominant narratives value stability and constancy, a
constant motioning toward the future. In 1949’s Male and Female, Margaret Mead
identifies the American family’s tendency to look toward the future, “towards what the
children may become, not towards a perpetuation of the past of the stabilization of the
26

For evidence of this turn toward reproductive futurism in the mainstream environmental movement, one
only need to look at PSAs designed to urge people to “save the planet” for the “sake of the children” or
“future generations.” Perhaps this is possibly the only way the environmental movement can appeal to the
mainstream—through their guilt as not only stewards of the earth in charge of preserving for the sake of the
future but also as people who should be producing the people who will populate the future. It is, if nothing
else, a vicious cycle. See also Noel Sturgeon’s “‘The Power is Yours, Planeteers!’: Race, Gender, and
Sexuality in Children’s Environmentalist Popular Culture” or the more recent “Penguin Family Values: The
Nature of Planetary Environmental Reproductive Justice” for an insightful discussion about how
heterocentrist (and racist) rhetoric underlies popular children’s entertainment through naturalized roles for
men and women and a narrow definition of family.
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present” (253). These children will “repeat the parental way of life,” continuing the cycle
of marriage and childbearing with very little variation since “we can follow with fair
accuracy the picture of this assumed development—the recommended, applauded,
underlined pattern” (253, 263). This is an attitude echoed by Lee Edelman’s 2004 No
Future, an oft-debated study about queerness’s connection to the death drive. Edelman
calls for an inquiry into a “reproductive futurism” in which the “Child remains the
perpetual horizon of every acknowledged politics, the fantasmic beneficiary of every
political intervention” (2-3).27 The Child is for Edelman an archetype, “an erotically
charged investment in the rigid sameness of identity that is central to the compulsory
narrative of reproductive futurism” (21). The problem for queers in this equation is that
“queerness names the side of those not ‘fighting for the children,’ the side outside the
consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive futurism” (3).
Edelman’s oppositionality is not without issues, but it does point out one essential
element of queer ecocriticism to my mind: the fixation is not on reproduction for the sake
of inheritance.
Therefore, a queer ecocritical temporality does not necessarily foreclose the future
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Tim Dean, in his critique of Edelman’s No Future, suggests the origins of the notion of creative
becoming, queerness’s answer to the restrictions of nonreproduction, lie in the multiplicity of Deleuze and
Guattari’s conception of the rhizome:
Whereas the latter insists that every notion of futurity remains hostage to heteronormativity,
Deleuze elaborates through the concept of becoming what might be called a queer notion of
futurity. As a ceaseless movement of being that is not coordinated by teleology or development,
becoming never results in anything resembling an identity. In the process of differentiating
becoming from evolution (and hence from the whole problematic of reproduction), Deleuze and
Guattari characterize it in terms of ‘creative involution’: Becoming entails not reproduction—
reproducing in the future a version of what exists in the present—but what might be called
nonreproductive, nonapocalyptic invention. (135)
In adopting this model of becoming, queerness is not necessarily implicated in non-(re)production; rather,
queerness comes to signify the possibility of (re)production without the destruction and control implicated
in heteronormativity and the cycle of production-consumption. Another study that takes on Edelman’s
argument and states that queer theory should look toward the future is José Esteban Muñoz’s Cruising
Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity.
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but rather values temporalities outside this consideration. Consequently, sanctioned
reproduction and the contingent ecological destruction often generated by the hubris of
human dominance, succession, and consumption runs counter to the idea of “queer time”
as having creative solutions to the birth, marriage, reproduction, death narrative.
Namely, I adopt Judith Halberstam’s notions of queer time, which she argues “develop, at
least in part, in opposition to the institutions of family, heterosexuality, and reproduction”
(1). 28 Queer time is in direct opposition to “family time” or “repro-time,” a temporality
that emphasizes not only the endless cycling and scheduling of daily life that revolves
around children (as well as the work needed to support those children) but also the “time
of inheritance” which “refers to an overview of generational time within which values,
wealth, goods, and morals are passed through family ties from one generation to the next”
(5).29 Repro-time is invested in an almost unchanging cycle of birth, courtship, marriage,
child-rearing and death that is constantly accounting for and looking toward the future,
i.e. children, as the natural route for humans to take. Interesting, Halberstam also
identifies the way heteronormative models of time are bound up in the possession of
products and the constancy of one’s influence over the next generation. It is a restrictive
28

Regarding the issue of queer families and reproduction/adoption by gay and lesbian couples, Valerie
Lehr cautions that the “politics of inclusion” uncovers “norms that are embedded in family ideology have
been continually present as a divisive force”: “Only by understanding conflicts—such as whether
homosexuality is a natural, essential part of the self; how gender and sexuality are connected; and whether
monogamy and maturity are linked—are connected to dominant constructions of appropriate family can we
begin to move beyond them, offering instead a different vision of self, relationships, and politics centered
on creating neither a unified gay family nor private families” (44).
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According to Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, “The disciplinary methods reveal a linear time
whose moments are integrated, one upon another, and which is orientated towards a terminal, stable point;
in short, an ‘evolutive’ time. But it must be recalled that, at the same moment, the administrative and
economic techniques of control reveal a social time of a serial, orientated cumulative type: the discovery of
an evolution in terms of ‘progress’” (160). I find this quite ironic in imagining the restrictive sense of
linear time. In a similar vein, Baudrillard states, “It is evident that objects are never offered for
consumption in absolute disorder. They may, in certain cases, imitate disorder the better to seduce, but
they are always arranged to mark out directive paths, to orientate the purchasing impulse towards networks
of objects in order to captivate that impulse and bring it, in keeping with its own logic, to the highest degree
of commitment, to the limits of its economic potential” (27). Consumerism, then, is bound up in a similar
linear narrative of time.
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sense of inheritance, to say the least. Queer time, then, is not progressive, moving toward
an objective and fixating on the forward motion into the future; it is shiftier than that. It
does not restrict the same way Halberstam’s repro-time or the ever-cycling narrative of
production-consumption confine. It allows for an accumulation of time unconcerned
with an end result.30
The other oppressive narrative that queer ecology critiques is that of the cycle of
production-consumption. It is a restrictive and recurring system of use, abuse and waste.
In a very real sense, this is the system that is implicated in much of the environmental
destruction that occurred after the Second World War. Steven Miles argues there was
“not merely a consumer society, but a consumer culture” in the Post-Fordist period (9).
The distinction Miles makes between society and culture emphasizes that after World
War II, “consumption no longer appeared to be determined by the producer. On the
contrary, the producer was increasingly subject to the demands and tastes of the
consumer” (9). The production-consumption of the postwar period correlates with the
booms in both population and the economy after World War II.31
30

Although Dianne Chisholm’s Queer Constellations is about queer urban spaces and the use of city sites
for the deployment of queer desire primarily, I find her adoption of Benjamin’s dialectical in the form of
what she calls “queer constellations” useful. Queer constellations are “dialectical images” that emerge
through “literary montage, the flaneur and flanerie, the boheme, allegory, porosity, topographical memory,
and monadology” (10). These images, Chisholm explains, “[i]nstead of punctuating the narrative of
progress they blast it apart, reassembling fragments of collective history into dialectical images” as well as
“[s]mashing dominant narrative and dominated space into montage” (30). Accordingly, queer
constellations introduce the importance of fragmentation and reassembly, of physical spaces and fluidity,
and of destroying often oppressive narratives of, in this case, heteronormativity.
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Jean Baudrillard views the cycle in a slightly different way. He emphasizes the consumer’s desire to not
just demand products and use them up but also to create something wholly different in the process of use:
The consumer society needs its objects in order to be. More precisely, it needs to destroy them.
The use of objects leads only to their dwindling disappearance. The value created is much more
intense in violent loss. This is why destruction remains the fundamental alternative to production:
consumption is merely an intermediate term between the two. There is a profound tendency
within consumption for it to surpass itself, to transfigure itself in destruction. (47, emphases in
original)
Baudrillard does not see consumption as the end result of production. Rather, the destruction of consumer
items only highlights their usefulness as things able to be destroyed and disposed of. Baudrillard’s
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But queer ecology also acknowledges the impact and effect of all people on the
Earth. 32 It is not just reproductive couples that inhabit and utilize the planet but queers as
well. Therefore, I do not suggest that queers are somehow instilled with some mystical
or exclusive knowledge about the environment; rather, they might be more likely to
recognize the management of space, and in particular natural spaces, because of their
status as outsiders. Consequently, an essential part of the policing of queer sexuality is
the creation of specific spaces into which the oppressed are thrust. While these spaces
are produced as a way of keeping queerness away from the eyes of mainstream propriety
and also of maintaining control, queers often adopt and adapt these spaces for their own
ends. In establishing and adopting spaces for their own occupation, as Gordon Brent
Ingram argues, queers can institute possibilities for liberation and community-building,
“at least in terms of greater visibility, some increase in freedom of behaviour, and the
lowering of perceived risk of assault or other forms of repression” (95). Specifically,
Ingram refers to outdoor space as particularly strategic to queers because it is “almost a
home, because there are few other places to go” (101).33 Ingram further suggests that as a
recognition of the “dwindling disappearance” and “violent loss” of consumer goods is an essential part of
gauging the attitude with which consumers engage with products. For my purposes, however, I adopt the
phrase “production-consumption” to describe the phenomenon of a cyclical and ultimately environmentally
unsound practice.
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On the question of what queer ecology should “do,” Timothy Morton remarks on how “[I]nstead of
reducing everything to sameness, ecological interdependence multiplies differences everywhere” (“Guest
Column” 277). Also, “[q]ueer ecology would go to the end and show how beings exist precisely because
they are nothing but relationality, deep down—for the love of matter” (277).
33
Several authors (like Lillian Faderman and George Chauncey, amongst others) have written histories
detailing the adoption and use of urban spaces for the establishment of gay and lesbian communities.
During the 1970s, with the rise of the feminist movement, the “Back to Land” movement drew lesbians into
rural spaces in an attempt to live outside of mainstream, patriarchal and consumer-driven American society.
See specifically Sandilands, “Lesbian Separatist Communities” in which she argues: “Some women have
actively appropriate a normative idea of ‘nature’ for a lesbian sexuality societally deemed ‘unnatural’; For
others, this has involved carving out an idea of ‘natured’ female sexuality in defiance of what they seen as
n urban-masculine patriarchal sexuality. The demarcation of a land as lesbian only has created for others a
safe space for outdoor sexual activities that would be extremely risky elsewhere; some emphasized the
affirming importance of a nature space where lesbians could have sex in semipublic without the risk of
violence, and others saw outdoor sex as a particular way of connecting with nature. Indeed some women
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science, landscape ecology offers insight into the cultural dimensions of ecosystems. For
this reason, it is important to consider landscape ecology’s particular vocabulary and its
relationship to the formation of communities. Borrowing from that vocabulary, Ingram
suggests a term such as “connectivity represents various flows of nutrients, disturbances,
organisms, and even language, concepts, and cultural practices, that shift across the
landscape at various scales” while a “matrix is the most connective set of elements,
habitat, and social practices (or lack of practices) that span and touch on territories and
aspects of particular landscapes and neighborhoods” (“Fragments, Edges, and Matrices”
263). The terms Ingram invokes here echo the idiom of queer theory. But this
“cooperation” between nature and queers should not be assumed to be utopic; rather, the
it is the recognition that particular outdoor spaces and other environments are specifically
adopted for the transgression of normative behavior that is important. It is another
human use of the natural world, but indeed a more changeable and libratory one.

QUEER ECOLOGY AS CRITICISM
These aforementioned tropes—an acceptance and valorization of other-thanheteronormative sexualities, an open acknowledgement of alternative families,
temporalities that fall outside of a restrictive sense of futurity and inheritance, a critique
of the cycle of production-consumption, a recognition of the environmental damage done
by careless human breeding as well as the establishment of queer spaces in which to live
out and enable queer desires–all contribute to a queer ecocritical reading of literature.
The literature of the 1960s, the work from the decade subsequent to the beginning of the

actively eroticized the land itself and saw sex as an important environmental practice alongside organic
gardening” (19).
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Baby Boom and consumer revolution of the 1940s and 1950s, is a rich point from which
to view these concepts of queer ecology. I draw my literary analyses from this time
period because this is the beginning of the full critique of the heteronormative, overconsumptive and ecological destructive way of life. If the time immediately after the war
is commonly thought of as a period of unprecedented growth and the acquiescence to the
dominant narratives of the nuclear family and production-consumption, then the 1960s is
generally remembered for its relatively rebellious spirit, a time for children raised in the
comforts of the suburbs to mature and break out of the restrictions of their middle-class
families. I mention this not because there was no valuable work done to revise the
dominant narratives before the 1960s but rather because the 1960s so often encapsulates
much of what this project is about—a break from heteronormativity and a recognition of
the environmental danger of too much consumption.
I have chosen texts that have been commonly read through the critical lens of
gender studies, queer theory, or ecocriticism, so part of my project lies in reclaiming
these texts for more complex readings which combine these emphases. Christopher
Isherwood’s A Single Man (1964), Ken Kesey’s Sometimes a Great Notion (1964), Jane
Rule’s Desert of the Heart (1964), and Margaret Atwood’s The Edible Woman (1969)
engage with issues surrounding sexuality and the environment and challenge the
dominant narratives of heteronormativity and overuse of the natural world. Each novel
issues its own paradigm of naturalness, emphasizing the term’s fluidity across texts but
its restrictedness within. I focus particularly on how each novel challenges not only the
mainstream acknowledgment of heteronormativity but also the accepted destruction of
the natural world by those who conform to the dominant narratives. That is not to
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suggest, however, that any of the novels achieve a strictly environmentalist tone which
places the other-than-human world above all others. Rather, the natural world is always
at the behest of human manipulation. Nature, as it exists in the varying novels, exists
only for the operation of human thought and action.
By examining sexual relationships between characters and the way they engage
with the natural world, I arrive a multi-layered reading of the novels’ connections with
my own queer ecological interpretation. Queerness is represented by homosexual and
homosocial relationships, fluidity of time and processes, and alternative lifestyles that
work to dismiss the dominant narrative of marriage, childbearing, and consumption.
Likewise, the natural world, represented in multiple ways, stands as an entity separate
from the humans in the novels. It manifests a variableness that should not be seen as
vulnerability but as a reflection of queerness’s break with the evitable and restrictive
cycling of repro-time. That is not to suggest that the natural world does not adhere to the
dictates of natural cycles (the seasons, the days, etc.) but that in its fluidity it manifests a
power in and of itself. Additionally, the natural world represents a consistent
immovability, a force that will not and cannot permanently disappear. The apocalyptic
visions of these novels are represented not only in the nuclear narratives of the Cold War
but in the overall durability of the natural world and its conditions.
In the chapter on Christopher Isherwood’s A Single Man, I show how George, the
novel’s main character, acts a barometer for the ecological destruction enacted by the
“breeders”—the families and their children—who surround him. While mourning the
sudden death of his longtime partner, George observes the suburban heterosexual couples
and their offspring as well as the rampant growth and construction, and the general
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environmental destruction occurring in California at the time. While the novel is
traditionally read as a text that empowers and normalizes a gay man in a long-term
relationship, I argue that these critics are ignoring the environmental signs spread
throughout the novel. George notices the urban and suburban sprawl occurring in
California, and he realizes that the sprawl (and humans) will die and “the desert, which is
the natural condition of this country, will return” (A Single Man 111). Isherwood
specifically uses his gay character to track the inevitable apocalypse that will be brought
on by breeding and reverses the paradigm of queerness as unnatural by making
reproduction unnatural and inherently apocalyptic. Besides this, George constructs
spaces to support his queerness. And instead of imposing new binaries in the narrative,
Isherwood includes descriptions of touch and play, primarily that between George and his
student Kenny, as a means of dissolving boundaries and opening upon the possibility of
naturalized same-sex eroticism.
While Isherwood uncovers the destructive nature of heterosexual coupling
through his frankly homosexual character, Ken Kesey uses homosociality to dismantle
heteronormative domesticity and the systems that enforce mandatory heterosexual
masculinity for men who live and work in logging communities. Kesey’s Sometimes a
Great Notion, the author’s second novel, has not received the critical attention afforded to
his first novel, One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, despite the novels’ similarity of being
centered on a robust, authoritative male personality. I explore the deep and abiding
homosociality present in the story of the Stamper family, a logging clan in Oregon. I
frame my argument about the homosocial activities of communities of male loggers in
the Northwest by showing that prescribed ideas of masculinity and manliness do not
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necessarily (always) presuppose heterosexual activity. The primary homosocial
relationships in the novel occur between Joe Ben and Hank Stamper (despite the fact they
are both married) as well as Hank and his brother Leland. Kesey uses these relationships
to disassemble and discount the presence of heterosexuality and reproduction in the
novel, which actually carries over into a covert reading of the novel’s ecofeminist
tendencies. While the logging men’s physical displays are often read by critics as
Kesey’s way of reinscribing the macho, pioneering mentality into a modern American
literature populated by flaccid and weak men, I read these moments erotically,
underscoring their occurrence in the space of the forest as necessary to the enactment of
homosociality. Since the Stampers engage in clear cutting forests, it is impossible to read
their relationship to the natural world as one of conservation; rather, they utilize the space
of the forest in order to create a narrative of homosocial community. Here, nature must
be cleared to make way for alternative communities. Also, through descriptions of the
rising river, Kesey emphasizes human being’s ultimate inability to control and police
nature, which in turns dismantles the notion of naturalized human dominance.
My next chapter moves from the forests of the Pacific Northwest into the desert of
Reno, Nevada. Jane Rule’s Desert of the Heart centers on Evelyn, an English professor
who travels to Reno to seek a divorce from her husband. While there, she meets, falls in
love, and has a sexual relationship with a young woman named Ann. Despite Evelyn’s
admission that the younger Ann makes her feel like a “mother,” the two have multiple
sexual encounters, which simultaneously confirms and erases this familial relationship.
There are many forms of family present in Rule’s novel, making creative alternatives to
parentage and childbearing present and valuable. Like A Single Man, Desert of the Heart
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contains moments of play and touching which seek to reinforce the importance of sexual
exploration across seeming boundaries as well as to normalize and bolster same-sex
relationships. Rule establishes an alternative ecology here, focusing on how elements of
in a biological system interrelate. Also, as with Isherwood’s novel, the current criticism
on Desert of the Heart tends to highlight the politics of Ann and Evelyn’s lesbian
relationship. While the focus on the sexual politics of the lesbian relationship is not
remiss, it ignores the fundamental environmental factors that Rule includes, as Stacy
Alaimo points out in her pivotal criticism of the novel. It is the Nevada landscape that
often affords the pair the freedom to escape and love without the policing eye of the
casino in which Ann works, the other women who live on the divorce ranch, or the many
men who wish to claim their affections. Mortimer-Sandilands sees in the novel “a strong
advocacy for a heightened perception of nature that blends an awareness of the
difficulties of forging a home-place for queer individuals and communities, with a strong
interest in the biotic communities in which such home-places take particular shape and
meaning” (“Queer Ecocultural Studies” 461). To these ends, Rule equates the barrenness
of the desert with the couple’s animality, revising the narrative of ecological barrenness
by including in the couple’s rich and totally naturalized love affair. The desert is already
queer, fluid and able to absorb definitions created by its visitors and inhabitants. And it is
the desert’s barrenness, a characteristic often inscribed with the negativity of nonproduction that allows the couple to create their own definitions of eroticism and
naturalness.
Moving from the explicitly lesbian to a less explicit female queerness, my final
chapter addresses the naturalized notions of womanhood and domesticity in Margaret
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Atwood’s The Edible Woman. In her first novel, Atwood presents the narrative of
Marian, a woman in rebellion again her fiancée Peter and his control. On the surface,
Marian buys into the heteronormative narrative of marriage and childbirth, but her body
tells her otherwise. What occurs in The Edible Woman is a series of strange bodily
incidents in Marian—she runs (read: escapes) senselessly from her fiancée, retreats into
the “womb symbol,” the space beneath the bed, finds her tongue and stomach turning
against her as she is increasingly unable to eat, and then enacts another escape from her
future husband. All of these things add up to a rebellion against marriage and the
consumerism tied up to it. Ironically, Marian works for a company that surveys
housewives on new commercial products, and the company becomes Atwood’s symbol
of the trap of heteronormative marriage and consumerism. While the novel is often read
as a proto-feminist novel in which Marian is punished with anorexia, which is forced
upon her by narcissistic men and patriarchy in general, and then “fights back” with the
cannibalization of a cake shaped like a woman, I read the novel as a critique of not only
the marriage system and a narrative that reinforces the Mother as the Ultimate Woman
(embodied in the novel by the perverse, pregnant and unmarried Ainsley and the married,
reproductive and distracted Clara) but also a forced and destructive system of
“Production-consumption.” As Duncan, a graduate student and acquaintance of Marian,
explains, production-consumption is a system that forces its unnatural food products on
consumers and forces them into an unending, self- and environmentally destructive cycle.
It is in this novel that the indict of the cycle of production-consumption is most evident. I
read Marian’s gradual starvation as a deliberate challenge to the rotundity and
productiveness of pregnancy, just as her multiple escapes back into womb spaces (the
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bed, the bathroom, the subway) signal a retrogressive sense of time. Ultimately, Marian
falls for Duncan, a man who claims, “I’m not a human at all” and hates the endless cycle
of time since “it’s a treadmill, even ironing, you iron the damn things and then you wear
them and they get all wrinkled again” (152, 154). Marian’s refusal to eat is a direct
refusal of the shape and curves of ideal womanhood, and her queerness comes in the form
of the boy-shaped body.
Finally, I want to acknowledge the importance of recovering both these particular
novels as well as literary work from the 1960s in general. These works complicate the
meaning of the nuclear family and its wasteful ways in a period characterized by its
relationship to socially sanctioned narratives of waste and want. In reclaiming these texts
from their exclusively queer or ecocritical readings and placing them at the intersection
of both modes of literary analysis, I present a multifaceted line of criticism that seeks out
the acknowledgement that queer studies and ecocriticism have things to lend each other.
Although Isherwood, Kesey, Rule, and Atwood are often read and remembered by the
literary community, they are not acknowledged as much for the texts that I have chosen.
Often these texts seem to lie at the crossroads of varying movements and analyses so to
my mind, queer ecocriticism provides a fascinating and versatile lens through which to
engage with each novel. Additionally, the 1960s is remembered by most scholars as
important for its political and pop cultural, or more a time of serious political and
sociological movements balanced by the flourishing of the music, television and the film
industries. Often, the literature of the 1960s is not given its full consideration. As I
illustrate in the following chapters, the literature of the 1960s is rife with its own political
and cultural importance, as its lies at the intersection of queer studies and ecocriticism.
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CHAPTER I
“WARM BLOOD AND LIVE SEMEN AND RICH MARROW AND WHOLESOME
FLESH!”: THE COMING APOCALYPSE IN CHRISTOPHER ISHERWOOD’S A
SINGLE MAN
There are times when the change without apparent direction, and the
growth without control, give the appearance of a socially acceptable
madness, of a human population irruption that may well end tragically
both for the people and for the land.
—Raymond Dasmann, The Destruction of California
Only connect…—E. M. Forster, Howards End
We are caught…in the iron treads of a technological juggernaut. A
mindless machine. With a breeder reactor for a heart.
—Edward Abbey, The Monkey Wrench Gang

In the “Mr. Lancaster” section of Christopher Isherwood’s 1962 novel Down
There on a Visit, Mr. Lancaster explains that his assistant cannot make a party because
“[h]is wife’s expecting another baby. Her fifth. They breed like vermin. That’s the real
menace of the future, Christopher. Not war. Not disease. Starvation. They’ll spawn
themselves to death. I warned them, backed in ’21. Wrote a long letter to The Times,
forecasting the curve of the birth rate. I’ve been proved right already. But they were
afraid. The facts were too terrible” (26). Lancaster’s Malthusian warning, dating back to
’21, has gone ignored by the larger population, particularly the media, which is indicative
of the larger attitude toward the population “problem.” Later in the novel, Ambrose, a
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gay man who reminds Christopher of “one of Shakespeare’s exiled kings,” describes his
imaginary, utopian homosexual “kingdom.” It is a space where gay men will be free to
express themselves openly at the same time heterosexuality will become unacceptable,
and heterosexuals will be kept in spaces on the margins, reserved for “people like that”
(100).1 Ambrose’s kingdom will also be useful to women since they will “be beautifully
looked after on the breeding farms, as wards of the State. And, surely, most of them
would greatly prefer artificial insemination, anyway. It’s quite obvious that they have no
real interest in men” (100). This, Ambrose explains, is because “Women are all
Lesbians, really—they take naturally to all the ineffectual feminine messing about—
cuddling and petting” (101). Even if Ambrose’s vision is sexist, it reveals an underlying
agenda—to combat heterosexism specifically by corralling women and curbing their
reproduction.
Combined, these passages demonstrate the complexity of a queer ecological ethos
in Isherwood’s work. Heterosexual coupling is inherently risky, tending toward
apocalypticism because the people who “breed like vermin” create pressure on valuable
natural resources, particularly food. That Isherwood’s brand of apocalypticism stems
from problems created by the breeding of human beings within the dangerous and
volatile nuclear family rather than the ever-present Cold War threat of nuclear war is
telling. Reproductive sex is, essentially, the end of mankind, and the destruction of the
environment directly correlates to the production of children. There is, for these
childbearing couples, no future (to invoke Edelman’s phrase) because they will surely kill
themselves—and everyone else—off from too much reproduction. Isherwood infuses the

1

Notice the interesting co-option and revision by Isherwood of the epithet often leveled at homosexuals.
To be “like that” is a phrase often applied to homosexuals in order to differentiate and marginalize them.
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heterosexual sex act with the power to create a generalized apocalypse, wiping away all
life on the planet. At the same time though, heterosex, at the fault of the woman, is
entirely stripped of any physical eroticism, making heterosexual acts purely reproductive
and not pleasurable in any way. The particular reading of queer ecology I present in this
chapter is primarily concerned with the valuing of homosexual male relationships over
any other kind. For this reason, Isherwood is also preoccupied with the creation of a
queer space that overturns heterosexism and homophobia in order to open up queer,
erotic possibility, establish zones of safety for queerness, and expose ecological
destruction.
The reason I begin my chapter on Isherwood’s 1964 novel A Single Man with this
mention of Down There on a Visit is because the passages highlight important features of
my own queer ecological reading of the later novel. A Single Man, which follows
George, a gay, middle-aged, English professor who has recently lost his partner, Jim, in
an automobile accident, through twenty-four hours of his life, focuses on the prevalent
themes of queer ecology. In its own way, the novel naturalizes queerness and makes it
“ordinary” through George’s conventionality and respectability. But rather than
replacing a heteronormative paradigm with a naturalized sexuality, Isherwood remains
ambivalent towards humans’ ability to surmount or escape death, or more specifically,
the past or future, in any way. According to reviewer Alan Pryce-Jones, Isherwood’s
“coherent philosophy” involves the “feebleness of our nature” and the knowledge that
“we are going to be wiped up in a towel and poured down the sink anyway. Our loves,
whether unorthodox or no, will not last, cannot save, deserve scant sympathy” (5). Using
Isherwood’s oft-cited phrase “I am a camera,” another reviewer sees the middle-aged
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George as “in that container, the once glittering camera, its bellows broken, its metal
rusted, its lens dusty, cracked, and blind” (“Time Exposure” 77). While I do not agree
that George is “blind” in the sense that he is unable to “see” what is occurring around, I
do contend that there is a certain amount of wrath under which George operates which
colors his critiques.
That Isherwood uses the gay George to critique the dominant narrative of the
naturalness of heterosexuality and its acceptance of environmental devastation is not
coincidental. Rather, he possesses the visionary ability to observe the subjugated since, as
Isherwood himself asserts, A Single Man is not exclusively about homosexuality but
“about minorities. And the homosexuals are used as a sort of metaphor for minorities in
general” (Wickes 44). In particular, Isherwood’s admission emphasizes what I see as a
queer ecological examination of heterosexist, anti-nature, and anthropocentric control
over the marginalized. George displays an attachment to the idea of minorities, which I
will discuss later in the chapter, but it is something worth noting here. George’s
privileging of certain narratives, namely his stereotyping of racial and ethnic minorities,
reflects his deep investment in containing these minority groups. That is, despite
George’s idealization of Mexicans and African-Americans namely, he contains them
within a neat, definitive space of their own, separate from his queer sphere. The
emphasis here must be and is on the homosexual minority.2
In fact, through the creation and maintenance of queer spaces in the novel,
2

It is perhaps also worth noting that Isherwood sees George’s status as an English immigrant and his age—
his mid-fifties—as other reasons for his minority status. Imagining being put away into to “some
beautifully ordered nursery-community where Senior Citizens […] are eased into senility,” George finds an
easy equation between “old” and the racial epithets of “kike” and “nigger” (34). George’s still-active
imagination visualizes a senior citizens’ home that allows its residents to “screw, if they can still cut the
mustard; and if they can’t, let them indulge without inhibitions in babylike erotic play” (34, my emphasis).
The connection between age and eroticism is telling—Isherwood appears to be connecting age and
eroticism as a way of reversing the common association between homosexual eroticism and immaturity.
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Isherwood not only emphasizes the value of keeping open the possibilities of queer desire
but also the contingent importance of ecological preservation and a temporality that
focuses on the present. Isherwood makes George’s home and the beach on which he first
meets Jim safe havens for queerness as well as conservation of the natural world.
Reviewer Stanley Kauffman describes George as a man who “is no more an exile
essentially than any man of sensibility faced with a world for which he is increasingly
unequipped. […] There is no future for him, he knows, only a Now, and in that Now
only a hunger for sex and company” (24). While Kauffman’s assertion that George
merely craves sex and company is suspect, he aptly indicates George’s insistence on the
Now. Although the narrative’s timing is strictly linear, the sense of queer temporality
established in the novel centers on the ever-ready deployment of the Now as opposed to
the heteronormative fixation on the future. George’s personal sense of time remains
always in the present because his timing is how he sets himself apart from the
heterosexuals and their destructiveness. Without the threat of consequences, a queer
sense of time can remain open to all fluctuating possibilities. Jamie M. Carr identifies a
queer temporality by arguing that Isherwood’s earlier novels emphasize a “sense of time
that is not linear […] nor ‘progressive,’ as a privileged temporal structure of history,” a
sense of time that seeks to shift the “paradigms of progress” (2).
Conversely, heterosexual couples’ obsession with the future, centered primarily
on reproduction and the motif of the nuclear family and the child, fits into a paradigm
that is incessantly, mindlessly re-cycling itself in a loop of production-reproductionconsumption. Isherwood labels these heterosexuals “breeders” because of their
unchecked and heedless reproduction. Like the heterosexual vermin in Down There on a
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Visit, the breeders in A Single Man will eventually cycle out themselves and the rest of
the world through their careless procreation, their unbridled and destructive use of natural
resources, and their dependence on endless consumption of goods and technology which
is directly connected to environmental destruction. The novel is shaded with a fatalism
that stems from a distrust of the breeders as well as George’s recognition of the
increasing victimization of the natural world brought on by humans’ destructive hubris.
This makes any all natural spaces or attempts at queerness necessarily transitory and
always at the behest of George’s fixation upon death.
It is essential to remember that at the novel’s core is George, a man grieving the
loss of his partner. Because of his grief, George’s main motivation in the novel revolves
around not just remembering Jim by keeping him present but also in raging against the
forces that brought about Jim’s death.3 For example, George claims to feel a “kind of
patriotism for the freeways,” despite his hatred for automobiles, because his participation
in the act of driving to work and the forward motion signified by the freeway means he
can “claim to be a functioning member of society. He can still get by” (33). Jim is
always present, everywhere George moves, but particularly in their own home, where
George imagines Jim visiting him like “an observer from another country who is
permitted to peep in for a moment from the vast outdoors of his freedom and see, at a
distance, through glass this figure who sits solitary at the small table in the narrow room,
eating his poached eggs humbly and dully, a prisoner for life” (15). The weight of
George’s sadness is evident in both of these passages. I include these descriptions as a
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In the 2009 film adaptation of the novel, Tom Ford gives George’s character an added, if somewhat
stereotypical, dimension: he contemplates suicide, toying with a gun, all day. While this detail does some
work to illustrate the extreme stress and grief from which George suffers, it merely adds back in the classic
avenue of escape and damnation presented to homosexual characters in previous novels.
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way of illustrating the privileging of George’s personal relationship over every other
narrative in the novel because despite his ecological visions, George is no
environmentalist. Rather, he blames breeders, specifically Doris, whom I discuss later in
this chapter, for Jim’s death. All other motivations spin off from the primacy of the Jim’s
(non)presence in the novel. Although he comprehends the destruction that breeding and
consumerism inflicts upon the natural world, George himself does privilege the natural
world as a space or force that has value on its own. Rather, he subordinates it to human
definition, desire and appropriation, seeking out spaces that will serve his queerness and
his need to keep Jim present foremost and not vice versa. The relationship involves an
interplay between privileging both queer and ecological narratives, but queerness—
George’s homosexuality chiefly—takes precedence over all else.4
Much of the previous criticism on A Single Man focuses on the frank and positive
depiction of George’s sexuality, as well as the revision to stereotypes of homosexuals
prevalent in the 1960s, and what Joseph Bristow calls “the mutable—even chimerical—
form of [George’s] identities” (148).5 David Garnes argues Isherwood makes George’s
4

But the scene also takes on more complexity when the gay community, or lack thereof, in the novel is
considered. When the book begins, Jim is already dead, and George experiences increasing isolation. In a
1973 interview, Isherwood, explaining the choice of not “juggling a domestic homosexual relations on top
of all the other factors in the book” by making Jim dead from the beginning of the novel, describes
George’s lack of “philosophical support” once his partner is dead: “The more intense the happiness, the
more poignancy one feels in the fact that it can only be for a certain while, that things change, and that one
is separated from people by death and circumstances” (Kaplan 122, 123). His only friend is Charlotte, an
English exile like himself but decidedly heterosexual. Gregory Woods, who aptly mentions George’s
hatred of his suburban neighbors and their children as well as “his misogyny in silent rants against
heterosexual breeding habits,” reduces George’s “jaundiced anti-heterosexualism” to a one-dimensional
problem—the lack of a gay community in the novel (345). I think the lack of a gay community in A Single
Man is not so much as problem that the author should have solved but rather a symptom of George’s
condition. That gives his vision greater weight. So, even if George does not get an external, gay
community of his own, Isherwood endows him an ability to queer whatever he wants.
5
S. Nagarajan argues for Isherwood’s use of Vedanta’s lack of the separate single man because he sees
“several Georges all functioning at the same time” (68). Nagarajan classifies the multiple Georges as either
public or private, while the “criticism of the American society implied in the novel is that it produces these
purely ‘public’ characters and their converses without giving any opportunity to its members to realize the
truth of ‘pure’ consciousness” (68). George’s “pure consciousness,” I would argue, is most strongly felt in
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sexuality unremarkable and that “George is meant to be seen as a kind of Everyman, a
character whose closely observed life reflects the human condition” (198). Similarly,
David Garrett Izzo emphasizes George as “an Everyman who just happens to be gay and
that his bereavement is no less painful for him that it would be for anyone else” (235).
David Bergman sees Isherwood as revising “the received notions of gay people, and A
Single Man stands in marked contrast to the two reigning images of the homosexual in
the sixties: the denizen of the demimonde and the beautiful ephebe” (206). Reed
Woodhouse argues that George is a “warrior—a ‘single’ one and unlikely to win” and
locates George’s “heroism” in “his willingness to fight back against time, his body, the
sentimental hypocrisies of his society, the cult of sexual normality, the multiple untamed
selves that cohabit his psyche” (156).6 And while Mario Faraone gets closer to my own
queer ecological interpretation with his assertion that George is “a perfect symbol of the
sterility and spiritual desert in which he lives,” Faraone ultimately eschews George’s
desire for erotic exchange in favor of “the impossibility of true connection” (255).
While these critics’ arguments are plausible, they do not take into account what I see as
Isherwood’s obvious embrace of environmental language. By focusing exclusively on
George’s queerness, they are limiting their interpretations to the sexual proclivities of the
human world while ignoring the other-than-human world. In fact, Isherwood’s candid
treatment of George as a middle-aged, gay man is mutually dependent upon George’s

the times when he embraces the present and rejects futurity.
6
And as Peter Parker states, “Isherwood felt no one could be more single, more isolated, than a
homosexual man whose partner had died, because society did not acknowledge the partnership, and so did
not recognize this particular bereavement. He had also taken a single man, just one individual, to illustrate
a whole culture and way of life, and he had done this by taking a single day in this man’s life, which begins
with an assertion of individuality” (623). The novel is in many ways an imagining of how a middle-aged
homosexual man would cope with the loss of his partner. Some, including Isherwood himself, have
suggested that the novel arose from a turbulent period in the partnership between Isherwood and Don
Bachardy, thirty years his junior.
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observations of an encroaching, destructive, heterosexual world, which is determined to
accumulate possessions, reproduce like an epidemic, and diminish the natural world and
queerness.
The beach in A Single Man, the public, outdoor space that serves as a central
queer site for George, is, in Gordon Brent Ingram’s words, an important space for
“learning social skills, for exchange of information, for peer support, and for identity
formation” (104). The beach is where George first meets Jim, touching off a long-term,
(mostly) devoted relationship between them. But it is not a space reserved exclusively
for gay men. The beach is a natural, queer site because it remains, until the end of World
War II and the consequent Baby Boom, untouched by encroaching suburbia and its
destructive residents and their attachment to heteronormativity. “In the beach-months of
1946,” the “magic squalor of those hot nights, when the whole shore was alive with
tongues of flame, the watchfires of a vast naked barbarian tribe” allows “coupling
without shame in the sand” for all participants (Single Man 148). Completely
unrestricted, the beach permits a full range of unabashed erotic contact and play. This
“bohemian utopia” supports free and open sex as well as a pagan embrace of nature.
Significantly, this is the same place George takes Kenny, a student whom George
attempts to seduce. With Kenny, George is able to temporarily reclaim the beach as a site
of spontaneous queer seduction, play, and touch. After a trip to the Starboard Side,
George’s favorite bar, the two descend to the beach and shed their clothes. As the couple
drunkenly runs toward the water, “their bodies rub against each other, briefly but roughly.
[…] Their relationship, whatever it now is, is no longer symbolic” (161). Their play is
sanctioned and encouraged by the natural world. As they descend into the water, naked
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and eager, it appears the “waves and the night and the noise exist only for their play”
(163, my emphasis). Kenny is an elegant “water-creature,” like Venus emerging from the
ocean foam, while George sputters and chokes, receiving “the stunning baptism of the
surf […] becoming always cleaner, freer, less” (162-3).7 The water washes George of the
labels he fears, includes him in a queer community of his own invention, making him, as
well as Kenny, a more natural creature immersed in the ocean and in queerness. Their
mutual ejaculatory release is also undeniable here: they play with themselves and are
made wet together.
The beach scene’s positioning in the novel makes it the climax (pun intended) and
the closest George gets to having a sexual encounter within the novel, and it is all of
George’s making. That Kenny is seemingly heterosexual and only interested in using
George’s home for trysts with his girlfriend is beside the point. He is certainly queered in
the novel, open to George’s invitation. The erotic encounter forces George to question,
“[W]hat is this life of ours supposed to be for? Are we to spend it identifying each other
with catalogues, like tourists in an art gallery? Or are we to try to exchange some signal,
however garbled, before it’s too late?” (174). What’s important here is George’s
insistence on exchange, some kind of bodily, physical communication that would
eliminate harmful social identifiers, confirm his existence and iterate his sexuality,
generate some human-to-human connection, and formulate a relationship with the natural
world. After George’s questions comes his repudiation of the “miserable fools and
7

Of the images of baptism, James Berg suggests that they “are not merely a reaching back to prewar texts
(the scene is reminiscent of the ‘sacred lake’ in A Room with a View) but also owe a debt to Isherwood’s
study of Vedanta and Hindu texts as well as his involvement with Southern California beach culture. The
images of borders and refugees may relate to Europe and Mortmere, but they owe at least as much to
California and Mexico (as we can see from Down There on a Visit) and from being an outsider (gay, in this
instance) in a world organized against him” (“American Isherwood” 17).
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prudes and cowards” who do not realize “what the bed means—that’s what experience
is!” (174-5). In fact, according to George, the tragic condition of the modern world is the
emphasis on “flirtation instead of fucking” (176). Although George fails to bed Kenny,
their flirtation enables a spontaneous, playful and ever-changing dialogue between them.
“[B]ut not a Platonic dialogue,” Isherwood cautions, “not a debate on some dreary set
theme. You can talk about anything and change the subject as often as you like. In fact,
what really matters is not what you talk about, but the being together in this particular
relationship” (154). It is a dialogue that does not look forward or back; rather, their
conversation remains in the present.
And while the implementation of the memory of things past might seem
antithetical to the Now-ness of queer temporality, the way Isherwood intersperses
memories of Jim into the main action of novel (itself written in present tense) is telling.
Isherwood uses the fragments of George’s memory to make his home space another
natural, queer site in the novel. Memories of his domestic life with Jim come in pieces
but make up a dialogue with the past that reinforces the domestication and isolation of
their queerness. “As good as being on our own island,” George observes when he first
sees the house (20). Indeed, everything about the home suggests a kind of environmental
economy absent in the homes of their breeding neighbors: the garage, overgrown with
ivy, is home to Jim’s menagerie of animals rather than an automobile, indicating the
couple’s emphasis on conservation of nature rather than acquiring technological items;
the house is “a tightly planned little house,” suggesting not only resistance to expansion
of any kind but also the promise and recovering of physical play and contact—
“constantly jogging, jostling, bumping against each other’s bodies by mistake or on
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purpose, sensually, aggressively, awkwardly, impatiently, in rage or in love” (12); it is an
older, lived-in home, not like the brand new structures built by his neighbors; and it is,
for all purposes, George’s refuge, isolated and distant, where his memories of Jim and his
queerness are preserved. Ecologically speaking, George’s home space is abounding with
an ethic of conservation.
When Jim declares, “Oh, well, I expect [the house will] last our time,” he
embraces the home’s separateness and decrepit state (it is only accessible by an old,
rickety bridge) as well as the “our time” which he assigns only to himself and George.
Later, George claims the home’s isolation for the sanctioning of his queerness.
Imagining himself as a monster in a fairy tale in his isolated lair, George vocalizes his
resistance to his breeding neighbors: “The fiend that won’t fit into their statistics, the
Gorgon that refuses their plastic surgery, the vampire drinking blood with tactless
uncultured slurps, the bad-smelling beast that doesn’t use their deodorants, the
unspeakable that insists, despite all their shushing, on speaking its name” (27). By
opposing the status quo and refusing consumerism, George iterates his queerness and
ecological awareness as well as his ability to disrupt normative modes of time by
remaining in the “our time” and the bohemianism that Jim embraces. By imagining
himself as the monster isolated from his breeding neighbors, he is separating himself
from their brand of temporality as a way of reclaiming his lost love.
Since “breeding and bohemianism do not mix,” Isherwood is able to enact a
complete ideological and temporal separation between the bohemian George and the
breeders who are his neighbors. Isherwood’s biographer, Peter Parker, points out that, in
Isherwood’s notes to the earlier version of A Single Man, which had been tentatively
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titled The Englishwoman and centered on the character of Charlotte rather than George,
an interesting pattern emerges: “When she first comes to America after the War she feels
a great romance in this attitude of his. […] But then they have a child and everything
changes. The Husband is scared. Suddenly he believes in Security. He has to Get a Job
and Support His Loved Ones. He is a bit like a zombie. He moves away from her” (qtd.
in Parker 615). The Husband is literally the living dead, stripped of autonomy and living
only for the upkeep of His Loved Ones. The introduction of the child is the end of the
romantic, bohemian relationship between the husband and wife. Isherwood’s deliberate
capitalization of such terms as “Get a Job” highlights them as Platonic ideals. As a result,
to be a breeder “you need a steady job, you need a mortgage, you need credit, you need
insurance. And don’t you dare die, either, until the family’s future is provided for” (A
Single Man 19).
The way that George’s queer time becomes manifest is through his claim on the
present, as I briefly mentioned above. This fixation on the Now is born in part from the
anger and pain he feels at having lost his partner and in another part from a fear of the
future instigated by his distrust of his destructive, breeding neighbors. Remaining in the
present is George’s weapon against the breeder mentality and his means of reclaiming
Jim from the past. The following declaration is prefaced by George’s oscillating
consciousness, which highlights the fragility of George’s vision. In this moment of selfquestioning and -answering, George in turn convinces himself: “Jim is in the past, now”;
“But George remembers him so faithfully”; “Jim is my life”; “Jim is death”; “But George
is getting old. Won’t it very soon be too late?” (182). The tension between the present
and past is more a symptom of George’s confused grief than it is his irresoluteness. Jim,
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though spoken of in the past tense throughout the novel, is fully present to George, a
force or energy with which George is constantly engaging. The culmination of George’s
past-present debate is the following proclamation: “Damn the future. Let Kenny and the
kids have it. […] George only clings to Now. It is Now that he must find another Jim.
Now that he must love. Now that he must live” (182). As I stated before, George’s main
motivation is reclaiming Jim to the present moment. By condemning the future and
giving it over to “the kids,” George firmly places himself and his need to find “another
Jim”—whatever form he might take—in the present moment.
George’s declaration is an empowering one, and Isherwood’s speculation on his
death only a few pages later is interesting in light of queer time’s relationship to
longevity. The temporality and now-ness in this scene is reminiscent of the opening of
the novel in which George awakes from a night’s sleep:
Waking up begins with saying am and now. That which has awoken then lies for
a while staring up at the ceiling and down into itself until it has recognized I, and
therefrom deduced I am, I am now. Here comes next, and is at least negatively
reassuring; because here, this morning, is where it has expected to find itself:
what’s called at home. But now isn’t simply now. Now is also a cold reminder:
one whole day later than yesterday, one year later than last year. Every now is
labeled with its date, rendering all past nows obsolete, until—later or sooner—
perhaps—no, not perhaps—quite certainly: it will come. (9)8
8

The opening of Isherwood’s novel is strangely reminiscent of one of Darl’s monologues in William
Faulkner’s 1930 novel As I Lay Dying, a novel itself steeped in issues surrounding ecology and sexuality. I
do not think it is much of a stretch to compare the two—Darl, like George, is considered queer and is an
outsider in his world. Darl is also endowed with some kind of special vision that allows him to see things
that others cannot apparently see. The passage in As I Lay Dying to which I am referring is the one in
which Darl provides what is essentially a set of instructions for how one should prepare oneself for sleep:
In a strange room you must empty yourself for sleep. And before you are emptied for sleep, what
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Appearing at the very beginning of the novel, this passage introduces the importance of
the present deployment of time and George’s concern with staying in the moment as well
as the inevitability of death. The intermingling of the I-am-here-now and George’s
insistence on being at home, rather than establishing a sense of progression that parallels
repro-time, actually highlight the acknowledgement of temporality that is not concerned
with inheritance. “I’m afraid of being rushed,” George declares to his reflection in the
mirror, despite the fact that “The creature we are watching will struggle on and on until it
drops. Not because it is heroic. It can imagine no alternative” (11, 10). George is not
delusional or romantic about the future; it is merely an unpleasant inevitability that
cannot be supplanted by inheritance or procreation.
One of the ways Isherwood critiques notions of Cold War containment and
homophobia is by grafting onto George the persona of the militant and angry “Uncle
George.” Imagining the newspaper editors and reporters as “vermin,” Uncle George
accuses each of being responsible for Jim’s death: “their words, their thoughts, their
whole way of life willed it, even though they never knew he existed” (40). “Their”
words, thoughts, and lifestyles are the summation of that which Uncle George is in
opposition. The newspaper people, like the vermin breeders, are anti-queer and not
environmentally attuned, since they not only seek to prohibit “sex deviates” but also
promote “rocket war” and total ecological destruction. Uncle George imagines the
are you. And when you are emptied for sleep, you are not. And when you are filled with sleep,
you never were. I don’t know what I am. I don’t know if I am or not. […] And then I must be, or
I could not empty myself for sleep in a strange room. And so if I am not emptied yet, I am is.
How often have I lain beneath rain on a strange roof, thinking of home. (81)
Darl is a shape shifter, like George, going existent to non-existent. He goes from empty to is in a matter of
moments, questioning whether he is or ever has been. It has also been argued that the emptying Darl does
in this scene is a masturbatory act, linking it again to the ending of A Single Man in which George
masturbates and then falls asleep. The association between sleeping, existence and home is also an
important one since it is one’s home space, particularly in the case of George, in which one is at one’s most
existent.
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ultimate punishment for them: forcing them to perform various and sundry sex acts upon
each other in a display of open eroticism. Indeed, the “uncle” part of his moniker is also
important to the formulation of the queer ecological persona, and it calls to mind
Sedgwick’s characterization of avuncular relationships and their association with queer
temporality. Avuncular relationships can be imagined “not, that is, as alternately abject
and omnipotent, links in a chain of compulsion and replication that leads inevitably to
you; but rather as elements in a varied, contingent, recalcitrant but re-forming seriality, as
people who demonstrably could have turned out very differently—indeed as people who,
in the differing, refractive relations among their own generation, can be seen already to
have done so” (Tendencies 63). By charting this description, Sedgwick intends for the
avuncular relationship to be “messy,” as they are not parents themselves but
representatives of a “varied, contingent, recalcitrant” series. That is, uncles are
necessarily queer, already marginalized because of their resistance to being “links in a
chain.” George’s creation of Uncle George engages in an outrage associated with social
inequality. But Uncle George and his “varied, contingent, recalcitrant” nature also
represent the paradigmatic fear of deviant sexual behavior in postwar America.
Significantly, in this novel written at the height of the Cold War, Isherwood
associates apocalypse with unchecked reproduction, misuse of the land, and
overextension of resources, particularly water, rather than with nuclear warfare. The hills
outside Los Angeles, once so wild and largely uninhabited, except for the wildlife—
coyotes, rattlesnakes, and deer—have seen the encroachment of human populations. I
include this lengthy quote because it is to me the key behind the specific apocalypse in A
Single Man:
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True, there are still a few uninhabited canyons, but George can’t rejoice in them;
he is oppressed by awareness of the city below. On both sides of the hills, to the
north and to the south, it has spawned and spread itself over the entire plain. It
has eaten up the wide pastures and ranchlands and the last stretches of orange
grove; it has sucked out the surrounding lakes and sapped the forests of the high
mountains. Soon it will be drinking converted sea water. And yet it will die. No
need for rockets to wreck it, or another ice age to freeze it, or a huge earthquake
to crack it off and dump it in the Pacific. It will die of overextension. It will die
because its taproots have dried up—the brashness and greed which have been its
only strength. And the desert, which is the natural condition of this country, will
return. (111)
The city is described as a living organism, but it is a parasitic, unsustainable one. This is
an apocalypse, an end of times, not brought about by nuclear warfare or even an
uncontrollable natural disaster.9 Rather, it is apocalypse that comes at the hands of

9

Excerpts from Isherwood’s diaries reveal a similar concern with the waste and sprawl of California in his
personal life. A February 6, 1961 entry reads:
One thing I won't forget—driving up to the top of the hills with Monroe and Bill Enge and John
Connolly yesterday, after Marguerite's party, and looking down over the city. All the platforms
cut out of the hillsides, ready for pretentious French chateau-style houses “worth” eighty thousand
maybe, but no more than slum dwellings because so crowded and viewless and altogether
wretched. And I had the sense of something spawning itself to destruction, spreading and
spreading out until its strength is exhausted and then shriveling up and dying, and then the rockets,
or the new ice age, or the whole slab of coast cracking off along the earthquake fault and sliding
into the sea; lost in any case. And the quickie promoters and real estate agents hustling to make
their dollars before it happens. Such a sick sad knowledge that this is “Babylon the great city” and
it can't end well—and was never and could never be great, anyway. (The Sixties 46-47)
Over a year later, on April 5, 1962, Isherwood writes:
Yesterday, Michael Barrie drove Gerald, Joe Ackerley, Don and me to Laguna Beach and San
Juan Capistrano. We were supposed to look at the flowers. Certainly, the hills around Laguna
Canyon were a beautiful bluish green, with thick patches of lupines, and mustard, and white
flower-clumps, like streaks of late snow, which Gerald and Michael call elyssium—I can’t find
that name in the dictionary, however; only alyssum. But the rest of the drive, down through Long
Beach, was a wretched cavalcade of billboards, telegraph wires and poles, fluttering pennants on
used car lots, gas stations, hot-dog stands, etc. etc., and I could feel Joe thinking, “This is their
America, is it—well they can keep it.” (174)
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people—too many people whose “brashness and greed” is manifested by is misuse of the
Earth. Desert, signifier of barrenness and loneliness, is, in fact, “the natural condition” for
that part of the country. Anyone who does not conform to what Isherwood identifies as
the breeders’ falsified image of an “American utopia,” for which they are “ready to purge
and starve themselves for generations, in the hopeless hope of inheriting it,” is subject to
Nadel’s concept of the nuclear gaze and its distrust of ambiguous motives (26).
George also fears surviving into a “Rubble Age.” When the subject of fallout
shelters comes up in conversation with a colleague, Grant, who despite all his liberal
attitudes, George condemns him as having “three imprudently begotten children” (86).
The Rubble Age will come, George imagines, because of the Grants of the world, and it
will “be quite natural for Mr. Strunk to gun down Grant and his wife and three children,
because Grant has neglected to lay sufficient stores of food and they are starving and may
therefore possibly become dangerous and this is no time for sentiment” (88). The threat
of apocalypse by starvation is manifest again in this passage.
The apocalypse appears to be localized, unique to the state of California, where
Isherwood sees the unchecked spread of people and their materialism which will literally
dry up the land. In his short essay entitled “Los Angeles,” written about 15 years before
A Single Man, Isherwood expresses similar sentiments. He sees “the monster marketgarden,”10 the sea of advertisements that greets people coming into the city as vapid yet
seductive, making “this rude abundance […] nearly as depressing as the desolation of the
wilderness. The imagination turns sulky” (157). The way to fight the influence of
consumerism and “to live sanely,” says Isherwood, is to “cultivate the art of staying
Both of these excerpts reveal Isherwood’s very real preoccupation with the state of California’s ecology.
Note also how both entries involve driving—another annoyance of the environmentally aware Isherwood.
10
This is a term that resurfaces in Atwood’s The Edible Woman to describe the supermarket.
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awake.” Again, I quote this passage at length because it contains some of Isherwood’s
most powerful commandments on surviving the city and its corresponding usurpation, by
way of consumerism, of free will:
You must learn to resist (firmly but not tensely) the unceasing hypnotic
suggestions of the radio, the billboards, the movies and the newspapers; those
demon voices which are forever whispering in your ear what you should desire,
what you should fear, what you should wear and eat and drink and enjoy and what
you should think and do and be. They have planned a life for you—from the
cradle to the grave and beyond—which it would be easy, fatally easy, to accept.
The least wandering of the attention, the least relaxation of your awareness, and
already your eyelids begin to droop, the eyes grow vacant, the body starts to move
in obedience to the hypnotist’s command. Wake up, wake up—before you sign
that seven-year contract, buy that house you don’t really want, marry that girl you
secretly despise. (161, my emphasis)
To give into consumption, to buy the house and marry the girl, is to give up on one’s free
will. The alternative to resistance is compliance, which is in turn confinement and deathin-life.11 He illustrates this lifestyle, the one I have identified with “repro-time” and the
environmentally destructive tendencies of the breeders, which Isherwood and George
11

“Los Angeles” takes a purely ecocritical turn in its conclusion. Another way to resist, or at least to
remind oneself of the “natural condition” of California, is to visit the still wild outposts of the state. The is
where the “real nature” of California lies, but Isherwood cautions adventurers because the landscape will
remind human visitors of their impermanence in relation to an anthropomorphized Earth here. The land
tells the visitor that he is welcome
during your short visit. Everything is at your disposal. Only, I must warn you, if things go wrong,
don’t blame me. I accept no responsibility. I am not part of your neurosis. Don’t cry to me for
safety. There is no home here. There is no security in your mansions and your fortresses, your
family vaults or your bank or your double beds. Understand this fact, and you will be free.
Accept it and you will be happy. (162)
The Earth is a force that remains aloof to humans’ need to dominate and package it. It acknowledges
humans’ transience and discounts human systems and structures as empty means of security and
permanence. The things we build and covet are no guarantee against eventual ecological collapse.
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scorn. Isherwood’s command here to stay awake reads a lot like the opening to A Single
Man in which George wakes himself from sleep and becomes fully conscious of the
destruction and entrapment around him.
Perhaps part of Isherwood’s command to resist comes in part from his own status
as a minority, the unacknowledged and unspeakable in the midst of the heterosexual,
reproductive and consuming units of people. As William Alexander McClung
acknowledges, the cycle that George is imagining is inevitable and a combination of the
“earth’s resuming its rhythms after human beings’ interruptions, [and] a vengeful
response to, as he puts it, greed” (50). But George sees himself as somehow separate
from the city’s destructive means and ends, as he “demonizes the city as a mindless,
insatiable, primitive life-form, while implying that the prior uses off the land (pasture,
ranches, orchards, were immemorial and legitimate, unlike, apparently, housing” (49).
These people tend, like George’s students with their “infuriating sheep-obstinacy,” to
crowd together (55). Their buildings are clustered, ugly, variously designed and
encroaching on the pristine wilderness George imagines existed at one point. In fact,
George, during on of his Uncle George fantasies, imagines destroying a “huge, insolent
high-rise building which will contain one hundred apartments” and “will block the view
along the coast from the park on the cliffs above” (36). The means? Either spraying the
building’s girders with something that will cause the gradual smell of rotting corpses or
“a kind of virus” that will eat into metal causing “the whole thing [to] sag and subside
into a limp, tangled heap, like spaghetti” (37, 38).12 The building’s offense is not merely
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Interestingly, both methods—the smell of rotting corpses and a material-eating virus—mimic the wastage
of the human body itself. Perhaps in a way, Isherwood is concluding that the destruction of building and
property is necessarily, in the case of the breeders, simultaneous and consequential. That is to say, if one’s
building collapses, one might as well collapse too.
55

that it blocks the view of the landscape. It also houses the multitudes, packed into a tight
space and living freely on what used to be undeveloped land. All around George is
evidence that humans do not belong in this part of the world.
In fact, Raymond F. Dasmann’s 1965 The Destruction of California is a useful
frame through which to examine contemporary issues of land use in California. The
book is an indictment of the population and building explosion in postwar California.
His call for restraint in the proliferation of human beings, ecological destruction and
suburban sprawl includes these questions about the alteration and devastation of
California’s geography: “Is it better now that the whole mass is blended together and
covered with a pall of smoke? Was it really worth while corralling the Colorado and
channeling the waters of northern California, to effect this change? Will the future
development make it better or worse?” (4). Dasmann’s subjects are the rapidity of
population growth, the alteration of the landscape, and the evidence of the sheer amount
of stuff—cars and houses, specifically—that begin to clutter the landscape after the
Second World War.13 The redirection of waterways particularly disturbs Dasmann. The
damming of rivers will cause additional demand for water in places where is it not
already accessible, causing “further growth of population and industry that will in turn
create fresh demand for water, until every drop that can be captured anywhere will be
used and reused. And then what happens? Are we planning for this day? Or do we expect
some Armageddon to intervene before we must reach this final decision?” (20). While
Dasmann’s questions smack of the popular argument that there are plenty of resources
13

Coming to a similar conclusion in his 1957 article “Urban Pressures on California Land,” Howard
Gregor explains that arable land in California was being reduced at alarming rates after WWII. The main
culprit, according to Gregor, is the influx of people into California and their thirst for land on which to
spread out, characterized by their tendency to “build out” (314). Additionally, the “population migrations
to California have taken place in an age of automobiles,” making population movement, rampant and
destructive land use and economic development directly correlated (315).
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available but they are only getting distributed to the wealthy, his questions are a response
to what he sees as the rampant and unchecked proliferation of human beings and their
contingent demands on the landscape.
Traces of the oncoming apocalypse show up at the end of World War II when the
utopian, bohemian, queer spaces of George’s past turn into spaces reserved for the
sanctioning of the nuclear family and their impetus to consume in excess. The arrival of
the breeders, characterized as a faceless, nameless mob that acquires endless objects,
erases all traces of the natural landscape and the queerness that existed in George’s
bohemia. With the onslaught of the “domesticated servicemen,” beach fires and pagan
parties are prohibited on the once-queer, natural space of the beach, and “you must eat
sitting up on benches at communal tables, and mustn’t screw at all” (148). The Starboard
Side, the bar George once frequented, installs a new television, that ever-ready symbol of
technology and consumerism. George sees the television as responsible for the hypnosis
and frigidity of the bar’s patrons. They are absorbed in the television screen,
disconnected from each other and firmly attached to this electrified object. Jean
Baudrillard argues that people in a modern consumer society “are surrounded not so
much by other human beings, as they were in all previous ages, but by objects” (25).
These objects, he further explains, are “neither a flora or a fauna,” apart from the “natural
ecological laws,” since “they are always arranged to mark out directive paths, to orientate
the purchasing impulse towards networks of objects” in which the consumer becomes
entrapped (25, 26, 27). Or, as George puts it, Americans are only living symbolically,
they are adhering to a strict and confining “building code which demands certain
measurements, certain utilities and the use of certain apt materials; no more and no less”
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(91). “The Europeans hate us,” George continues, getting on the stage like an actor in
front of an audience, “because we’ve retired to live inside our advertisements, like
hermits going into caves to contemplate. We sleep in symbolic bedrooms, eat symbolic
meals, are symbolically entertained” (91).
Likewise, the domestication of the veterans and their growing families feeds a
consumer need, not only entrapping them in the pointed network of the proliferation of
objects but also contributing to what Baudrillard describes as “environmental nuisances,”
i.e. pollution (39). In fact, George is assaulted by the variety and sheer number of goods
at the supermarket, where “[y]ou could spend hours of your life here, in a state of
suspended insecurity, meditating on the multiplicity of things to eat”: “Every article on
the shelf cries out to you, Take me, take me” (Single Man 112). George is aware of the
inability of these objects to fill the void and assuage his loneliness, because the items are
empty of meaning and “what remains is only cardboard, cellophane and food” (113).
Moreover, George associates the food with the many meals he has eaten with Jim, and he
fears the “long landslide” of eating alone to drinking alone to “despair and sleeping pills
and the inevitable final overdose” (113). Mingled with George’s very real heartache over
Jim is his understanding that these consumer goods, even the things on the supermarket
shelf, are an empty substitute for what is real in the Baudrillardian sense.
What the breeders do not recognize is that they will inevitably destroy everything
and everyone in the world because they reject environmental stewardship, and their
notions of inheritance and futurity are utterly ridiculous. Isherwood describes the “The
Change,” the transition from the nature-friendly, erotically-charged queerness of
George’s world what happens:
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[…] in the late forties, when the World War Two vets came swarming out of the
East with their just-married wives, in search of new and better breeding grounds
in the sunny Southland, which had been their last nostalgic glimpse of home
before they shipped out to the Pacific. And what better breeding grounds than a
hillside neighborhood like this one, only five minutes’ walk from the beach and
with no through traffic to decimate the future tots? So, one by one, the cottages
which used to reek of bathtub gin and reverberate with the poetry of Hart Crane
have fallen to the occupying army of Coke-drinking television watchers. (18, my
emphases)
The description invokes Higbee’s notion of the “residential nursery.” The breeders’ only
motivation is acquiring household goods, building homes, and making babies. They
come and destroy the beach. Their children must be protected at all costs from death by
automobile (although it is gay Jim who is ironically killed in an automobile accident).14
It is no mistake that these are “breeding grounds” for which they search. Like vermin
who seek ideal territory for the purpose of their propagation, these people clear out land
for their own purposes without a thought to environmental impact. “[L]itter after litter
after litter” of “tots” appear in the neighborhood, forcing the expansion of schools and
supermarkets. Isherwood’s use of the word “litter” is concrete evidence of their sheer,
overwhelming number as well as their relationship to debris and waste.
George, in his isolation, surrounded by the breeder-consumers and apparently the
only one who can see the destruction that they fashion, begins to feel outnumbered.
14

It is significant that Isherwood chooses the automobile as the “vehicle” of Jim’s death. He is killed in an
accident while engaging in a heterosexual affair, so the automobile is doubly damnable—as both the
quintessential consumer item and environmental destroyer as well as the conveyance of his foray into
heterosexuality. It seems that Isherwood makes the automobile a sort of death trap for Jim, punishing him
for the engagement in a relationship with a women and his unseemly ride in the automobile.
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Perhaps this is, in part, where much of his discussion about minorities originates. But
since he is mostly closeted, George’s minority status does not carry the weight he
believes or hopes it does. Often his attention to other minorities is slightly misguided,
much in the way that heterosexuals in this period remained misinformed about
homosexuality. As I stated above, his alignment with ethnic and racial minorities signals
George’s desire to contain them. Since they are more visible as minorities than
homosexuals, or at least the type of middle-aged, average and inconspicuous homosexual
that George is, he harbors certain stereotypes with a protectionist attitude. His
justification for romanticizing them ignores the fact that they are prolific breeders
themselves. Rather, their poverty—their inability to build fancy homes, buy household
goods, and consequently waste them—appeals to him.
George’s fascination with ethnic minorities centers on those who live on the
outskirts of town and whose homes he sees when he is driving down the freeway to the
college campus. George imagines the charming and poignant stereotypes of the area’s
minorities: “Mexicans live here, so there are lots of flowers. Negroes live here, so it is
cheerful” (41). But “these people are not The Enemy” like heterosexuals are the enemy,
and if homosexuality were more visible or if it ever became acceptable “they might even
be allies” (41-2). George fixates on and idealizes the Japanese- and Chinese-American
students in his classroom, labeling their smiles “enigmatic,” and imagining “their beauty
is like the beauty of plants, seemingly untroubled by vanity, anxiety or effort” (61).
Shooting a “deep shining look” at his only gay male student, George thinks, “I am with
you, little minority-sister,” but only manages to embarrass the student (70). Despite his
good-natured desire to “teach him a lesson he’ll never forget” and to “give him courage
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to throw away his nail file and face the truth of his life,” George confuses his entire class
with a lecture they turn from “with a shrug and a grin, thinking the old peddler crazy”
(70, 74). He seems to think that, as a homosexual and an English expatriate, he reserves
the right to judge and evaluate the positioning of other minority groups. He thinks he
shares something significant with all underrepresented groups, but as Isherwood makes
quite clear, particularly in the space of the college campus, George is closeted. During
his slightly nonsensical lecture about an Aldous Huxley novel, George introduces a larger
discussion about the status of minorities and the threat they pose. 15 Of course, George is
primarily referencing the danger posed by the “invisible” homosexual minority to which
he belongs, speaking about himself specifically: “[A] minority is only thought of as a
minority when it constitutes some kind of threat to the majority, real or imaginary. […]
15

But Isherwood’s choice of the Huxley novel is an interesting and telling one when analyzed in terms of
futurity, of the Living minority and the Dead majority. After Many a Summer is about Jeremy Pordage,
who comes to Southern California to archive the rare books in the collection of Jo Stoyte. This is a
Southern California similar to Isherwood’s with its predominant advertisements that scream out from the
highway and the permeation of ethnic minorities. In his sixties, Stoyte’s mantra has become, “God is love.
There is no death.” He is obsessed with his own mortality and has hired Dr. Obispo to run experiments in
longevity on carp. The idea is to extend his own life and perhaps become immortal. Documents written by
the Fifth Earl of Gonister about his own experiments in longevity reveal, “Parrots, Ravens, and Elephants
are long-lived Creatures; from which we must conclude that the Brevity of human Life is due to other
Causes than then manner which Men beget and Females reproduce their Kind” (269). Thus, longevity is
detached from reproduction, and significantly, Stoyte is childless. Because of this, he is afraid and
unwilling to join the Dead majority, both as a breeder (although he is a great consumer) and as a corpse.
What Huxley shows us is the ridiculousness of the desire for longevity through untraditional means. Stoyte
and Obispo discover the 201 year-old Earl of Gonister, whose own experiments in longevity have kept him
alive but aged him and made him (d)evolve into an ape-like creature. The novel ends with Obispo’s
laughter, signaling Huxley’s discomfort and ridicule for those who seek immortality. But it is not
immortality that George seeks and that he is critiquing in his own lecture. Rather, he seems to be taking on
Stoyte’s refusal to join the majority to which he obviously belongs.
But it is in George’s classroom lecture on Aldous Huxley’s 1939 novel After Many a Summer Dies the
Swan that the discussion of minorities is the most complex. The minority/majority split here is between
the Living and the Dead. We have already seen Isherwood portray breeders as zombies, while George sees
Americans who retreat inside their symbolic lives are the living dead as well (emphasis on the “dead”). In
equating reproduction and consumption with death, even if it is a metaphorical or spiritual one, Isherwood
again assigns the breeders to the majority. George ranks those who are queer, himself and those who have
not given into “repro-time” and the consumption cycle, as part of “that marvelous minority, The Living”
(103). Interestingly, that declaration is made after he visits Doris, the woman who attempted to ensnare
Jim in a heterosexual relationship, in the hospital and directly after he witnesses a frenzied Christmas
shopping rush outside a store, the consumers’ “eyes reflecting, like polished buttons, the cynical sparkle of
the Yuletide” (103). It is spoken as a rejection of not only the Dead and death but also the entire search for
futurity through procreation and consumption—the futile attempt to stave off or erase one’s mortality.
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Sure, minorities are people—people, not angels. Sure, they’re like us—but not exactly
like us” (70-1).
Additionally, Isherwood indicts the university where George teaches literature
classes for engaging in environmentally destructive behavior. This is despite George’s
opinion of his profession as university professor being somehow more eco-friendly than
various other professions: “But isn’t is a consolation to be with students who are still
three-quarters alive? Isn’t it some tiny satisfaction to be of use, instead of helping to turn
out useless consumer goods?” (83). San Tomas State College is a site of “destructionconstruction-destruction,” where the hills have been flattened by bulldozers, the trees are
not allow to grow before they are ripped out, and “the landscape is gashed with raw
terraces” in order to build dormitories and accommodate a growing population (42). A
“clean modern factory, brick and glass and big windows,” the college churns out
thousands of graduates each year, “the male and female raw material which is fed daily
into this factory, along the conveyor belts of the freeways, to be processed, packaged and
placed on the market” and is “cut off from the outside world by its own parking lots,
which will then form an impenetrable forest of cars” (47, 43). Described accordingly, the
university is uninterested in preserving natural spaces and has replaced forests of trees
with forests of cars.16 The university’s primary goal is to produce students who are
“preparing themselves for life which means a job and security in which to raise children
to prepare themselves for life which means a job and security in which” (47). Isherwood
ends the description abruptly because it is never-ending, self-perpetuating, and
16

Cars, Isherwood tells us in “Los Angeles,” are one of the primary problems in the area. Everyone either
owns one or uses one and sees no problem traveling large distances to get from one place to another: “It is
an essential, not a luxury, for the bus services are insufficient and there is no subway. I would scarcely
know how to ‘show’ Los Angeles to a visitor. Perhaps the best plan would be to drive quite aimlessly, this
way and that, following the wide streets of little stucco houses, gorgeous with flowering tree and bushes”
(157).
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representative of Halberstam’s characterization of repro-time. Tellingly, this is the same
cycle assigned to the “occupying army of Coke-drinking television watchers” in George’s
neighborhood.17
A good deal of Isherwood’s distrust of reproduction and overconsumption lies
within the characterization of women and children in the novel. Isherwood, in a telling
and significant passage I will quote at length, characterizes Woman as Enemy for both
very personal reasons and reasons relating to the queer ecological tone of the novel as a
whole. According to S. Nagarajan, heterosexual relationships are impossible for George
because “such a relationship exists only to provide an opportunity to Woman to exercise
her biological rights over man and the man returns from the relationship with a feeling of
disgust, self-anger, and a sense of having been exploited” (69). While I suggest that
Nagarajan is misstating the “motivation” behind George’s homosexuality and his pursuit
of Kenny, I think he does arrive at a reasonable interpretation for George’s encounter
with Doris. While visiting Doris, the woman with whom Jim was having an affair and
who was with Jim in the fatal automobile accident, in the hospital, George observes in
horror:
What has it to do with that big arrogant animal of a girl? With that body which
17

With the combination of Coke and television, this indictment is particularly damning. In his article about
Coca-Cola’s ad campaigns and role as symbol of American-ness and domesticity during World War II,
Mark Weiner argues that Coca-Cola not only “embodies the egalitarian, self-directed spirit of consumer
society in the United States” but also consistency and stasis of a mass-manufactured product (124). The
Coca-Cola Company participated in the war effort by becoming not just a cultural symbol for GIs overseas
but also a reality—the government implemented a program to bring Coke to the troops as a way of building
morale. Coke is the symbol of American consumerism, embodied by its unvarying, fabricated, artificial
sameness. As for television, I turn to Jerry Mander’s classic denunciation of television and its control of
the larger system of artificial environments, advertising and consumerism. He sarcastically characterizes
the trickle down theory of economics as a “beautiful cycle of activity” (139). The cycle, “translated
through the media and through our educational system into popular understanding,” that involves
“everyone helping everyone else, laboring together and management rowing the boat together, all serving
the common good and growing endlessly” (139). Taken together, the fact that the breeders watch
television and drink Coke implicates them in this artificial and ultimately destructive cycle that traps its
adherents.
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sprawled stark naked, gaping wide in shameless demand, underneath Jim’s naked
body? Gross insucking vulva, sly ruthless greedy flesh, in all the bloom and gloss
and arrogant resilience of youth, demanding that George shall step aside, bow
down and yield to the female prerogative, hide his unnatural head in shame. I am
Doris. I am Woman. I am Bitch Mother Nature. The Church and the Law exist
to support me. I claim my biological rights. I demand Jim. […] because Doris
was infinitely more than Doris, was Woman the Enemy, claiming Jim for herself.
No use destroying Doris, or ten thousand Dorises, as long as Woman triumphs.
(95-6)
Although Doris is not technically a breeder, the specter of her reproductive possibility,
which is represented by her anatomy, is particularly disturbing to George. The
misogynistic undertones in George’s tirade illustrate his underlying discomfort with all
things female, including Doris and representations of Mother Nature. The discomfort
stems not only from the unchecked and wild breeding potential that George believes lies
in women but also George’s own enraged narrow-mindedness. This is as close as
Isherwood gets to imposing a more acceptable paradigm than heterosexuality. Although
I would argue that George has every right to be upset about his partner’s death, I will also
point out that George’s suspicion of all things heterosexual is deeply linked with his
sense of queerness and environmental destruction.
Highlighting the futility of killing “ten thousand Dorises,” George articulates the
insurmountable biological imperative of heterosexuality. Killing her will not erase all the
other breeders. George’s revulsion for the vagina reflects his horror and culminating
disdain for the breeding, consumptive lifestyle, as well as his own personal contempt for
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Doris’s attempt to “convert” Jim to heterosexuality. She is shameless, open and spread
wide, a vacuum-like vulva unnaturally consuming the entire world. Besides this, she is
the ultimate consumer personified. He plays up the irony of associating the natural with a
procreative mother image because he does not see a natural association between the two.
There is deviation from his own appreciation of the natural world—namely, the beach,
the unpopulated landscape, and any other space that supports his queerness—and the
destructively procreative and entirely constructed image of Mother Nature. In the horror
of this vision, the “Bitch Mother Nature” is a deviation from the benevolent and loving
Mother of lore. Rather than produce natural resources for the good of her “children,”
Bitch Mother Nature reverses the process by eating them alive. Her demand to “claim”
Jim stems from the biological imperative of Woman’s (with a capital “W”) reproductive
capabilities, the so-called “female prerogative.” George is not far off the mark, though,
by thinking that Doris’s sexuality is state sanctioned. The Cold War-era politics of
reproduction supported the notion of a Baby Boom and the building of an insular home
space filled to the ceiling with consumer goods.
Incidentally, Isherwood’s depictions of other heterosexual couples, and by
extension their children, are uniformly negative. Their anxiety regarding George’s
homosexuality is centered on imagining him as a monster in their midst and by keeping
him isolated. In keeping with queer ecological principles, Isherwood suggests that Mr.
and Mrs. Strunk lead consumer-driven, thwarted and narrow lives, and their son, Benny,
is a destructive renegade. Mrs. Strunk, “grown wearily gentle from toiling around the
house at her chores, gently melancholy from regretting her singing days on the radio; all
given up in order to bear Mr. Strunk five boys and two girls,” embodies a potentially
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bohemian life cut off by the postwar domestic imperative (21). A June 1958 entry from
Isherwood’s diaries shows him behaving in much the same manner as George.
Referencing the noise caused by the children next door, Isherwood complains:
The day began badly because I flew out and shouted at the kids, who were
spraying water from the Hines’ house over the Simca. Not much water—that
didn’t matter—but the noise! It not only disturbs me when I’m working, it
threatens me with not being able to work if I want to. I heard Mrs. Hines
reproving the kids later. Of course she thinks I’m an old prissy ill-natured queen,
and let her, with all my heart, if it makes her keep her children away! (760)
His repulsion and frustration with the Hines children is offset by his own assumption that
Mrs. Hines is marking him with an epithet. The result is an interesting blend of liberation
and containment—free of children and their noise, Isherwood can work at any time and
pace he wishes, but at the same time, the “old prissy ill-natured queen” exists in isolation
and as a matter of prejudice. Like Isherwood, George imagines a homophobic Mr.
Strunk attempting “to nail him down with a word. Queer, he doubtless growls” (A Single
Man 27). Interestingly, George thinks Mr. Strunk’s “natural” tendencies as homosocial if
not fully homosexual. Mr. Strunk, who “used to be what many would call a living doll,”
is more interested in male company that that of his wife. He seems fully satisfied with
his heterosexual, breeding “kingdom,” but he still retains an anxiety surrounding his own
homosocial tendencies as well as George’s presence in the neighborhood (27, 26).
As for Mrs. Strunk, “trained in the new tolerance, the technique of annihilation by
blandness,” she is almost purely consumer and only interested in eschewing difference
rather than embracing it. Her attempts at tolerance are misguided because, as Isherwood
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reveals, she cannot hope to ever understand the complexities and realities of a same-sex
partnership such as George and Jim’s. She reads all the latest books and psychology and
spews information ad hoc. Although she appears to tolerate George despite his
queerness, she has a skewed, clinical view of the homosexual, entirely informed by
contemporary psychology:
Reading from it in sweet singsong she proceeds to exorcise the unspeakable out of
George. No reason for disgust, she intones, no cause for condemnation. Nothing
here that is willfully vicious. All is due to heredity, early environment (Shame on
those possessive mothers, those sex-segregated British schools!), arrested
development at puberty, and-or glands. Here we have a misfit, debarred forever
from the best things of life, to be pitied, not blamed. […] Let us even go so far as
to say that this kind of relationship can sometimes be almost beautiful—
particularly if one of the parties is already dead, or, better yet, both. (27-8)18
The “best things in life,” as Mrs. Strunk figures it, are children, homes, and purchasing
power. Also, the implication that queers are better off dead is significant on several
levels: first, by iterating the fear of homosexuality in terms of who “deserves” to live,

18

Mrs. Strunk’s clinical definition is evidence of the prevalence of contemporary psychological
explanations for homosexuality. Frank Caprio’s 1958 study on The Sexually Adequate Male attempts to
account for homosexuality by assigning Freudian meanings to “perversity” and some men’s inability to
perform with women: “Boys rebel against their mothers who try to make husband-substitutes out of them.
They refuse to be looked on as ‘sissies’ by other boys. It is this basic feeling of inferiority in the male child
which is very often fostered by a mother who means well but nevertheless does harm, which accounts for
the development of a homosexual pattern, in adolescence and adult life” (175-6). By boiling
homosexuality down to the effects of the smothering, coddling mother who was this generation’s monster,
Caprio eschews any agency on the male child’s part. Caprio accounts for both homosexual men’s refusal
to service a woman and his desire to engage sexually with men as “of course a defense mechanism for not
being able to accept a woman as a sexual being—an unconscious wish to idealize womanhood. […] It
explains why many homosexuals enjoy a sexless companionship with elderly women (mother-surrogates)”
(177). Caprio sees physical manifestation of homosexuals’ collective misunderstanding of the
unconsciousness; “Hence they find it difficult to discipline themselves successfully” (178). Amongst the
ailments connected to denying their unconscious (but somehow connected to their feelings of guilt and
anxiety) are depression, fatigue, and fainting.
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Mrs. Strunk articulates the common trope of the biological and social “unnaturalness” of
queerness; second, Mrs. Strunk believes in popular notions that homosexuality is merely
a neurosis that can be cured with prompt therapy, which emphasizes the accepted notion
that heterosexuality is healthy and queerness is unhealthy; and last, Mrs. Strunk endorses
the symbolic relationship between George and the now-dead Jim, engaging in
erotophobia, rather than the tactile, grounded relationship of their lived reality. Indeed,
George counters contemporary psychology by stating, “Jim wasn’t a substitute for
anything” (29). But despite Mrs. Strunk’s best efforts to “accept” George’s queerness, it
is evident that her view of healthy and productive relationships falls into a very narrow
category: acquiring goods and bearing children are the only manifestations of naturalness
and normativity for her.
The future, to people like Mr. and Mrs. Strunk, lies in their son Benny, who is the
representative Child in the novel. Benny is this symbolic Child, confirming the
heteronormative belief that the “Child remains the perpetual horizon of every
acknowledged politics, the fantasmic beneficiary of every political intervention”
(Edelman 3). But he is a perversion, and Isherwood uses the boy to illustrate the
illegitimacy of the reproduction-consumption pattern. Portrayed as a “junior
consumer,”19 Benny is destructive and violent toward natural entities and on a direct
course to perpetuating his parents’ lifestyle. An ominous “CHILDREN AT PLAY” sign
appears in George’s neighborhood, and it is a threat rather than a mere observation. The
child’s “play” is not the kind of play depicted by Mortimer-Sandilands as being essential
19

This term comes from Cynthia, another one of George’s colleagues. She laments at how “hideously”
children are dressed in America and how they are “being cheated out of their childhood” (89). The reason?
“They’re being turned into junior consumers!” she exclaims, seeing “those dreadful dainty little creatures
wearing lipstick” as the primary downfall of morality. Similar to George’s ethnic idealization and
stereotyping, Cynthia interestingly notes that Mexican children “are so real. No anxiety. No otherdirection. They just bloom” (89).
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to queer ecology—his play involves no spontaneous touch and redeploys heteronormative
consumerism. Benny, “hammer in hand” begins smashing a broken bathroom scale he
retrieves from the trashcan as George watches from inside his home. “[M]aking believe
the machine is screaming with pain,” Benny appears violently disturbed to George
(Isherwood 23). Mrs. Strunk, however, believes “Benny is passing through his
Aggressive Phase, right on schedule; it just couldn’t be more normal and healthy” (23).
The notion of “phases” that a child must pass through conforms to the conceptualization
of normative temporality. Mrs. Strunk sees Benny’s behavior as the “anarchy of nature,”
but Isherwood’s derision toward these notions is evident—Benny’s “play” is a perversion
and totally unnatural in the realm of queer play (24).
The real anarchy of Benny’s play lies in his disregard for and disengagement from
other people and creatures. Any queerness that might be perceived in “the masculine
hour of ball-playing” is erased because the children’s ball-playing is a carefully detached
performance, one they have learned from their fathers. Benny, joining the other children
to dig a hole in a vacant lot, “spits on his hands and picks up the spade. He is someone or
other on TV, hunting for buried treasure” (24). The imitation of some TV personality
places Benny on the side of Baudrillard’s consumer society, indicating by the
consumption of his parents’ television that objects “are always arranged to mark out
directive paths, to orientate the purchasing impulse towards networks of objects in order
to captivate that impulse” (Baudrillard 27). Isherwood further observes, “These tot-lives
are nothing but a medley of such imitations. And soon as they can speak, they start
trying to chant the singing commercials” (24). Consequently, children’s play in the novel
is always in imitation of something unnatural and always placing them in their parents’
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destructive network.
In order to escape this seemingly inevitable network of consumption,
reproduction, and violence toward nature, one must fully embrace the possibility of
death. I say “possibility” because at the end of George’s day, Isherwood only conjectures
that he dies. Or, as Bergman again highlights in reference to Isherwood’s normalizing of
homosexuality, George’s “death is not the wages of sin, a penalty paid for being gay.
Instead it is a quiet, gentle, painless death—the ‘good death’ we believe granted only to
the virtuous, and the biological death that all mortals must eventually suffer. In this
remarkable ending, Isherwood plays deftly with the requirements of the gay novel,
simultaneously recognizing and rejecting them” (207). The requirements that Bergman
references are the previously accepted literary trope that a gay male character must die a
violent death, usually via suicide or overdose, at the end of the novel. It is an important
revision, and much of Isherwood’s novel refocuses the camera’s gaze by reassigning it to
the homosexual. The critique of “deviant” ways is relocated in A Single Man. The
homosexual is given the chance to disparage and condemn the perverse and destructive
ways and ends of the breeder majority, the living dead, further indicting them by
transmitting the responsibility for apocalypse to them. It is not enough for Isherwood to
say their fixation on futurity through reproduction is futile; he must also acknowledge
that their consumptive, restrictive patterns and their ecologically destructive actions are
ridiculous and potentially hazard to every other person who lives on Earth.
Lest we assume Isherwood is embracing the image of the apocalyptic
homosexual, who in traditional narratives of the queer had to die at the conclusion, let us
recalls Sedgwick’s words in Epistemology of the Closet: “…the phobic narrative
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trajectory toward imagining a time after the homosexual is finally inseparable from that
toward imagining a time after the human; in the wake of the homosexual, the wake
incessantly produced since first there were homosexuals, every human relation is pulled
into its shining representational furrow” (128). That is, to envision no homosexuality, or
no queerness, is to envision an end of all human beings, and in my estimation, either a
total recovery of natural spaces or the total destruction of them. That is certainly
permissible to George. He has already accepted the end of man and the natural world at
the hands of an irresponsible population. His final gesture is to acknowledge fully the
end of life and become “now cousin to the garbage in the container on the back porch”
(186). If this sounds fatalistic, that is because it is.20 Isherwood has already repeatedly
pronounced the final destruction of nature and its resources at the hands of
overpopulation. Akin to garbage, the human is capable only of wasting in the end, and
must, like the waste created by humans, “be carted away and disposed of, before too
long” (186). George is thus implicated in creating waste by merely existing.
But that is if one assumes the novel’s end is also George’s. Isherwood cleverly
leaves George’s death up to speculation as a means of reversing the conventional
homosexual death. Isherwood quips that George’s death this night is “wildly

20

In a rather flippant review of the novel, George Greene professes, “One grows tired of the sentimental
assumption that inversion is an absolute prerequisite for any sense of—and share in—the nightmare of
mortality. It is not George’s bitchy asides and sensual reveries which make him moving as well as
irritating. It is those moments when he escapes from the tyranny of the self. […] It is fitting that we never
know his full name. Neither does he” (53). What Greene seems to be getting at is that George’s death, if it
occurs, is a direct result of his “inversion” and should not hold too much weight with readers. An escape
from the “tyranny of the self” is, essentially, death, and Greene grants it to him at the same time he
discounts it. An anonymous review of the novel seems to echo this same conclusion, that “George is a
prisoner of his perverse sexual appetites; Mr. Isherwood constantly describes him in terms of purely
physical functions, and George thinks of his body as an alien structure over which he has only nominal
control. The problem of finding a new partner, for instance, is going to involve far more than wariness and
diplomacy than is ever required of a man courting a woman” (“Prisoners of the Perverse” 123). By taking
agency away from George, as a man, a homosexual, a bereaving loved one, the reviewer is stripping him of
his own personal experience.
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improbable,” but he speculates that George’s heart condition (because this is what he is
describing) began the moment he “walked into the Starboard Side and set eyes for the
first time on Jim, not yet demobilized and looking stunning beyond words in his Navy
uniform” (185). Before George can be released into the Majority made up of the Dead
and join Jim, he is trapped in the same daily cycle that condemns the breeders.
Isherwood puts him in the same bed in which he begins the novel, and one could flip
back to the beginning of the novel and start all over again. His visions, it seems, are for
nothing, and Isherwood cannot make George’s vision redemptive since
heteronormativity, the certainty of the breeders’ apocalypse, and their environmental
wastage is insurmountable. Whether George lives or dies is actually irrelevant. Neither
option is liberating for George. Death is waste, and life is a trap.
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CHAPTER II
“YOU SHOULD BE A BIG ENOUGH GUY NOW”: HOMOSOCIAL BONDS AND
WILDERNESS MASCULINITY IN KEN KESEY’S SOMETIMES A GREAT NOTION
Love—and all its complicated ramifications […]—actually does conquer
all; Love—or the Fear of Not Having It, or the Worry about Not Having
Enough of It, or the Terror of Losing It—certainly does conquer all.
—Sometimes a Great Notion
[H]e had been so concerned with a simple but difficult Becoming that he
had taken no thought of Being. –Wallace Stegner, “Born a Square”
Civilization is not, at they often assume, the enslavement of a stable and
constant earth. It is a state of mutual and interdependent cooperation
between human animals, other animals, plants, and soils, which may be
disrupted at any moment by the failure of any of them.
—Aldo Leopold, “The Conservation Ethic” 1933

In Sometimes a Great Notion, Ken Kesey’s 1964 novel, Leland Stamper receives
a postcard from his hometown of Wakonda, Oregon written by his cousin Joe Ben. The
postcard arrives in the midst of a botched suicide attempt at Yale. Its postscript is
written, “showing black and blacker, large and larger than all the rest of the message,” by
Leland’s half-brother, Hank (69). The postscript reads, “You should be a big enough guy
now, bub,” and Leland fixates on the implied challenge to his masculinity (69, 70). After
a mention of Hank’s wife, Viv, Leland imagines the idea of his brother married “was so
ludicrous that I found some actual humor in the idea, enough to give me a real laugh and
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the courage of contempt besides,” indicating his apprehension in picturing his brother in a
stable, heteronormative relationship (70). The letter also contains a request for Leland to
return to Wakonda to help with the family’s logging business because the rest of the
town’s loggers have gone on strike. Leland, perceived as the effete, educated man living
in the East, is the Stampers’ last hope in filling the work quota for the Wakonda Pacific
Lumber Company. But Hank’s inference that Leland is a “big enough guy now” reveals
he believes just the opposite—Leland is, in comparison to his half-brother,
underdeveloped, overly cerebral, and incapable of the strenuous work required of a
logger. While Leland later proves his brother right to some degree, he, as well as Hank
and their father Henry, frames his notions of masculinity in terms that emphasize physical
strength, competency in work, a familiarity with and desire to dominate the natural world,
an apparent and strenuous heterosexuality, and fierce competition in the transmission of
sexuality, gender identity, and labor.
The novel primarily surrounds a logging strike in a small Oregon town. In this
chapter, I focus almost exclusively on Hank and Leland’s narrations, but Kesey’s multifaceted narrative lines extend back several hundred years and across numerous
characters, including: Indian Jenny and Simone, the two town prostitutes from very
different backgrounds; Jonathan Bailey Draeger, the athlete’s foot-afflicted union leader;
and the owner of Wakonda’s laundromat and movie theatre, who commits suicide after
learning he impregnates a local African-American girl. Tony Tanner explains, with all
the novel’s shifts in narration and its flashbacks, that “temporal arrangement is only
important within small units,” causing the novel to emphasize the actions contained in a
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single day. 1 In fact, Kesey’s “notes for the novel say, ‘This book, this story, is the real
story of one day, one very important and particular day chosen out of many days, many
months, many years. The day Hank brings the boom downriver’” (Tanner, Ken Kesey
59).2 This particular day, which provides the climax and main frame for the novel, finds

1

Early reviewers of Kesey’s second novel appear to misunderstand or merely ignore the underlying
complexities of Kesey’s world vision. Contemporary reviews, apart from maligning the novel for its
ungainliness, highlight the characters’ struggle for heroism in a decidedly unheroic time as well as the
novel’s tendency to push the boundaries of narrative, sequencing, mimesis, and theme. Irving Malin
identifies the use of symbols such as the Oregon weather as indicators of “the ‘great notion’—reality itself.
The union, the community, and the family—all social institutions—distort reality by shaping it in limited
ways; it is more complex and threatening than their simple ‘conventions’.” While Roger Sale contends that
Kesey’s characters are “embarrassing in their large scale triteness,” he also points out Kesey’s uses lore,
which is “kept alive only by the anachronistic,” at the same time he “is unsentimental indeed on the
relations of a violent pioneering past with a tame and tasteless present” (609). Joyce Carol Oates accuses
Kesey of eschewing the histories of Tom Jones and Tristam Shandy since, as she notes, Kesey “has tried to
combine the robust, masculine, worldly novel of action with the kind developed most skillfully by writers
such as Joyce and Virginia Woolf” (176-7). What can be taken from these reviews is the confusion and
misunderstanding, particularly thematically and narratively, that Great Notion caused upon its publication.
I take these reviews as signs not of the author’s weakness or inability to prioritize but of his engagement
with themes and characterizations that are often mutually exclusive. But since most of the criticism about
Kesey’s work centers on his first novel, 1962’s One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, Great Notion has been
largely ignored. Alternately declared by critics as clumsy, messy, unnecessarily long, and a lesser version
of Cuckoo’s Nest, Great Notion is a complex and sprawling novel of which critics seem to be more
frightened than willing to undertake and give its due. Stephen L. Tanner, in his book-length study of
Kesey’s work, argues that the reason Great Notion has not been treated as much as Cuckoo’s Nest is
because it is too long, and a second or even third reading is required before “many intricately developed
patterns are fully understood and appreciated” (Ken Kesey 55). Further, Tanner states that Kesey’s
“techniques are really not abstruse or obscure; there are just too many of them to take in on the first
reading” (55). For these reasons, Kesey is “like a juggler with many things in the air at the same time,”
which necessitates careful reading, as Tanner prescribes, in order to uncover what he sees as the main
motifs with which Kesey engages—suicide, rain, drowning, and the frontier (64). Indeed, Tanner misses a
few others what I believe to be essential themes here, but his image of Kesey as juggler is an accurate one.
In what follows, I will not only examine the themes that Tanner identifies but also a few I deem just as
essential for understanding Kesey’s most complex work.
2
Linguist Scott Fabius reveals that men, when in same-sex situations, seek common ground and establish a
status desirable to other men as a means of creating homosocial aspiration during various speech events
(713). Fabius conjectures that “fidelity to the institution is characteristic of most if not all of men’s
homosocial groups” because “direct expressions of homosocial desire are located away from individual
members to the group/institution,” as a means of keeping the line between the homosocial and homosexual
as demarcated as possible (699-700). In this context, Leland’s desire to join Hank in taking the boom down
the river is an expression of his commitment to the family’s logging business and its taming of the forest,
and by extension to Hank himself. In matching Hank’s strength and competing with him, Leland attempts
to create for himself a status that is admirable and desirable to his brother. It is for this same reason that
Leland picks a fight with his brother but with one revision: knowing Viv is watching, Leland believes
matching Hank’s strength will win her, but in reality it is the approval of his brother that he seeks. To gain
her approval, however, would diminish the purpose of Leland’s slightly unsuccessful aggressive physical
display. There is no clear winner in the battle, but Leland sees Hank as dominant, and “I did not intend to
spend another dozen years in his shadow, no matter how big it loomed!” (Kesey, Great Notion 709). But
approval from his brother can only come in the formation and approval of a homosocial group.
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several of its main characters scattered around town: Henry is in the hospital after a felled
tree tears off his arm; Joe Ben, Hank’s closest cousin, is dead from drowning, having
been pinned in the river under a felled tree; Leland and Viv have sex behind Hank’s back,
after which Viv departs from Oregon while Leland joins his brother on the boom, but
only after the brothers have a bloody fight on the dock in an apparent attempt to impress
and create sympathy in Viv. What appears to be a simple Freudian tale of the prodigal
son (Leland) returning to his home to avenge the seduction and eventual suicide of his
mother (Myra) by his half-brother (Hank) by seducing his half-brother’s wife (Viv)
amidst the hard scrabble life of the Oregon loggers is actually a complex narrative that
challenges the themes of masculinity, heterosexuality, the frontier, and man’s
engagement with the natural world.
Little has been said about the symbolic value of the natural world and its
connection with sexuality and gender politics in Kesey’s work.3 For a novel like Great
Notion, which uses the forest and rivers of the Pacific Northwest as its setting for an
exploration of the relationship between men in the same family and work community,
this seems hardly comprehensible. In fact, a 1971 interview in Kesey’s Garage Sale,
conducted by Ralph Krassner, the editor of the Whole Earth Catalog, reveals that Kesey
engaged with gender and sexual politics and their relationship to the natural world when

3

The profusion of work about Kesey and masculinity reveals more about the state of Kesey criticism than
it does Kesey’s literary output. The fixation on the hero theme in his novels reveals a desire to link Kesey’s
characters with the unquestioned “manliness” by which he presumably lived. The narrowness of these
interpretations indicate an obsessive tendency in previous critics of Kesey’s work to link an understanding
of his personal life to his literature, and many pieces fixate on Kesey’s escapades with the Merry Pranksters
as a way of explaining the motifs in his fiction. While I do not advocate criticism that is entirely stripped
of authorial biography, I believe the reliance on Kesey’s biography as a tool of explanation for his fiction
implies a general discomfort with engaging with what is in my opinion some of his more problematical
work. Therefore, in this chapter I examine Great Notion with a substantial reliance on close readings of
Kesey’s second novel. This is because up until this point, critics have largely avoided the words
themselves.
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writing Great Notion. Kesey describes the motivation behind the 1964 novel:
Women’s lib is the real issue in Notion. I didn’t know this when I wrote it, but
think about it: It’s about men matching egos and wills on the battleground on
Viv’s unconsulted hide. When she leaves at the end of the book, she chooses to
leave the only people she loves for a bleak and uncertain but at least equal future.
The earth is bucking in protest of the way she’s been diddled with; is it strange
that the most eloquent rendition of this protest should come from the bruised
mouth of womankind? (218)
Kesey could be referring to the frame of the novel: the story of the Stampers, the strike,
and the insistence of Henry Stamper to “Never Give an Inch” is framed by Viv’s
perspective, as she flips through the Stamper family photo album. And since Great
Notion lies in the very hands of Viv, a fact that can easily be forgotten in the dissonance
and tangle of the other narrative lines, it is important to remember that hypermasculinity,
although on the surface the most prominent virtue of the novel, can easily be eschewed to
make way for queer possibilities, particularly those sanctioned in natural spaces.4 It is
not just Viv through which the novel’s misogyny and misuse of the natural world is
transmitted; it is also the earth itself.
On the surface, Kesey’s formulation of manhood in Great Notion corresponds
4

According to Tony Tanner, the brothers’ manipulation of Viv “is not depicted as cruelty; if anything it is
one of the sad results of that loss of ability to recognize and communicate with other people’s reality which
more than one American novelist has portrayed” (City of Words 378-9). In this estimation, Great Notion is
much more about the failure, on the individual level, of human communication. Great Notion, to me, is
much more about the other possibilities of human communication, including the exchanges with the natural
world. Charles Bowden, in his introduction to the novel, makes a couple of relevant and apt points: “The
book demolishes all the ways we have of defining life so it will become tame. Collectivism comes across
as living death, individualism as actual death, resources are something disappearing as the family gnaws
through the last virgin stand. The human world vanishes at times […] And the entire book is in the hands
of a woman as she flips through a family album in an effort to explain the love and defeat she has witnessed
and shared” (xiv). Such an observation places both the characters and the environment in which they live
and work in a space where definitions, performances, and identities are constantly slipping away and being
redefined.
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with perceptions of masculinity held during the first part of the Cold War. The subject of
Cold War masculinity is often framed in terms of the language of frontier mythology and
the West.5 Suzanne Clark points out, “Manliness as a heroic pragmatism and a discourse
of identity located the national drama in the arena of last frontiers” (19).6 Although
nuclear narratives of the Cold War do not presuppose the genre of the Western, Clark
argues, the image of the atomic bomb and the rhetoric of the “Cold Warrior,” typified by
the cowboy and soldier, became representative of Cold War masculinity. “[T]hose old
fables” backed up “a new order,” which is marked by a sustained hypermasculinity that
“seemed not the politics of gender only because the politics of a gendered illusion kept it
submerged” but an attempt at establishing “whiteness, maleness, together with American
authenticity, as unmarked, neutral positions of superior reason” (15, 3). In addition to
the assumption of white, frontier, American masculinity as the paradigm of the Cold
Warrior, Kesey’s notions of masculinity, “combined with figures like Norman Mailer,
Hugh Hefner, and Ian Fleming, all of whom created masculine personas that offered the
American public the possibility of avoiding being labeled ‘pink’,” are performed “by
taking up acts deemed heterosexual,” as Michael Meloy explains (13). For these men,
“[e]xhibiting an open, exaggerated sexuality became an opportunity to validate one’s
5

Perhaps a little tongue-in-cheek, Wallace Stegner (himself included and Kesey as well) explains that the
naïve Western writer (writers writing about the West) have a conundrum with which to deal: the fact that
Western writers do not have a legitimate literary tradition from which to draw their influence as well as the
dominance of larger cultural narratives that potentially limit their scopes (“Born a Square” 170). These
narratives, Stegner argues, are uncomfortable for Western writers because they “specialize in despair,
hostility, hypersexuality, and disgust. If only because of their youth, the several Wests continue to
represent some degree of traditional American innocence” (171). I do not completely buy Stegner’s
assertions, but when I apply them to Kesey’s work, I do find that Sometimes a Great Notion is infused with
some pure and essential moments of innocence, while often devoid of the despair and hypersexuality that
Stegner mentions. It is something to consider.
6
The evocation of the term “frontiers” in the 1960s must call to mind John F. Kennedy’s famous “New
Frontier” speech given in 1960. Kennedy suggests each American become a “pioneer in the face of an
uncertain future full of unprecedented danger and hope. He quotes from the Bible—“Be strong and of
good courage; be not afraid, neither be thou dismayed”—in order to convey what he sees as the decade’s
and country’s greatest necessity and virtue—authority and power.
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heterosexuality,” and their pronounced manhood, I would argue (13). That also means
“to not participate in the sexual rhetoric of Joe McCarthy, Mickey Spillane, and Ian
Fleming was to potentially render oneself unmanly” (13). In other words, “real” men of
the Cold War era were noticeably heterosexual, sometimes aggressively so, dedicating
their identities and genitalia to a rhetoric that supported physical assertiveness but not
faint-heartedness. The Stampers, especially Hank and Henry, the self-made logger and
businessman,7 do not want to be viewed as “pink” so they throw themselves into filling a
work quota for the Wakonda Pacific lumber company with no regard for the feelings of
their fellow townspeople and strikers or any consideration for the overwhelming amount
of work that must be completed by so few people. To do otherwise would be spineless.
While the physicality displayed by the men of the logging community is often
7

It is through the image of the so-called self-made man that Kesey chooses, at least initially, to give his
male characters their masculine mystique. In James V. Catano’s study about masculinity and the self-made
man, he draws on Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble and Bodies That Matter in order to argue that masculinity
“is rule-governed practice […] a practice and maintained—culturally and individually—through and in
terms of present rhetorical arguments” (2). Catano further engages with what he identifies as doxa, or the
axiomatic elements of manliness, to explain that masculinity “is an oscillation or negotiation (as in
negotiating a minefield) between a dominant mythic rhetoric and the particulars of a personal situation,” in
addition to recognizing the “deep irony” of the rhetoric of the self-made man which claims “to offer the
ultimate in freely formed, self-created individualism, while it actually serves to establish a social subject, a
set of behavioral patterns and expectations that are already prescripted, as it were” (3). Combined, these
notions of the self-made man form a portrait of masculinity that is settled between the control of rhetoric
and culture and the desire to fight back against that control. Surely, the concept of prescripting serves to
classify the so-called “self-made man” as something hardly classifiable. But does Catano not suggest that,
by remaining in a kind of purgatory between supposed self-formation and prescribed socialness, the selfmade man is indeed at the command of the social order, whether it serves his interests or not? Indeed,
Michael Kimmel, speaking of the men’s liberation movement that coincided with the much larger
Women’s Liberation movement, states, “At its core men’s liberation provided a coherent critique of the
Self-Made Man; in its eyes, he was the failure. As a collection of do and don’ts, the male sex role was a
recipe for despair; given what it took to be a real man, few, if any, men could live up to the image, and
hence all men would feel like failures as men” (281). There is hardly room for autonomy in either Catano’s
or Kimmel’s estimation of the self-made man, leaving those men who have labored under the illusion of
having “made” oneself sadly mistaken. Also of note is their belief in the impossibility of a man being able
to achieve the mythic freedom of the self-reliant man. If this self-reliance is the hallmark of the stoic and
independent masculinity of the Western hero, there is little left to which he can cling. The solution to these
problems, I would argue, lies in James Knapp’s contention that Kesey is offering the sheer impossibility of
a combined “vital individualism, whose price is personal isolation” and “a vision of the necessity of interdependence and mutual brotherhood” (398). One cannot survive in both modes. Instead, I see Kesey
choosing the latter option as the mode through which his characters achieve self-sufficiency by affirming
their homosocial links.
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read by critics as Kesey’s way of reinscribing a macho, pioneer mentality into a Cold
War era American literature populated by flaccid and disempowered men, I read these
moments erotically and queerly, underscoring their occurrence in the space of the forest
as a necessary to the enactment of homosociality. Through his male characters in Great
Notion, Kesey illustrates that stable masculine identities do not exist, and indeed, socalled manly men do not necessarily rely upon an exclusively heterosexual relationship
with women to express their sexuality. But to take matters of masculinity and its
relationship to the natural world for granted would be a mistake. A categorical stability
for the manly man, his attitude toward women, and his associations with the resources
and forces of the natural world does not exist, at least not unquestioned, in the forests of
Kesey’s Oregon. In Studs, Tools, and the Family Jewels, Peter Murphy explains, “If gay
men represent undesirable male sexuality and straight men embody the only acceptable
male sexuality, all men become victims of the language passively adopted to describe
‘authentic’ masculinity. This kind of language does not allow us to entertain the thought
that there are alternate forms of masculinity to the heterosexual” (106). This includes, to
my mind, forms like homosociality, for example. The notion of authentic masculinity,
then, is a fraught one, one that forecloses the possibilities of alternative ways of viewing
the world, including nature. As Barbara Ehrenreich points out in The Hearts of Men, the
counterculture, of which Kesey is universally declared a member, was not simply “a male
rebellion” (107). If the Beats “idealized defiant masculinity,” then “the hippies discarded
masculinity as a useful category for expression” (107). While Ehrenreich’s evaluation of
the counterculture as an “androgynous vision” might be slightly overstating the fact, there
is something to her claim that “the counterculture reinforced the promise, from a new
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psychology, of a richer life for those who could overcome their masculine hang-ups”
(116). The “richer life,” in the context of Kesey’s novel, includes the opportunity for a
queer resistance that takes place in natural spaces. At the same Kesey formulates
characters who, despite being descended from a “[h]ard jaw, tendoned neck, deep chest
[…] stiff-starched, leatherbound, iron-cored patriarch,” cannot unquestionably be called
manly men (Kesey, Great Notion 17). The seeming contradiction of the two modes is
unresolved in the novel, a way for Kesey to formulate a queer resistance to Cold War
masculinity as well as domination over the natural world.
The archetypal figure of the Western hero, independent, self-made, and free of
women, is a useful frame through which to examine Kesey’s characters, but I caution
against the wholesale adoption of such figures as exemplars of masculine codes of
identity. In fact, Kesey revises mythologies of the Western hero and the narrative of
positive technological progression. He sees the progressive West as consequential in the
postwar period. Men are ineffective in both love and work, and their masculinities are
constantly being challenged. By extension, the novel’s treatment of women points to the
troubling subordination and misinterpretation of nature and woman by patriarchal
domination. The particular queer ecological aspects of Great Notion are manifest in the
primacy of the male-on-male relationships and how they challenge not just
heterosexuality as a fully realized and socially sanctioned identity but also the structure
of the nuclear family and its production of children. While I do not wish to equate
queerness with homosociality, I will acknowledge Eve Sedgwick’s use of Rene Girard’s
conceptualization of erotic triangles in her pivotal study on homosociality in literature,
Between Men. She argues that in literature that features romantic rivalry between men,
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there is an “insistence that, in any erotic rivalry, the bond that links the two rivals is as
intense and potent as the bond that links either of the rivals to the beloved” (21). First
located in the figure of Myra and then in Viv, their competition over women reveals the
same kind of triangulated desire Sedgwick introduces. Women have their own particular
function in the homosocial relationships.8 Sedgwick suggests that the “bond of
cuckoldry” emphasizes men’s striving toward “satisfying relationships with other men,”
and women become “property” in a triangular exchange in which one of the men
involved “requires a willingness and ability to temporarily risk, or assume, a feminized
status” (50-1). That is, in love triangles, the woman becomes a secondary erotic
consideration to the relationship of the men involved. Leland seeks to cuckold Hank and
thus enter a deeper relationship with him, but it is Leland who gains the “feminized
status” in the triangle. This relationship, Sedgwick suggests, forms a “potential
unbrokenness of a continuum between homosocial and homosexual” (1).9
8

Also in this manner, Viv and Myra, both reluctantly Stamper women, are positioned as the property for
which the men are competing while they are simultaneously displaying desire for each other. Their
function in the novel is to off-set the homosocial possibilities of the male relationships at the same time
they release the men from the willful knowing of their own sexuality. As long as Viv and Myra exist, Hank
and Leland are “safe” from acknowledging their desires for each other. Barry H. Leeds finds “Hank is
preoccupied with replicating Myra in Viv” while “Lee attempts to repay, in his incestuous relationship with
his brother’s wife, the injury done him by his brother and mother” (85). Leeds points out Kesey’s obvious
Freudian parallels drawn amongst the characters and their often incestuous relationships with one another,
but he misses one of the crucial locations of desire—the brothers’ competition over the bodies of both Myra
and Viv in which neither man wins. Instead, in the closing scene of the novel, in scene which Leeds
describes in “the essence of their vision and Kesey’s that the constant potential for new beginnings is
central to the dynamic process that is human life,” the brothers go off together, leaving Viv an opening for
escape (88). This, to me, is the pivotal scene of the novel, and the brothers, having chosen each other’s
companionship over that of the woman’s, choose the homosocial and non-procreative over the heterosexual
and consumptive.
9
Sedgwick’s evocation of the continuum is similar to the Kinsey Scale, which attempts to classify
individuals on a sliding scale of 0-6 (heterosexual to homosexual) as a way of illustrating the variability of
human’s psychic reactions and physical experiences. As Alfred Kinsey famously argued in 1948’s Sexual
Behavior in the Human Male:
Males do not represent two discrete populations, heterosexual and homosexual. The world is not
to be divided into sheep and goats. Not all things are black nor all things white. It is a
fundamental of taxonomy that nature rarely deals with discrete categories. Only the human mind
invents categories and tries to force facts into separated pigeon-holes. The living world is a
continuum in each and every one of its aspects. […] The homosexual activity rarely conflicts
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In Great Notion homosocial bonds function as the possibility of queer
resistance—that is, resistance to the traditional narratives of childbearing and –rearing
that often become naturalized in social narratives, and these bonds are always formed and
can flourish away from the structured, domestic spaces ruled by women and in more
masculine nature spaces, controlled and named only by men.10 I would argue, then, that
Hank and Leland’s competition as well as their finally acknowledged embrace at the end
of the novel is performed as a means of expressing their homosocial desire for each other,
and especially Leland’s for his brother. It is this expression, although it goes unspoken
and even unacknowledged by the pair, which is manifested in the forest and river, the
representative natural spaces in the novel. As Elaine B. Safer argues, the novel’s abiding
theme is the absurdity of the human condition in a “senseless universe” made up of
multiple layers: “the metaphysical indicates that ‘treacherous impermanence’ of nature,
whose rivers overflow all apparent boundaries on the water-soaked Oregon coast; the
historical reveals that the memory of Hiroshima destroys heroic potential in a post-World
War II society; the psychological shows the bizarre ramifications of an Oedipal situation
[…]” (230). Safer explains that through the motif of the absurd quest, the story of the
with their heterosexual relations, and is quite without the argot, physical manifestations, and other
affectations so often found in urban groups. There is a minimum of personal disturbances or
social conflict over such activity. It is the type of homosexual experience which the explorer and
the pioneer may have had in their histories. (639, 631)
Both Kinsey’s and Sedgwick’s use of a continuum is suggestive of the fluidity of human sexual identity.
Further, in Epistemology of the Closet, Sedgwick furthers her work on the bonds of men by explaining:
If such compulsory relationships as male friendship, mentorship, admiring identification,
bureaucratic subordination, and heterosexual rivalry all involve forms of investment that force
men into the arbitrarily mapped, self-contradictory, and anathema-riddled quicksands of the
middle distance of male homosocial desire, then it appears that men enter into adult masculine
entitlement only through acceding to the permanent threat that the small space they have cleared
for themselves on this terrain may always, just as arbitrarily and with just as much justification, be
foreclosed. (186)
10
Consequently, I wholly disagree with Barry Leeds’s observation that “What these characters have in
common is an inability to break out of the predetermined identity pressed upon them by external forces” on
the grounds that any notions of stable, predetermined identity are immediately questioned the instant Great
Notion begins (65).
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Stampers illustrates the very senselessness of any heroic effort. The natural world works
against the Stampers, Safer claims, as does history, archetypal figures, and heroic
mythology. “Kesey’s continual movement from the ludicrous to the calamitous
disorients us,” Safer contends, making us “aware that we live in a bizarre, cartoon world”
(237). This cartoonish-ness, I would argue, is exemplified by the ever-shifting and
disorienting natural world itself, making its actions and reactions indicative of the queer
condition of the novel.
As opposed to Isherwood’s valleys and desert, the natural world in Kesey’s novel
is embodied in the forest and the river. These spaces rule the ordering of Wakonda’s life.
The site that Hank, Leland, and Joe Ben have cleared for themselves in the forests allow
for the expression of their homosociality and their perceived masculinity.. Also, through
descriptions of the rising river, Kesey emphasizes human being’s inability to control and
police nature, which in turns dismantles the notion of naturalized human dominance.
From the fluidity of the “hysterical crashing of tributaries as they merge into the
Wakonda Auga River,” Kesey invites us to follow to the sight of Henry’s severed arm—
“tied at the wrist, (just the arm; look) disappearing downward at the frayed shoulder
where an invisible danger performs twisting pirouettes for an enthralled audience (just
the arm, twisting there, above the water)—and immediately introduces the reader to a
unpredictable and disorienting world order (Kesey, Great Notion 1, 2). It is an order, in
fact, that is marked and dictated by the very river that is the lifeblood as well as the bane
of the community. The spaces of the forest and river allow the men to transgress
(however limited the transgression is) the restrictive boundaries of heteronormativity and
domesticity.

84

But as men in the lumber industry, the Stampers’ relationship to the natural world
is a loaded one, and it is not as simple as a matter of destroying or conquering nature. It is
almost essential that “Nature undefiled” is the “inevitable setting of the Sacred Marriage
of males,” as Leslie Fiedler contends in 1948’s “Come Back to the Raft Ag’in, Huck
Honey.” Fiedler’s essay is one of the first to give credence to the male homosocial bonds
in the American canon (148). The proximity of these homosocial bonds (though Fiedler
does not actually call them such) does not reveal the search for a substitute for a female
presence but rather the “isolation sought more or less consciously as an occasion for male
encounters” (149). Their practice of clear cutting forests is certainly motivated by
economic interests and the establishment of dominion over the rest of the Wakonda
logging community rather than the spirit of conservation. The Stampers, as men
engaging with and utilizing natural spaces (specifically the forest), are illustrative of the
connection between the meaning of manliness and the domination of nature. In the
introduction to the collection Eco-Man: New Perspectives on Masculinity and Nature,
Mark Allister notes that there has been little said about so-called “masculinity” and
“nature” except that “…when we are asked to name particular American men we
associate with the term ‘masculinity,’ we don’t usually name men who use their minds,
but men who exhibit prowess in ‘nature,’ outdoors, in sports arenas, and ‘through’ nature,
by being rugged and handsome” (1). “[T]o prove one’s manhood is not to test oneself in
nature but to destroy it,” Allister further observes (3). This paradigm is useful in
considering the performative aspects of masculinity and nature. If exhibiting masculinity
means destroying and conquering natural spaces, the violence and devastation related to
displays of virile masculinity is highlighted. Thus, to prolifically reproduce, that is, to
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“prove” one’s manliness, is to also damage and obliterate natural spaces and resources.
While Hank, Joe Ben, and Leland want to outwardly display their manliness by chopping
down trees, taming nature, and objectifying and using women for their own pleasures,
their relationships with each other highlight a different and perhaps dormant desire—the
desire for queer resistance and for homosocial bonds.11
Important also to Kesey’s portrayal of work and the homosocial bonds between
men are the spaces of the forest and the river and the connection these spaces have to the
logging industry. In her work on masculinity in the Western extractive industries, Nancy
Quam-Wickham declares, “we need to acknowledge the centrality of work in the
construction of the legendary manliness of the western extractive workers” (103).
Focusing on the men who “conquer nature” through their occupations in mining, logging
and oil-rigging, Quam-Wickham outlines the various initiation rites and discourses used
by men in these industries to illustrate that the industrialized West is a particularly
gendered space, just as the mythic savage West.12 The emphasis on the physicality of

11

In his essay on the meaning of Mount Rushmore and sexuality in the establishment of the republican
landscape, Peter Boag suggests that the “Founding Fathers” sanctioned heterosexuality and a patriarchal
gender system as the “natural” social organization in the new republic, while they simultaneously contained
within themselves “hidden meanings and secret opinions” (borrowing from Aldo Leopold’s
characterization of mountains) that ultimately queered their selves and their histories (42). What Boag
reveals in his essay is that the unlucky in love and childless George Washington, “Abraham Lincoln and his
bedfellow, Theodore Roosevelt and his cowboys, and of Jefferson and his yeomen undermine the sexual
and gender expectations of the republican landscape of the West” (52). In this manner, “idealized
democracy and heterosexuality reinforced each other,” leading to the ill-begotten justification for westward
expansion as well as the monolithic and false formation of the Founding Fathers (53). Boag suggests that
early republican notions of naturalized sexuality helped form the bulk of American domestic policy in the
early centuries, causing the following paradigms: “The masculine that inhabited the public realm sought to
transform natures or wilderness into fruitful farms and productive towns. Although the feminine also had
in mind converting nature and the wild, it did so only to the point that these might provide a refuge for
domesticity” (48). Here is a definition of masculinity that is dependent upon the articulation of the
feminine.11 The constant fluctuation between masculine and feminine as well as myth and reality in the
formation of the American republican, pioneering spirit makes itself unstable, nebulous, in constant motion
in and out of definitive classification.
12
The main challenge to the virile manliness that Henry represents comes in the form of a man’s
relationship to his work and his work associates, especially when the work is decidedly gendered
masculine. Peter Boag’s book Same-Sex Affairs: Constructing and Controlling Homosexuality in the
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work as well as male solidarity resulted in masculine identities that were not “some social
construction of collective gender identity serving to uphold male hegemony” or “simply a
personal quality distinguished by certain characteristics” but rather as a means of
expressing one’s “identity and authority as men in both body and spirit” (95). Indeed, in
describing the way the men work together, Kesey reveals a kind of spiritual engagement
with the work as well as the forest: “they communicated with the unspoken language of
labor toward a shared end, becoming more and more an efficient, skilled team as they
worked their way across the steep slopes” (Kesey, Great Notion 567).
The stereotype of the uber-manly lumberjack developed alongside the move
toward virility in the production of homosexuality.13 In fact, one of the most famous
Pacific Northwest outlines the homosexual subculture of the transient labor force at the turn of the 20th
century. This “same-sex sexual subculture” was the subject of middle-class distrust and scrutiny as sexual
deviance was often associated with the immigrant, non-white working classes. What’s more, Boag claims
a direct correlation between the emergence of Portland’s modern, urban gay subculture with the
homosexual happenings in the rural spaces of the regions. Although the study itself does not match up with
the historical period of Great Notion, I believe that observations culled from Boag’s study can help explain
the homosocial ethos behind the Stamper clan’s associations. The association between the homosexual
subculture and the work they did is significant because without the labor involved, the communities would
not have been formed. Within these communities are the interpersonal relationships between those known
as jockers—the older, more experienced men within the transient laboring communities—and the punks—
the younger men or boys in need of guidance. While the jocker-punk relationship necessarily included
physicality, as Boag explains, it often went beyond sexual gratification: “The emotional awards of the
teacher-apprentice relationship or even the basic warmth and compassion could be gained by both jocker
and punk provided safety and protection as well, giving boys themselves significant reasons unrelated to
sex to submit to or even initiate these alliances” (35). While I am not arguing that explicit sexual acts occur
between the brothers, I do contend that their relationship takes on dimensions of the jocker-punk
relationship, a Hank acts at the teacher to Leland’s apprentice. That this pedagogical relationship takes
place in the woods is doubly significant: first, as a same apart from the domesticity of Jan and Viv, the
woods are an exclusively male and a seemingly masculine space; and secondly, the cover the forest
provides, away from the policing eye of mainstream society, a space for these relationships to safely
develop and flourish.
13
The movement began as a way for homosexuals, so long associated with effeminacy and weakness, to
express their masculine sides. Marked by the embrace of stereotypically macho representations—the
cowboy, biker, lumberjack—the gay clones discarded the relaxed attitudes towards utilized by
heterosexuals in favor of a deliberate and meaningful fashion. “Clones wore their garments in a selfconsciously tight manner in order to enhance their physical attractiveness,” explains Shaun Cole, whose
article on the masculine stereotypes embraced by gay clones reveals that “[i]n adopting an image that was
based upon a heterosexual macho images, gay men walked a tightrope between straight imitation and an
interpretation that could identify them not only as real men but as real gay men” (129). The macho man
presentational style was one of simultaneous self-defense and seduction, and it caught on not only in the
gay subculture but also in popular culture.
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homoerotic, fetish artists of the twentieth century, Tom of Finland, often used the image
of the lumberjack in his work. Tom of Finland’s lumberjacks, surrounded by the everphallic axes and either erect and rooted or felled trees, have barrel chests, rippling biceps,
strong jawlines, long, muscular legs, and shapely buttocks. Their gigantic members are
outlined by tight-fighting jeans that are in turn tucked into thigh-high work boots, and
those who actually wear shirts wear the standard plaid flannel. Indeed, Tom of Finland’s
fetish images are idealizations of the gay macho men, but they signal a marked trend in
the representation of homosexuals. The bodies of Tom of Finland’s subjects are,
according to Micha Ramakers, “reminiscent enough of reality to be credible, but just far
enough beyond that reality to form a nigh unattainable ideal” (72). Lumberjacks
represented the attraction of working-class masculinity, and Tom of Finland “focused
mainly on the ‘natural’ bodies such men possessed, but that would be rapidly extend to
the fetishization of working-class dress codes” (128). In this way, the production of a
macho homosexual identity adopted the conventions of that which had already been
classified as masculine. And indeed, the men of the Stamper clan appear to be clones of
one another. “A horde of kinsmen” greet Leland when he arrives, “their plaid shirts, spike
boots, and manly physiques bespeak the logging trade; a uniformity of features indicates
they are all members of the same family, for they all boast noble Roman noses, sandybrown hair wafted free by the fragrant northern breezes, and iron-green eyes. They are
all ruggedly handsome” (Kesey, Great Notion 86). They all look alike, but here it does
not seem to be merely an incident of genetic relationship: their relational bonds with one
another and their work cause them to not only dress alike but to carry themselves the
same physically.
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Kesey uses homosocial relationships between men (namely, Joe Ben and Hank
(despite the fact they are both married), Hank and Leland, and Leland and his roommate
and possible lover, Peters) to dismantle and discount the presence of heterosexuality and
reproduction in the novel. In particular, the forest and the river play important roles in
the allowance of homosocial relationships, but both spaces also amplify the fraught
association humans have with the natural world. It is through such natural images, and
those of the animal world as well, that people desiring to somehow tame or conquer
nature learn their folly and that Kesey reveals the gendered politics of his characters
connection to the natural world. By using birds and other animal images to describe
various characters, Kesey demonstrates the interconnectivity of the natural and human
world as well as using quite revealing descriptors.14 The Wakonda Auga, often
aggressive and rapacious, “roams the fields like a glistening bird of prey” (166). While
Hank refers to Viv as both “chicken” and “kitten,” Leland describes her as “the
wildwoods flower,” illustrating the different way the brothers view her—to Hank she is a
pet and smaller being that must be cared for and to Leland she is decorative, exotic and
other. Viv sees herself as “one of these carrion-bird people. Like a magpie or a raven.
Somebody…just interested in picking at the purple places in people’s past, she’d say, not
at their healthy places, just at their hurts” (494-3). Myra is evocatively associated with a
caged songbird, beautiful but trapped. The honking of the migrating geese haunts Hank,
and he craves the tenderness and proximity of the cow when he milks her. Leland,
himself described as an owl, asks his father during a foxhunt, “Don’t you think a poor
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Indeed, Kesey’s philosophical turn, described by Barry Leeds as “clearly existential,” questions human’s
relationship to Nature, and thus to Death and Time and the world around them (63). Gilbert Porter, arguing
that “Kesey has not written a mere Aesopian fable here,” points out that “he has employed animal nature to
probe human nature” (53).
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dumb beast has the ability to recognize the same cruel world as the drunk? Don’t you
think that fox down there has just as many demons to escape as the wino?” (289). We, as
humans, are intertwined with the natural world, Kesey argues, no mater how we choose
to form that relationship.
The nearly primeval forest, then, often intimidates the Stampers, causing them to
attempt to frame nature in manageable units and controlling it in their own manner. The
classical division between civilization and wilderness is, for James Knapp, enacted by
Kesey’s opinion that “nature was an alien presence that must be transformed by the arts
of civilization before it could serve a human purpose. His aim was not to build the mines
and mills and cities of the earlier dreamers, but his starting point, like theirs, was the
assumption that nature must be mastered by human technology” (406). Kesey is fully
aware of the human impact upon the natural world, and particularly the forest in Great
Notion. As Michael Drout points out, Hank “never wavers in his determination to reduce
the chaotic independence of trees to the controllable, useful substance of wood,” but as
fast as Hank and his family can basically clear-cut the forest, it is “always regenerating
itself and encroaching on Hank’s world” (135). Drout’s description brings to mind the
never-ending work of Adam in the Garden of Eden since Hank’s toil is seemingly
nonstop. But there will come a day when the forest will be totally depleted. For the time
being, though, the forest is a space for the enactment performative masculinity where
attempts at conquering nature can be made in the view of other men.
Symbolic of the force and unpredictability of the natural world and the absurdity
of attempted human dominion, the Wakonda Auga River holds great influence over the
community of Wakonda, and any human attempts to tame or manipulate the river go
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horribly awry. As Stephen Tanner argues, “The river and the ocean represent the forces
that erode individual strength and induce despair and surrender” (“Labor Union” 17).
But I would take this observation one step further by arguing that it is the force of water
with its fluidity and its ability to permeate and drown the human body that affects the
hubris of men who believe themselves impervious to the forces of nature. The river is
both active agent in men’s destruction and passive receiver of the same.15 Suffering from
athlete’s foot, Jonathan Bailey Draeger, the head of the union, believes a man can slowly
rot “like a corpse” from the incessant moisture of the famously rainy Pacific Northwest,
and he thinks, “It’s certainly no wonder that this area has two or three natives a month
take that one-way dip—it’s either down your blasted self or not” (Kesey, Great Notion
3). The title of the novel is drawn from the blues song “Good Night, Irene,” which
contains the line: “Sometimes I get a great notion/To jump into the river…an’ drown.”
The river and the moisture in the air appear to have some kind of hypnotic effect on the
residents of Wakonda. It is a land “saturated with moist and terrible dying,” enough to
drive men mad (29). Considered by earlier settlers a “Highway of Water,” the river
seems to have an ability to skew the residents’ sense of orientation: “She runs both
directions, don’t she? So maybe the river ain’t carryin’ the land out to sea like the
15

Furthermore, the only home built on the bank of the Wakonda Auga belongs to Henry Stamper, and it
stands as a fraught site of engagement with and opposition to the river. As the river eats into the riverbank,
the house is beginning to crumble and fall into the water. A “two-story monument of wood and obstinacy
that has neither retreated from the creep of erosion nor surrendered to the terrible pull of the river,” the
Stamper homestead stands, like Hank’s severed arm and the extended middle finger, like a great “fuck you”
to both the town and the Wakonda Auga (5). At the same time, Leland is amazed by the home’s accidental
beauty, the careful yet unintentional cultivation of the flowers: “The flowers that bloomed at random
around the porch and along the sides of the embankment had obviously required great care and attention,
but again there was nothing force or unnatural” (103). He sees the surrounding land as a “land for
childhood frolic, with forests dark and magical and shady sloughs alive with chubs and mud-puppies, a
land in which young and snub-nosed Dylan Thomas would have gamboled, red-cheeked and raucous as a
strawberry, a town where Twain could trade rats and capture beetles, a chink of wild beautiful insane
American that Kerouac could have dug a good six or seven novels’ worth” (258). Leland’s idealization of
the Stamper homestead and its surrounding forest is significant because it illustrate the fine line between
human manipulation and total naturalness.
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government is tellin’ us; maybe it’s the sea carryin’ the water in to the land” (4). The
river and water in general are powerful forces of disorientation.
But it is essential that we remember the river takes Joe Ben’s life, disrupting one
of the most tender and attentive relationship in the novel—that between Joe Ben and
Hank. Leland’s first glimpse of Joe Ben’s relationship with Hank begins thus: “Hank
smiles after the lovable little gnome in a manner to betray the tender heart that beats
beneath his rough exterior” (Kesey, Great Notion 87). Joe Ben is described by Hank as
being “that way; probably one of the most accommodating guys in the world” (132).
Using the description normally reserved for explaining the unspeakability of
homosexuality (i.e., he’s that way; he’s like that), Hank realizes the once too-pretty and
smallish Joe Ben is a delicate yet robust man.16 Their relationship, after having been
raised together, flourishes daily in the forest. They set out for work every day, spending
the majority of their waking hours apart from their wives and in the woods toiling
together to complete their task. Their relationship is, to my mind, the most fully
developed and evidently close. When Joe Ben slowly drowns, trapped beneath a felled
tree that has landed in the rain-swollen river, he and Hank engage in the most poignant
and tender scene in the novel. It is, to my mind, the scene in which the greatest amount
of human-to-human affection occurs. And perhaps that affection does not have a
perceptible erotic component, it is worth noting that Joe Ben and Hank’s attachment to
each other is the most powerful in the novel. In a moment not only desperately lifeaffirming but also homoerotic, Hank performs mouth-to-mouth on the drowning Joe Ben,
risking his own life to dive beneath the water to save his friend: “Then gulped another
16

In fact, John Howard’s 2001 study on the community formation of gay men in the South in the 20th
century is entitled Men Like That.
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lungful of air and plunged his face into the water, feeling with his lips until he found
Joby’s mouth…open in the dark there, open and round with laughing. And huge; like an
underwater cave, it’s so huge, like a drain hole at the world’s deepest bottom, rimmed
with cold flesh…so huge it could empty seas” (583).17 Joe Ben takes the receptive role
here, which is traditionally ascribed to women. The “kiss of life” that Joe Ben receives
from Hank is not enough to save him, but Hank’s desperation in this scene indicates his
deep and abiding attachment to Joe Ben. Expressing intense grief at Joe Ben’s funeral,
Hank climbs into the casket and tries to rearrange Joe Ben’s face into a more
recognizable form. He takes the role of the grieving widow, displaying a devotion to Joe
Ben even in death that is commendable in any relationship.
Described accordingly by Joe Ben, logging and the destruction of forests appears
to be merely a matter of mere semantics:
The whole notion of logging is very simple if you get onto it. It comes to this: the
idea is to make a tree into a log and a log into a plank. Now, when it’s standin’ up
vertical it’s a tree, and when it’s laid down it’s a felled tree. And when we buck it
into lengths of thirty-two feet an’ them lengths are logs. Then we drag them logs
acrost to where the truck drives ‘em down to the bridge at Swedesgap where the
government scalers cheat us an’ then we take ‘em down to the out mill an’ dump
‘em into the water. When we get enough of ‘em in the water we drag ‘em up into
the mill and we cut ‘em up an’ we got planks, lumber. (200)
Naming the functions of logging and giving the trees human-derived purposes are both
ways of controlling nature. At the same time, though, the sight of felled trees disturbs
17

In the film version of the novel, as Joe Ben receives breath from Hank, the two worry they will be seen
by someone and the resuscitative breath will be mistaken for them kissing.
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Joe Ben, and he confesses, “Always put me in mind of a graveyard […] You know,
tombstones? Here lies so an’ so, here lies Douglas Fir, Born the Year One, Chopped
Down the Year Nineteen Sixty-One” (521). Giving the trees human characteristics—the
trees have names, can die and be buried—allows Joe Ben to frame his sadness in terms he
can comprehend and articulate. Since part of his initiation into manhood involves
learning the work of his brother and joining homosocial logging community, along with
the satisfaction of seeing a tree felled, Leland forms a complicated relationship with other
men and their relationships as conquerors of nature.
Symbolically, Leland crosses into manhood the moment Joe Ben declares, “He’s
getting the call. He’s hearin’ the gospel of the woods. He’s forsakin’ all that college
stuff and he’s finding a spiritual rediscovery of Mother Nature” while Hank points out
that Leland is only gaining the physical shape needed to work alongside the “real” men
(251). Even if Joe Ben is overstating the matter, he illustrates an important division
between the softness and femininity of the life of the mind and the muscular manliness of
the world of work and the outdoors.18 But even through all their efforts to “whup it,” the
natural world seems to fight back against the deforestation with all its weapons:
“blackberries strung out barbed barricades; the wind shook widow-makers crashing down
the high rotted snags; boulders reared silently from the ground to block slides that looked
18

In XY: On Masculine Identity, Elisabeth Badinter illustrates initiation rites that aid the boy in becoming a
man as having three characteristics: a duty to leave one’s childhood, the needs for a series of trials, and “the
father’s nonexistent or unobtrusive role” (67-8). The trials, Badinter explains, “are comprised of three
stages, each more painful than the last: separation from the mother and the female world; transfer into an
unknown world; and subjection to dramatic, public trials” (69). A subset of these learning experiences is
something Badinter labels “homosexual pedagogy” with engages with “the teaching of virility by the
indirect path of homosexuality” (77). The purpose behind the teaching is that of imitation—a man copies
another man he finds attractively virile in order to be like him. While the idea of homosexual pedagogy
leaves a lot to be desired, Badinter’s connection between rites of initiation into manhood and the separation
of the feminine in favor of what she suggests is homosexual masculinity, but what I think is more evident
of homosociality, is useful to examining Leland’s immersion into the masculine world of the logging
industry and his competition with his brother.
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smooth and clear a moment before” (567). Leland is aware, when he makes this
observation, of the harm they are doing in completing their work. In this way, the forces
of nature seek to diminish man’s hold on it, but the men do not quit because it is all they
have to make them tough guys.
Additionally, the phallic symbolism of trees and the logging industry is not lost on
Leland. In conversation with Viv, he jokes he using his education even while he’s
logging because “The cable and the log are not that dull […] not when analyzed in their
truer, their deeper meaning, as sexual symbols. Yas. You must keep a secret, of course,
but I am out here on a grant from the Kinsey foundation, doing research for a book on the
Castration Complex of the Choke-setter” (493). Leland’s reference to Kinsey and Freud
signals his deep and abiding awareness of his real mission in Wakonda—the sexual
conquest of his brother’s wife and, by extension, his brother. His linkage between the
work he does as a choke-setter and the Freudian theory of sexual difference is important
here. The choke-setter’s job is to attach a cable to a felled tree so the skidder operator
can pull the tree to the collection area. Leland’s association of a felled tree with a
castrated penis is, as much as it might be obvious, at the heart of his motivation. Does
Leland desire the absence of his own phallus so that he can make himself more female
and, in turn, more desired by the male sex? The evocation of Freud’s theory surely
suggests this. Or is this merely a moment in which Leland is attempting to demonstrate
his cleverness to Viv? Perhaps. But earlier in the novel, Leland makes another mention
of Freudian complexes in relation to the mysteries of his bond with Hank, which suggests
that his desire to claim Viv is motivated by something deeper than and different from
heterosexual intercourse. “Certainly there were all the run-of-the-mill Freudian reasons
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beneath my animosity toward my dear brother,” muses Leland:
…all the castration-complex reasons, all the mother-son-father reasons—and all
especially deep-seated and strong within me because the usual abysmal longing of
the sulky son wishing to do in the guy who had been diddling Mom were in me
compounded by the malevolent memories of a psychotic sibling…oh, yes, I had
numerous scenes working on these multi-faceted levels—and any one of these
note-pad facts would have constituted reason enough to provoke vengeance in the
heart of any loyal neurotic—but this wasn’t the Whole Truth. (220)
What is the Whole Truth, then? Indeed, one of the scenes Leland is “working on these
multi-faceted levels” is the sexual encounter between Hank and Leland’s mother, “[t]hat
tangle of arms and legs, sighs and sweat-wet hair telescoped through my bedroom
peephole” (258). We must remember, too, the very real fact that Leland sees the naked
body of his brother, and this is what touches off his apparent revenge plot. Leland’s
apparent subjectivity, then, is touched off by the glimpse of his brother’s nakedness.
From the beginning, Leland, an intellectual from the East who, having been raised
by a mother, is seen as queer, weak and unmanly. Leland has an attachment to his
roommate, Peters, a relationship that Leland indirectly describes as being that of a
husband and wife although it is in effect, at least according to Leland, a casual
relationship.19 Glimpsed by his father for the first time in twelve years, Leland is so thin
and bedraggled that Henry doest not recognize him, forcing Henry to ironically caution
his kinsmen against inbreeding:

19

It is worth noting, and I do not think it is much of a stretch to suggest, that Peters and Leland’s friendship
resembles, in proximity and composition, the oft-cited queer friendship that of Shreve and Quentin in
William Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom!. They are roommates at school and close confidantes. Leland is
suicidal, like Shreve, and is wholly preoccupied with the occurrences of the past and of his familial home.
96

Ain’t I been sayin’ till I’m blue in the face, “Leave off this diddlin’ of your
cousins and sisters an’ the like an’ get out an’ us up some other women fer a
change!” I’m sick ‘n tired of all these freaks an’ halfwits you been turnin’ out.
We cain’t be inbreedin’ all the time like a buncha damn hawgs! The family got to
be healthy an’ strong t’ keep up the standards. I don’t aim to tolerate no
weaklings! No, b’ gawd, I don’t. We need examples by gawd, like my own boy,
Hank there, like the stock I turn out. (89)
Viewed in this manner by Henry, Leland is the product of inbreeding, an unnatural
offspring the loins of a diseased mind. Inbreeding, the result of reproduction gone awry,
represents the ideology that not all heterosexual coupling is affirmative and that
heterosexual coupling can in fact produce queerness. The irony is that Leland is Henry’s
progeny and so Henry is unwittingly naming himself as an unnatural breeder. But still,
Leland is not a man, to Henry’s mind. He is, though, “one of the sensitives,” according
to Joe Ben, in need of emotional support and friendliness.20 In fact, with Leland’s return
to Wakonda, all matters of stable gender identity associated with work or lifestyle
become moot.
Almost the complete opposite of his second son, Henry Stamper is the exemplar
of stubborn and established masculinity in the novel. He declares hatred for
“pantywaists”; he is an important and respected member of his community; he is a
20

The anxiety surrounding Leland’s queerness is much more pronounced in the 1970 film version of the
novel. Preoccupied by the length of Leland’s hair and his “hippie” attire, Henry, played by an aging and
grizzled Henry Fonda, declares in turn that his son “comes back a daughter,” that he “looked just like Rita
Heyworth,” and that he’s become a “New York fairy.” The hope is that the work will “make a man outta”
Leland since he is such a disappointment to his father. Removal from the effeminate and intellectual East
is absolutely essential to Leland “reclaiming” his masculinity. But the anxiety surrounding homosexuality
does not end there. In the film’s most elegantly executed scene, the one in which Joe Ben slowly drowns in
the river after a fallen tree pins him there, Joe Ben expresses his concerns about Hank performing mouthto-mouth on him. The fear is that Henry will witness the artificial resuscitation and believe the two are
kissing. “I wouldn’t like that one bit,” says Joe Ben.
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physically strong (though aging) man; and his outright stubbornness and aggression
marks him as a man who does not tolerate weakness in anyone. “Hypervirility,”
Elisabeth Badinter claims, is a performative attitude that manifests itself in men who
realize they are incomplete because it is impossible to reach a masculine ideal (133). I
would argue that Henry’s oft-repeated motto—“Never give an inch”—is a marker of his
apparent hypervirility (Kesey, Great Notion 133).21 The motto originates from a plaque
hung above Hank’s bed by his father, who painted the slogan over the words “Blessed are
the Meek, for They Shall Inherit the Earth” (34). The presence and manifestation of a
personal decree, especially one so frankly aggressive, is a sign that Henry is performing
his virility. In fact, upon the arrival of the decidedly unmanly Leland’s arrival, Henry
outlines his prescription for masculinity: “Now to the problem at hand: who’s gonna
teach this yere boy to ride a motorcycle an’ doodle a cousin an’ all that sorta thing? […]
Who’s gonna learn him to shave with a ax blade? To nut a nigger? We got tend to these
details. Who’s gonna see to him gettin’ a tattoo on his hand?” (91). A real man, to
Henry, acts on his masculinity by having sex with his cousins, castrating black men, and
picking fights.
There is no denying that Hank is a tough guy, at least on the surface. He serves in
the Korean War, rides around America on a motorcycle after his discharge, picks fights
with other men, gets arrested, and woos Viv, bringing her back with him to Oregon in
order to be his helpmeet as he aids his father in the lumber business. But, as I have
illustrated above, such things do not always make the man. Hank does not possess an
unquestioned desire to dominate nature. Arnold Talentino aptly points out that “Hank’s
21

Badinter, borrowing from the chapter titles in Deborah S. David and Robert Brannon’s The Forty-Nine
Percent Majority, Badinter identifies the four imperatives that go into making the tough guy: “no sissy
stuff,” “the real male is a big wheel,” “he must be a sturdy oak,” and “Give ‘em hell” (130).
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sensitivity to the natural world is unmatched by any other character in the novel, although
on the surface they might seem gentler, more sensitive, and more willing to ‘give an inch’
than Hank” (67). But far from being “soft” or “pink,” Hank shows flexibility in his
relationship to the natural world. His ability to recognize human impact on the otherthan-human world is important to his formation as a man and as queer. Hank, as Boney
Stokes, Henry’s longtime friend, explains, “sees how the land lays…it just is not a oneman world, never was…no mortal man can long endure…” (639). What Drout sees as
“[n]ot merely a demonstration of physical prowess,” is “Hank’s personal defiance of the
river represents his struggle against the chaotic powers of nature,” in what I would argue
is Hank’s performance of masculinity (134). And while Drout sees the river “Hank’s
most powerful and persistent adversary,” I see it as an adversary against which Hank has
no hope of winning because he is, after all, only a man (134). In one of the novel’s most
agonizing symbols, Leland describes Hank training for a swimming meet by incessantly
swimming into the current of the river. In fact, as Leland reflects on returning to home, it
is the image of his brother “his long, sinewy body diving into the river, naked and white
and hard as a peeled tree” that is the clearest for him (77). In all his efforts of defiance,
Hank’s attempts at manipulating nature go unrealized.
One episode in particular seems to represent Hank’s not quite contradictory
tenderness and aggression as well as his understanding of and desire to dominate nature.
Tunneling through a seemingly impenetrable berry thicket, Hank removes several bobcat
kittens from their home in the thicket, conscious that their mother will miss them. Hank
suffers scratches from both thicket and kittens, but his single-minded mission to own and
cage those kittens overrides his physical pain. At once Hank is surrogate mother to the
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bobcats, carrying them in his mouth by the scruffs of their necks, the penetrator of the
blackberry thicket as well as disrupter of the natural processes of motherhood. When the
river floods and drowns the kittens in their cage, Hank realizes, “It was like me and that
river had drawn ourselves a little contract, a little grudge match, and without me knowing
exactly why,” forcing him to think that the river is after everything he thinks he owns
(125). He seems to understand its variability and volatility, that “you can make the river
stand for all sorts of other things,” and “all it wants is its fair advantage” (126). But this
does not stop Hank from empathizing with other entities from the natural world,
particularly animals. Hank has a similar ambivalent relationship to animals when it
comes to hunting. “Not that I’ve ever had much patience with the kind of pantywaist
who says, ‘Oh, how can you kill the cute little deer? How can you be such a brute and
coward?’” Hank declares, but he still cannot stand to see the animals killed. Real men
hunt deer without a thought for the animal’s pain, and Hank declares himself, while not
on the side of “pantywaists,” unable to kill animals with impunity.22 The seeming
contradiction of this declaration shows Hank’s simultaneous refusal and embrace of
heroic masculinity.
It is this perceived heroic masculinity and the natural world that clings to Leland’s
impression of and desire for his brother. Consequently, Leland’s own attempt at revenge
is ultimately unsatisfying and without much consequence, illustrating the overarching
motif of inadequate heterosexual couplings. The consummation between Viv and Leland
means very little because, as Leland is surprised to discover, it does not make him into
22

Again, Hank’s relationship to animals and his empathy with their condition are represented in his tie to
the migrating geese that haunt his sleep. Despite being awakened by their honking every single night, he
manages to have some empathy for them. He imagines a lost goose’s honking taking on an existential tone,
as he wonders, “Where is my world? […] and where in the hell am I if I can’t locate it?” (505). Slowly,
Hank’s feelings of the geese change from annoyance to compassion since “I didn’t want [the goose] shot
because he sounded like he was asking Where is everything? Where is everything?” (507).
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another Captain Marvel, and Hank is “straightened out” by his brother. In this way, Viv
is definitively used as the site through which the brothers express the desire toward each
other.23 When Leland locates his revenge scheme in terms of the natural world (“I
needed to fell the tree that had been hogging my sunshine before I even germinated”), he
is emphasizing, in his mind, the importance of the natural world to his relationship with
Hank (223).
Interestingly, interspersed throughout the scene of Leland’s sexual encounter with
Viv is Hank’s parenthetic account of swimming across the river to home when he
discovers the boat launch gone. “Tired and beat are you are, you’ll make it acrosst, you
big stud swimmer you…” thinks Hank, evoking images of a swimming sperm (596). So
again with the phallic imagery, he writes Peters to ask, “ In these days when a man’s
courage hangs between his legs and can be read like a thermometer, do I hesitate going
through with my plan because simple old masculinity doubts make me afraid to risk
sticking out my courage to the screwing point?” (497). His writing purposefully rife with
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When Leland blames his initial failure to act on his desire to claim Viv on “an impotence that could no
longer be blamed on impotence,” he is getting at the significance of his inability to act (591). The
impotence is caused, I would argue, by his desire for his brother rather than any real sexual desire for Viv.
And it is also significant that the act of their lovemaking does not occur within the narration; it is merely
described by Leland as such:
[W]e made love. The scene no longer needed the impetus of my contrived plot. I no longer
moved the scene; the scene moved me. Quite simply, we made love. We made love. How
pedestrian the words look—trite, worn, practically featureless with use—but how can one better
describe that which happens when it happens? that creation? that magic blending? I might say
we became figures in a mesmerized dance before the rocking talisman of the moon, starting slow,
so slow…a pair of feathers drifting through clear liquid substance of sky…gradually accelerating,
faster and faster and finally into photon existence of pure light. (595-6)
Leland continues thus for some time, and I quote this section at length because it gets at the utter
sentimentality and diembodiedness of Leland’s heterosexual encounter. It would be easy to read Leland’s
description as mocking of heterosexual coupling. Indeed, with no actual physical descriptors—no account
of Viv’s body, Leland’s reaction to it or of the act itself—only Leland’s never-ending chatter: “And
consummated there a month of quick looks, guarded smiles, accidental brushings of body too open or too
secret to be mere accident, and all the other little unfinished vignettes of desire… and, perhaps most of all,
consummated the share knowledge of that desire, and of that return desire, and of the juggernaut advance of
that desire” (596).
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sexual imagery, Leland basically confesses his impotence in the face of a sexual
encounter with a woman. Sex with Viv is always tied up in his desire to repay the
seeming affront to Myra done by Hank. In this way, his inability to act on his desire for
Viv directly correlates with the recognition of Hank’s sexual prowess. While listening to
Leland’s jazz on the radio, Hank declares it “manure,” to which Leland replies: “‘Such a
prejudice must limit you terribly.’ And he said, ‘Are we gonna be like that?’ And I said,
‘I should think you would want to at least exclude such things as the female sex from
such a sweeping statement.’ And he said, ‘I should think this outfit snuggling her little
tail up against me here would make a qualification like that pretty damned unnecessary,
but, if you are goin’ to be hard-nosed about it…’” (315). Here again, being “like that”
implies being homosexual. To prove his heterosexuality, then, Hank invokes the body of
his wife. He defines not being “like that” as having a woman in his bed every night.
Leland’s choice in music marks him as unmanly, since accordingly to Hank, it “sounds
like the musicians all squat to pee” (314). The scene plays into the complexities of the
definition of manliness in the novel, and evidently, Hank describes his masculinity in
terms of heterosexual coupling.
Additionally, with Viv’s escape from the forced domesticity of the Stampers and
her marriage, there is another suggestion for the queering of family structures and
heterosexuality. As Stephen Tanner explains, “The potential for feminist complaint is
probably there. The world of the novel is distinctively a masculine one. Viv’s sorrow at
having no children is revealed, and the impression is strong that she is not entirely at
home at the Stamper house. In the end she leaves in order to find self-fulfillment
elsewhere. But despite these attempts to establish her character, she remains little more
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than a counter or pawn in the conflict between the brothers” (Kesey 86). I disagree with
Tanner’s assertion that Viv is merely a pawn in the brothers’ game since to suggest that
Viv is not a fully developed character means that Viv is not given a full conscious and the
ability to escape at the end of the novel. In fact, Kesey takes great pains to prove the
misunderstanding and unhappiness in Viv and Hank’s marriage. Says Hank to Janice,
Joe Ben’s wife, when Janice complains about “him not respecting Viv’s secret spiritual
needs and giving the poor girl a little more chance to be a wife”: “Don’t you mean a
chance to be a nursemaid, Jan? I appreciate your good intentions but take my word: Viv
is wife aplenty. If she needs to doctor something I’ll get her a kittycat” (Kesey, Great
Notion 183). Hank clearly misunderstands his wife’s needs. What Hank sees as Viv’s
paltry attempts at becoming an “Informed Woman” is actually Viv’s desire to live outside
the imprisoning force of the male patriarchal attitude toward the natural world and by
extension her “natural” duties to the men in her life. Viv suffers a miscarriage and her
dreams of bearing children are remembered as “an ambiguous lump” (711). While she is
saddened by her miscarriage, her subsequent childlessness should not be read as a
rejection of the child-bearing but rather as a rejection of her marriage. It takes two to
make a child, and Hank’s failure to also produce a child should not be overlooked here.
Indeed, Viv’s escape from Oregon and Hank (as well as Leland) is an escape from the
seeming stability of marriage and heterosexual consummation. It is a move toward
empowerment for herself, a move to recapture that lost dreams of her childhood, which
included the search for an ambiguous someone willing to accept her as herself.24 And
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Leland remembers his mother Myra, who died by her own hand, as being imprisoned, caught as he is
between the forest, “[t]hat green curtain” and “that steel-plated river” (140). In this manner, Leland relates
his mother’s body to that of the earth, associating her abuse at the hands of Henry with the abuse of natural
resources: “But who chopped the firewood and slopped the pigs and raised those apples from the crippled
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while Viv enables the homosocial triangle that connects the brothers, she is also the
embodiment (as Kesey explains in the interview mentioned earlier) of the postwar
Women’s Lib movement.
The postwar discontent that permeates Great Notion also has its roots in not only
in the nuclear panic of the 1950s and 60s but also the environmental destruction at the
heart of warfare and the postwar population boom. “Don’t you see it’s just the same
plain old horseshit as always,” ask Henry, reticent to engage in the “bomb talk” (111).
Hank, returning from combat in Korea, feels the restlessness and delusion of a country
“off kilter.” As he rides around the country on his motorcycle, experiencing the fresh air
and open road, he nevertheless feels a kind of depression brought on by what he senses is
destroying the country:
Dammit, he’d just returned from a police action that had taken more lives than the
First World War, to find the Dodgers in a slump, frozen apple pie like Mom useta
make in all the supermarkets, and a sour stench in the sweet land of liberty he’s
risked his life defending. Plus an unusual foreign worry on the Average
American Guy he’d just saved from the insidious peril of Communism. What the
hell was wrong? There was a kind of bland despair and the sky was filled with
tinfoil. What was wrong with people? He didn’t remember people around
Wakonda being so damned watered down, or so revved up either. “Those boys
out West, they got style…grit.” But as he pushed his face into the arid American
earth? And what kind of freak of optics lets a man see a space star of trillium beside a silver-gray step of
fir, and not see the fly agaric growing there? How could one look at the dusty rose sun shining off the river
and not see the slabful of gore with a tag tied to her toe?” (140). The association is an important one for
the exploration of the “feminist complaint” in the novel. Indeed, Henry’s misogyny is telling of the
environment from which both Viv and Myra must ultimately escape. Thinking “women were the knotholes
in slippery-elm logs,” Henry boasts a version of masculinity that does not just exclude women from the
advantage of subjectivity but also objectifies them in terms of nature.
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wind and moved through Missouri, Kansas, Colorado without observing an
evidence of style or grit, he had grown more and more uneasy. (171)
Enmeshed as it is in Cold War narrative of containment and postwar nuclear anxiety, the
novel presents a vision of an America already on its way to total environmental depletion
as well as complete human defeat brought about by the hubris of manly men who think
they can subdue forces of nature. Mechanization has turned the comforts of home into a
bizarre and readily consumable product. Men are becoming more and more impotent in
the face of what Hank sees as “bland despair.” Indeed, even men returning from combat
do not receive the type of hero’s welcome reserved for previous military engagements.
Leland’s own sense of the country, then, centers on notions of temporality that
can be construed as queer because they are non-progressive. Having escaped from the
dull, cyclic and normative timing of the university, Leland embarks on a natural world
that seems stripped of conceivable ideals of time. The forest and the ocean are for Leland
without time, and his reason for coming to Wakonda is not because he cares about his
future but desires to somehow retroactively capture his childhood and make right with his
past. This back-looking is indicative of Leland’s queered sense of time, and as he
imagines his relationship with his brother, it moves into a realm itself without any time:
“We are joined, brother, shackled together for all our lives, just as the birds and the
waves are immutably tuned together, in a song of patience and panic. We have been
tuned thus for years, me piping and pecking after morsels while you crashed and roared”
(359). But, like Isherwood’s George, Leland recognizes the timelessness of a nuclear
apocalypse. The concept of total annihilation—of humankind, the natural world, and
everything in it—erases the necessity for keeping track of time, making the temporality
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of apocalypse slightly more queer than that which looks backward because it erases all
possibilities of tomorrow. “Zap; that’s all it takes. The little red button and zap,”
explains Leland. “Right? And this little button makes a definite difference in our world;
in our generation, ever since we’ve been old enough to read, our tomorrows have been at
the mercy of this button” (496). Leland’s observation accompanies both Henry and
Hank’s discontent with the postwar world, but he takes it one step further—he applies his
realization to his own conception of temporality and realizes that “someday” is not a
realistic concept.
Seeing the hides of various animals displayed outside the Stamper home, Leland
questions, “Who trapped the animals and stripped the hides? In this world, in this day?
Who played at Dan’l Boone in a forest full of fallout?” (138). Questioning the viability
of the hero motif as well as the ecological climate of the Pacific Northwest, Leland sees
the “junk motif” of those living in the Northwest as dominant paradigm of the once
monolithically great West. Amongst the “guns, paperback Westerns, beer cans, ash trays
overflowing with orange peels and candy wrappers” lie the “greasy part of invalid
machinery convalescing on coffee tables…Coke bottles, milk bottles, wine bottles”
(141). Similar to the Starboard Side in A Single Man, the Sea Breeze Café and Grill with
its “lipstick stain on coffee mugs; bleak array of candy; insomniac flies waiting out in the
rain; a plastic penful of doughnuts; and, on the wall, above the Coca-Cola calendar, the
methodical creaking creep of a bent second hand across a Dr. Pepper clock” is
representative of the condition of the postwar world. It is, ironically put by Leland, the
“perfect place for a man to sit and commune with nature” (563). Taken as a unit, these
objects represent what are the seeming fallout of overproduction and overconsumption,
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and undeniably the abuse of resources and the pollution association with junk. Success in
America, Arnold Talentino reveals, “gradually became translated into more and more
money for more and more things, so that now success usually means enough money for
excess, conspicuous consumption” (65). It is a success that asks Americans to conform to
“the machine-like system which seems to promise this success. To succeed one must be
like a machine that can work with the machines that seem to produce success” (65).
Kesey illustrates that one could become “poisoned from the processed environment, from
the distorted food and language and building and feeling, and both have been apt satirists
of Public Relations and other institutionalized lying” (Widmer 123). Conforming to the
machine, to the institution, signaled not just a sacrifice of one’s personal freedom but also
an embrace of that which was environmentally destructive, namely the love of junk, the
destruction of the landscape, the overconsumption of resources, and rampant
reproduction.25
25

Another useful way of looking at the social and environmental destruction of the postwar period is
through the Combine, a symbol used by Kesey in One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest. The Combine, as
interpreted by Daniel Vitkus, is “a vast system of machines and robots, engaged in a process of converting
human flesh, imagination, and individuality to a machine-world of freedomless conformity” (73). Vitkus
further suggests that Cuckoo’s Nest “celebrates a ‘natural’ maleness which is placed in opposition to a
domineering, emasculating representation of the feminine” (exemplified by the Combine) and that
“Kesey’s construction of nature and naturalness is clearly gendered in terms of a male strength and
sexuality which he places in opposition to female power” (Vitkus 66, 77). Ignoring for the moment the
homosocial and possible homosexual implications of the male relationships in Cuckoo’s Nest, Vitkus
claims what I see as an anti-ecofeminist reading, aligning naturalness with masculinity and male sexual
prowess that develops in spite of a domineering feminine presence. But his invocation of naturalness opens
up a whole new frame through which to examine not just Cuckoo’s Nest but also Great Notion. I would
suggest that the characterization of the Combine, supported as it is by the control of industrialization and
mechanization, the inexorable power of female privilege, and the suppression of the pioneering spirit, is
necessarily a heteronormative model. It is ultimately a misogynist symbol because it represents the
castrating power of mechanized and feminized authority.
But perverse as it seems, the Combine is the naturalizing and normalizing force in the novel, and it
represents the debilitating stupor of routine, the ecological destructiveness of reproduction, and the
interruption of individual autonomy. “The mill,” Chief Bromden explains during one of the ward’s
outings, “put me in a kind of dream, all the humming an clicking and rattling or people and machinery,
jerking around in a pattern. […] [I]t reminded me somehow of the men in the tribe who’d left the village
in the last days to do work on the gravel crusher for the dam. The frenzied pattern, the faces hypnotized by
routine…” (Kesey, Cuckoo’s Nest 32). The hum and rattle of machinery is the symbolic effect of the
Combine. Additionally, the Combine sucks in and devours citizens with factory-like efficiency, causing
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what Bromden sees as:
Or things like five thousand houses punched out identical by a machine and strung across the hills
outside of town, so fresh from the factory they’re still linked together like sausages, a sign saying
“NEST IN WEST HOME—NO DWN. PAYMENT FOR VET,” a playground down the hill from
the houses, behind a checker-wire fence and another sign that read “ST. LUKE’S SCHOOL FOR
BOYS”—there were five thousand kids in green corduroy pants and white shirts under green
pullover sweaters playing crack-the-whip across an acre of crushed gravel. The line popped and
twisted and jerked like a snake, and every crack popped a little kid off the end, sent him rolling up
against the fence like a tumbleweed. Every crack. And it was always the same little kid, over and
over.
All those five thousand kids lived in those five thousand houses, owned by those guys that got off
the train. The houses looked so much alike that, time and time again, the kids went home by
mistake to different houses and different families. Nobody ever noticed. They ate and went to
bed. (202)
In this oft-cited passage from the novel, Kesey associates the Combine with conformity, reproduction
without thought or distinctiveness, the suburbanization that has achieved the efficiency of the
environmentally harmful factory, and the playground that has been paved with crushed gravel. “Over and
over” and “time and time again” along with the anonymity of the various children signal not just the
monotony of the factory efficiency of the Combine life but also the mindless conventionality of the
reproductive routine. The Combine, while misogynist in its characterization of women as the force of evil
and mechanization, is more importantly a symbol of what threatens Cold War masculinity—the destruction
of the environment, and by extension, autonomy.
While Kesey has the Combine represent the normalness of mainstream society, with its obligatory homes
and children, he also valorizes the character of Randle McMurphy since it appears he has escaped the
“civilizing” effects of the Combine. Bromden thinks, “Maybe he growed up so wild all over the country,
batting around form one place to another, never around one town longer’n a few months when was a kid so
a school never got much a hold on him, logging, gambling, running carnival wheels, traveling lightfooted
and fast, keeping on the move so much that the Combine never had a chance to get anything installed” (78).
Now trapped in the psychiatric ward, McMurphy’s bombast and swagger and certainly his chauvinist
attitude toward Big Nurse make him the hero of the novel. His attempts to free the other patients from the
emasculating propensity of the Big Nurse’s control often go horribly awry, but Bromden’s assumption that
McMurphy can outrun the effects of the Combine suggests the possibility for an alternative to the
reproductive destruction wrought by the mechanization of the Combine’s influence.
Interestingly, Bromden’s description of McMurphy also brings to mind the footloose and always-on-thefringe Neal Cassady, the man who was the bridge between Jack Kerouac’s Beats and Kesey’s Merry
Pranksters. Raised on the periphery of society by his often-absent hobo father, Cassady learned the
rudimentaries of sex and survival from older women and his father’s male friends. In his adult life,
Cassady bedded many women and fathered multiple children, but he never remained in one place for long.
Arguably, his closest and most steadfast relationships were with other men, namely Kerouac and Allen
Ginsberg. Craig Leavitt’s pertinent interpretation of Cassady centers on his nebulous and ever-shifting
sexuality and his ability to escape from the restrictive domestic situations. Leavitt connects Cassady to
notions of masculinity in the American West and then revises them in order to illustrate that Cassady both
embraces and adjusts them to fit his particular condition. Leavitt borrows from Will Wright the plotting of
representative Western masculinity from the nineteenth century: “a lone hero with special talents (usually
for violence) entering a community to which he is a stranger, defeating a villain or other evil that threatens
this community, then becoming an accepted citizen of the grateful town, often sealing this new status by
marrying a women from the rescued population” (223). Taken this way, both Leland and Hank could be
considered a hero in the classic sense, but as Leavitt points out, the heroics of this century involved
“passionate living” in which the existential hero finds it impossible to reconcile themselves to a stable
concept of masculinity. What Leavitt’s estimation illustrates, I think, is that any stable concepts of
masculinity, particularly those based on classical notions of the hero in the West, are up for debate and
revision. Cassady’s aggressive masculinity and heterosexuality has been taken for granted for a long time,
but what Leavitt’s estimation illustrates, I think, is that any stable concepts of masculinity, particularly
those based on classical notions of the hero in the West, are up for debate and revision. In the case of
Cassady, whose heterosexuality and masculinity has often been taken for granted, passionate living often
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As a landscape, the West of the post-World War II period cannot and does not
offer the escapism that frontier mythology promised. As Charles Witke points out, Kesey
sees the pastoral mode as no longer viable (20). In general, this is because of what I see
as the illusion the wilderness and wide-open spaces of the West created in pioneers and in
the builders of American democracy, but there are some matters of the pastoral that

involved homosocial experience and homosexual encounters.
There are a few other important things about Cuckoo’s Nest that are relevant to the present discussion. I
mention this not because I think Cuckoo’s Nest is the richer of the two novels and more deserving of
attention, as previous critics have readily intimated, but rather because Cuckoo’s Nest does hold
interpretations of masculinity and its relationship to autonomy and nature that I find useful for examining
the homosocial and ecology affinities in Great Notion. Kesey’s first novel centers on a psychiatric ward
run by the domineering and unforgiving Big Nurse and inhabited by the silent Chief Bromden, amongst
others. The boisterous, outgoing, and virile Randle McMurphy enters the ward and attempts to subvert the
order established by Big Nurse, but he is finally subdued and punished with a lobotomy. The operation
leaves him an invalid, and in the last scene of the novel, in a mercy killing, Bromden smothers McMurphy
with a pillow. Robert Forrey claims, “[N]o psychologically informed reading of Kesey’s novel can ignore
the repressed homosexuality that seems to pervade it” since so much of the novel takes place in spaces
inhabited almost exclusively by men, and McMurphy is preoccupied with asserting his sexual potency to
prove that he is indeed a man (229). In fact, Forrey claims that Cuckoo’s Nest is “overpraised” by male
critics and should actually be maligned because the novel is “conservative, if not reactionary, politically;
sexist, if not psychopathological, psychologically; and very low, if not downright lowbrow, in terms of the
level of sensibility it reflects, a sensibility which has been influenced most strongly not by the Bible or a
particular literary tradition as much as by comic books, particularly the Captain Marvel variety” (222-3).
Further arguing that the novel should not be associated with sixties counterculture because it is “much more
representative of the older, alcoholic, he-man, rather than the newer, drug, hippie culture,” Forrey believes
that the “values of Kesey’s novel are not unlike those in the work of Hemingway and Steinbeck,” those
uber-males of American literature (223). Indeed, Forrey’s critique is dated and not unproblematic, but his
invocation of Hemingway and Steinbeck illustrate exactly my point about the state of Kesey criticism—it is
obsessed with reinforcing a representative he-man-ness in analysis that pervades discourses about men who
take on social or natural orders that are ostensibly detrimental and restrictive when it comes to the
individual. Like wise, Leslie Fiedler contends that Kesey, whom he labels the “Psychadelic Superman,” is
very much under the influence of the comic book in the formation of his characters as well as his writing
style (Return of Vanishing America 184).
But Forrey’s mention of the brow-level of Cuckoo’s Nest and his observation that comic books might have
influenced Kesey’s sensibility signals something essential about the formulation of masculinity and its
relationship to the archetype of the hero: the formulation of heroic masculinity often took its cue from
popular and pervasive images, recognizable by a large portion of the American population. It is crucial that
such comic book heroes as Captain Marvel (a figure Kesey invokes repeatedly in Great Notion) and
Superman found their way into popular imagination in the Cold War period.25 In 1992’s Gunfighter
Nation, the last in the trilogy, Richard Slotkin identifies the Frontier as a powerful and useful symbol for “a
vivid and memorable set of hero-tales—each a model of successful and morally justifying action on the
stage of historical conflict” (3). Slotkin stresses the relevancy of frontier myths, the inevitability of an
immediately recognizable and applicable symbol, with its attendant discourse, for Cold War America. It is
the “hero-tales” that interest me most here because they are, as Slotkin aptly points out, some of the most
pervasive and vital discourses of the time. It is through the hero-tale that the nation receives its acceptable
behaviors and its ethical recommendations.
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remain legitimate.26 Stephen Tanner, in his article “Labor Union Versus Frontier Values
in Kesey’s Sometimes a Great Notion,” argues, “Kesey is interested in the force of the
self-reliant individualism of the Western frontier (and of his own ancestors), which he
finds disruptive but nevertheless desirable in contemporary American society” (16).
Also, “The hero must learn that frontier individualism has its expense and excesses,” at
the same time “the union members must learn that the cooperative communal aims of
collectivism go awry when they ignore the importance of personal strength and initiative”
(21).
Described by Jonas Stamper as “volatile,” the westward trek “sounded good on
paper,” but the illusion of the open and encouraging frontier is quickly subsumed by the
reality of illusion of man’s ability to make some kind of permanent mark on the natural
world (23-4). Pamphlets tout Wakonda’s positive but ultimately illusory characteristics:
“Where (the pamphlets had informed him) A Man Can Make His Mark. Where A Man
Start Anew. Where (the pamphlets said) The Grass is Green And The Sea Is Blue And
The Trees And The Men Grow Tall And True! Out In The Great Northwest, Where (the
pamphlets made it clear) There Is Elbow Room For A Man To Be As Big And Important
As He Feels It Is In Him To Be!” (23). What Jonas finds is that there is “something”
about the land that makes a man feel small, that “The town? It may grow, but abide? It
may grow and spread and proliferate, but abide? No. The old forest and land and river
26

In the introduction to Queer Ecologies: Sex, Nature, Politics, Desire, Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands and
Bruce Erikson do a reading of the 2006 film Brokeback Mountain. They mention that queer ecological
politics converge in the film in the fact that Ennis and Jack are shepherds, making their story essentially
pastoral; therefore, “the idealized, bucolic ‘naturalness’ of pastoral homoeroticism calls into question the
idea that heterosexuality is the only ‘natural’ sex around” (4). In “The Queer Politics of Gay Pastoral,”
David Shuttleton illustrates how the pastoral mode has been adopted and revised by gay authors through
the ages. Significant to this project is Shuttleton’s assertion that writers like Whitman sought “the recovery
of an Ur-masculinity” as a ways to escape “a claustrophobic domestic space of a demonized, oppressive
middle-class femininity” (139). Indeed, even if the pastoral may be facing invalidity in the 1960s in the
United States, this point of Shuttleton’s points out a possible way for adapting and adopting the pastoral.
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will prevail, for these things are the earth. But the town is of man” (25). If masculinity
is predicated upon man’s ability to shape and dominate nature, then the Stampers are
unable to abide by this dictate. They realize this, perhaps too late.
Indeed, Kesey’s pioneers, the men and women who bring the Stamper clan West
to Oregon, are not the mythological heroes and stalwart missionaries who traditionally
appear in idealized tales of westward expansion.27 They are partially impotent and given
to impermanence both in their personal and professional lives. Jonas Stamper, Hank’s
grandfather and progenitor of the Stamper clan of the novel, damns the entire family by
declaring they possess the “Curse of the Wanderer; curse of the Tramp; bitter curse of
the Faithless” (Kesey, Great Notion 18). The early Stampers are “stringy-muscled
brood,” and “With too much bone and not enough meat,” they are not able to correct their
“curse” until they acquire more “practical” pursuits like setting up businesses and taking
27

Kesey himself seems to share some of the footloose wanderers of his fiction. He abandoned writing
fiction after Great Notion’s publication and lukewarm reception, and the fact has become endless fodder
for critics more fascinated with his life story than his fiction. Kesey wanted to live his novels rather than
write them was the explanation for the abandonment of his vocation.27 Kesey’s reliance on experience over
mere intellectualism or artistic production is famously outlined in Tom Wolfe’s The Electric Kool-Aid Acid
Test, published in 1968. Wolfe’s portrayal of Kesey oscillates between the masterful, intellectual, creative,
and often domineering leader of a cultural, youthful revolution and “a glorified beatnik up on two dope
charges, and why make a hero out of him” (6). Interestingly, Wolfe describes Perry Lane, Kesey’s home in
California as “Walden Pond, only without any Thoreau misanthropes around. Instead, a community of
intelligent, very open, out-front people—out front was a term everybody was using—out-front people who
cared deeply for one another, and shared…in incredible ways, even, and were embarked on some kind
of…well, adventure in living” (47). Perry Lane was, like Walden Pond, an experiment in organicism and
outdoor living, an engagement with the nature world. But at the same time Kesey was interested, like
others in the counter culture, in the human impact upon the environment, he was completely engrossed in
the technology becoming available in the late-1960s. Writing about the counterculture movement of the
1960s, Bill Osgerby explains, “In this way the iconography of radical youth served as an emblem of
nonconforming individualism, an affirmation of a masculine identity that eschewed stodgy conservatism in
favour of fashionable leisure, stylistic display, and the pleasures of commodity consumption” (Osgerby
185). To say that those who participated in the counterculture, hippies and indeed Kesey himself, were
entirely aware of and concerned with their ecological impact would be slightly overstating the fact. There
is no way to ignore Kesey’s love of and fascination with vehicles—his bus and his motorcycles—or his use
of various media—devices for recording the goings on—on his trip with the Merry Pranksters. “Sandy
could see that Kesey wasn’t primarily an outdoorsman,” Wolfe observes, “He wasn’t that crazy about
unspoilt Nature. It was more like he had a vision of the forest as a fantastic stage setting…in which every
day would be a happening, an art form…” (51). Indeed, Kesey is most interested in human’s relationship
to and manipulation of the natural world, choosing the wilds of the Oregon forest for the staging of the
homosocial rivalry and desire between two brothers.
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part in already established communities (18, 20-1). In removing any high-minded
purpose or even pragmatic significance from the Stampers’ movement, they remain in “a
kind of trancelike dedication” to “leapfrogging west across wild young America,” “not as
pioneers doing the Lord’s work in a heathen land, not as visionaries blazing trail for a
growing nation […] but simply as a clan of skinny men inclined always toward itchy feet
and idiocy, toward foolish roaming, toward believing in greener grass over the hill and
straighter hemlocks down the trail” (18-9). Like every other pioneer and migrant who
went before them, the Stampers seek the monolithic American wild that never quite
existed. Indeed, the citizens of Wakonda and the strikers, like Chief Bromden in One
Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest, feel a general distrust of the mechanization invading their
labor forces: “The trouble ain’t administration, it’s automation. Homelite saws, one-man
yarders, mobile donkey—why half the men can cut twice the trees” (51). Interestingly, it
is not for reasons of conservation that these men fear the introduction of the machine into
the garden, to invoke Leo Marx. Despite desiring growth and progressiveness, the men
display a distrust of the technological advancement that allows a faster destruction of
natural spaces. Although it is not for the natural spaces they are concerned, their distrust
of machines and a decrease in required labor signals the anxiety about the forces of the
postwar discontent.
The critique of the Western frontier mythology is just one way Kesey subverts
popularized ideas held during the Cold War. Through the critique of human domination
of the natural world and the establishment and priority of the homosocial relationships,
Kesey also dismantles the idea that masculinity is reliant upon two predetermined
notions: “real” men are perceptibly heterosexual and their only relationship to
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environment around them comes in the form of domination and violence. Hank is
exemplar of this critique both as a “sensitive” when it comes to the landscape and
animals and as the main purveyor of homosociality in the novel. Besides this, Great
Notion also engages with issues of Women’s Liberation by giving Viv a chance for
escape and transformation in the end of the novel. While the men are running off
together to again engage with the work of the forest and each other and to enact their own
brand of hypervirility (whether it fails or not), Viv rejects heteronormativity and the
domestic space associated with her marriage to Hank. The apparent influence of the
Women’s Lib movement on Kesey certainly goes a long way in breaking down the ultramasculine ethic with which others identify and define Kesey and his work. Further in the
Krassner interview, Kesey reveals, “Women’s lib has made us aware of the debauching
of Mother Earth. The man who can peel off the Kentucky topsoil, gouge the land empty
to get his money nuts off, then splits the conquest, leaving the ravaged land behind to
raise his bastards on welfare is different from Hugh Hefner only in that he drives his cock
on diesel fuel” (219).28 Kesey speaks like an ecofeminist here, pointing out the
connection between the subjugation and debauchery of women as well as nature.
Kesey’s evocation of rape and unsanctioned procreation indicates his awareness of not
just the environmental impact of violence and overuse of the land and resources (which is
here gendered male) but also of the Cold War ideological shift in relation to the natural
world and the state of reproduction. His insistence that “Women’s lib is the real issue in
Notion” is also his acknowledgement of the queering of masculinity, its relationship to

28

Perhaps some would point out that Kesey’s misogyny is quite apparent in this response. That is, Man is
acting violently upon Nature, which is gendered Woman. But I read the response more openly. It is, in
contradiction to the misogyny with which people label Kesey, a response that exposes the possibilities of an
openly different gender politics for Kesey’s work.
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the other-than-human world and the work community, and shifting of the sexual
continuum that occurs.
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CHAPTER III
“A VOLUNTARY EXILE, A PERMANENT RESIDENT”: NATURALIZING
LESBIANISM AND STERILITY IN JANE RULE’S DESERT OF THE HEART
And although it has been accepted in recent years that there is no such
thing as nature, that everything is culture, there remains within that
culture a core of nature which resists examination, a relationship
excluded from the social in the analysis—a relationship whose
characteristic is eluctability in culture, as well as in nature, and which is
the heterosexual relationship. —Monique Wittig, “The Straight Mind”
Nevada is beautiful in her wildness, and if tillers can thus be brought to
see that possibly nature may have other uses even for rich soil besides
the feeding of human beings, then will these foodless deserts have taught
a fine lesson. —John Muir, “Nevada Farms”

About six years after Kate Millet declared in Sexual Politics, her influential
feminist literary study, that “[F]emale homosexuality is currently so dead an issue that
while male homosexuality gains a grudging tolerance, in women the event is observed in
scorn or in silence,” Jane Rule published Lesbian Images (337). Generally, Lesbian
Images is Rule’s analysis of the lesbian authors who came before her. Each chapter
objectively outlines the work of individual lesbian authors, from Radclyffe Hall to Jill
Johnston, who examine the subject of the love between women. In Lesbian Images, Rule
proves that not only is lesbianism not a dead issue but also that, at least in her personal
case, the subject of heterosexual marriage is decidedly unsettled. In the introduction to
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Lesbian Images, Rule references her parents’ marriage, proclaiming, “Rarely two people
share an avocation for family life and bring it to all the intense imagination usually
associated instead with careers, religious service, or the arts” (7). With her parents’
nearly ideal marriage in mind, she nevertheless acknowledges that being a wife is a
performance that takes practice. To this, Rule admits that she does not “have the native
talent” required for heterosexual marriage.1 It is important to note Rule’s admission that
heterosexual marriage contains an intersection between two competing yet complicit
elements: the one a performance, a learned and rehearsed role requiring labor akin to a
career and based upon some kind of cultural decree; and the other, a kind of inborn and
spontaneous ability that one is either born with or without. Taken together, these two
elements indicate the continuing tension between what is considered natural and
unnatural, innate and acquired, bringing to the fore Rule’s contention that heterosexual
marriage walks a fine line between the two.
Similarly, Rule begins her 1964 novel Desert of the Heart with a discussion of the
“convention” of marriage that makes it “the idiom of life” for women (7). These idioms
and language largely, disguised as a “natural” component of life by their unexamined
acceptance and justification, Rule makes moot when a woman “is forced to admit that she
has never been able to pronounce it properly” (7). Such a woman, when marriage is “a
foreign tongue,” becomes a “voluntary exile” in “an alien landscape” because she cannot
(and not will not) accept marriage as the “natural” objective in a woman’s life. Evelyn
Hall, an English professor from Berkeley, California, is the particular woman of which
Rule is writing. As the novel begins, Evelyn is traveling to the desert of Reno, Nevada

1

Although, her nearly 50-year partnership with Helen Sonthoff (which only ended at Sonthoff’s death) is
notwithstanding, of course.
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(known for its “quickie” divorces) to seek a divorce from her husband, George. There,
she meets Ann Childs, a sometime cartoonist and change apron at a local casino, and they
fall in love. Consequently, from the beginning of the novel, Rule establishes marriage as
a terrain strange and unnatural for some women, particularly Evelyn and Ann, and
replaces it with a lesbian experience that is made conspicuous by its relationship to the
natural world and its refusal to be marked by any naturalized convention. As one critic
aptly points out, Rule’s refusal to accept marriage wholeheartedly goes far in defining
“marriage as a convention [that] draws attention to both the social plots that constrain
women and the patterns of spiritual narrative that help figure the novel as a literary form:
conventionally speaking, both the novel’s and the women’s stories are predicated upon
and resolved through marriage” (Breen 199). By beginning her novel with a direct
questioning of the accepted convention of marriage, Rule is immediately aligning herself
on the side of revising these conventions.
But Rule’s particular questioning of convention also goes a long way in
challenging notions of the natural. In fact, as Stacy Alaimo aptly points out, the act of
naturalization “is a mode of cultural work” so that resistance to the heterosexism of the
“natural” can occur “only through discursive subversion, deconstruction, and
rearticulation” (170). Rule actively takes natural spaces, usually marked and owned by
heterosexism and normativity, and remakes them into spaces sanctioned for the
consummation of lesbian relationships: “The fact that nature is experienced via the body
of Ann, the face of Evelyn, and Evelyn’s ‘being with Ann’ suggests instead that their
desire actually drives the embrace of the desert as a ‘natural’ but queer place” (Alaimo
169). Alaimo’s larger argument is not that Rule endows her queer, female characters
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with some kind of special attachment to the natural world but rather that Rule’s
characters actively and purposefully complicate “the natural to such a degree that it can
no longer serve as the bedrock of heterosexuality” (166). The extension of notions of
normalness or even naturalness into the realm of lesbianism relegates queerness to a more
open sphere of experience in Rule’s novel, one that expands definitions of both
acceptable and conventional sexuality, as well as expanding the implications of human
engagement with the environment.
I would argue that Rule revises familiar narratives to allow for the naturalization
of lesbianism as a means of extending queerness into the realm of the natural rather than
merely foreclosing the affirmative possibilities of all expressions of desire; that is, Rule
emphasizes the recognition of love between women as a viable means of sexual and
emotional expression. My own reading coincides with Marilyn Schuster’s argument that
“when women write about loving women there is no more than a mere substitution or
shift in themes, there is a fundamental thematic transformation realized through the
conjunction of narrative voice and narrative object” (432). The politics of survival for
Schuster “no longer means only the insertion of a lone, tortured, or exotic lesbian figure
into a hostile social and textual environment, but the creation of new ways of speaking
and seeing so that lesbian reality can find a viable means of expression” (431). Schuster
highlights Rule’s pragmatic use of heteronormative ideology since “[s]he does not
blindly promote the norms generated by that cultural matrix, nor is she complacent about
the privileges and deprivation that those norms protest and impose” (433). I would add to
Schuster’s evaluation that Rule upsets the natural/unnatural binary by not only
naturalizing the lesbian figure and giving her expression through new means (those
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means being an uncompromised and unfetishized shared narration of Ann and Evelyn)
but also revising such concepts as femininity and motherhood, taking into account the
meaningfulness of alternative temporalities.
The disruption of accepted conventions and narratives is the main purpose behind
Desert, and Rule gives her characters, all of them queered in some way, the ability to
remake conventions and spaces to suit a queer plotting. The desert (and at times the
alkali lake which lies on the outskirts of Reno) functions in three vital ways: as the
physical space, apart from the prying eyes and restrictions of convention, for Ann and
Evelyn’s relationship to thrive and become consummated (much like the forest functions
for the Stampers in Sometimes a Great Notion); as the space where the semantic and
symbolic work of terms such as natural and production, as well as fertility and sterility, is
disrupted; and, in general, as the place where, because it houses the casino, people come
to cross the lines of conventionality and respectability. Many of the revisions of
conventions, then, are found in semantic shifts. Toward the end of the novel, Evelyn tells
Ann, “Nothing else I’ve ever known has been as right and as natural as loving you”
(216). The confession is a direct reversal of Evelyn’s earlier admission: “I know I talk in
clichés. I can’t help it. I feel we’re wrong, Ann. It isn’t right. It isn’t natural. I can’t go
on with it. I don’t want to” (216). Evelyn demonstrates her understanding of two things
in these declarations: one is her ability to speak in convention and cliché, labeling her
lesbian relationship as “unnatural” and highlighting her reluctance to break with
convention by divorcing George; the other is her ability to reverse those conventions, to
rename the “natural” to include her discoveries.
These linguistic borders, though, always bear a relationship to the human
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constructions of language and the meanings of the natural whether connected to
sexualities or the physical, other-than-human world. Rule, according to Bonnie
Zimmerman, challenges the idea of the “unnaturalness” of lesbianism by representing the
natural world as “not always fecund and blooming,” but rather as the desert. The desert
appears to be “sterile and empty” but is actually “bursting with life” (43).2 The desert
might actually be “antinatural,” as Zimmerman calls it, because “it disrupts the biological
‘imperative’ linking sex and reproduction” (43).3 But the desert, like the casino in which
Ann works, is a site of “free will and choice,” giving each site its own affirmative
perspective (43). In fact, as Donald Worster argues in Under Western Skies, the lands of
the Western United States provided an idealized type of freedom for its settlers: “For
many, the bondage has been the expectations of others, their importunings and demands,
their dependency, their entrapments, emotional and economic. Men have gone west to
get away from women, women to get away from men” (84).4 Further, Worster extends
this idealization of the freedom of the West into its physical characteristics:
We have found a vast space in which to be natural again, to be unencumbered
except by the encumbrances we freely choose and then only as long as we choose

2

Jon Christensen debates the semantic difference between “wilderness” and “wasteland” in association
with the Nevada desert and the paradox of its characteristics: “And so we begin to get a hint of the
redemption possible in wilderness and even in the wasteland, as they blend together and become metaphors
for life itself—not just life in its beneficent, embracing, nurturing sense, but life as difficult, harsh,
challenging, necessarily risky, and yes, even dangerous. And that, I think, gets pretty close to life in the
wilds of Nevada” (65).
3
It is troubling, though, when Zimmerman suggests that Rule’s novel is symptomatic of a larger turn in
lesbian theory that states that lesbianism is somewhere outside the “realm of nature” because it “represents
the most fully human existence” (43). While it is not Zimmerman’s fault that this idea exists, the argument
highlights the deceptive binary of nature/culture (nature equaling anything non-human and culture
corresponding with all that is human) and ignores the affirmative ways in which lesbians and queers utilize
and adapt “natural spaces” for their own purposes.
4
The Western Paradox, as spelled out by Worster in the classic Under Western Skies, is basically the
machine in the garden image: “Two dreams then are tugging at our feelings: one of a life in nature, the
other with machines; one of a life in the past, the other in the future. Nature makes us what we are, we still
like to think, makes us good and decent; but it is technology that makes us better” (81).
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them. But here is the rub: If this vision of liberation is to endure, this western
space must stay open, which is to say, it must stay dry. Freedom in our western
vision requires aridity. It depends on the brilliance of light, an openness of
terrain, a clean spaciousness that gives us plenty of room to spread out and look
around, to get some distance from the crowd, to deal with our private selves, to
renew hope. It requires the West as it naturally was and is. A little more water
might spoil it all. (85)
The West’s aura of openness is positioned squarely in the American imagination.
Tellingly, Evelyn’s first glimpse of the desert gives her a feeling of familiarity, but “not
because she had ever been there before. She had seen the travel posters and the
advertisements. She had reluctantly read westerns” (Desert 8). But the desert’s mystique
and allure should not be discounted. Interestingly, Worster connects the desert’s appeal
(its openness) with the very thing many find uninviting (its dryness). Worster’s utopian
vision of the deserts of West imagines freedom as “vast space,” both physical and
psychic, I would suggest, in which to act and live as one may wish. The interplay
between the desert’s natural condition—its aridity—and its construction via human need
and interpretation highlights an essential element of Rule’s queer version of the desert.
The openness of the desert is not just ideal for the clandestine encounters in which Ann
and Evelyn engage; it also allows them to act upon their own performances and
interpretations.
Queerness and natural spaces that are opened up to queer possibilities are
suggestive of self-determination and liberation in the novel, while heterosexual
relationships and those traditionally reinforced by institutions are often either portrayed
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as ambivalently death-dealing or ignorant of free will. For Rule, queer relationships, and
lesbian ones specifically, are about the opening of choice and the shedding of restriction.
Elizabeth Grosz believes it best to avoid the “polarized model” of lesbian relations that
often figure them in terms of, amongst other things, “narcissistic doubles, self-reflections,
bound to each other through mutual identification and self-recognition, or in terms of
complementarity” (“Refiguring Lesbian Desire”181). These binaries, like most other
binaries, are limiting, so instead Grosz introduces a kind of lesbian desire that, like queer
ecology itself, is constantly productive, since “desire does not provide blueprints, models,
ideals, or goals. Rather, it experiments; it makes; it is fundamentally aleatory, inventive”
(180). She evokes the Deleuzian notion of “becoming” to characterize queer desire as
“not a question of being (-animal, -woman, -lesbian), of attaining a definite status as a
thing, a permanent fixture” (184). In fact, to be sexually productive rather than sexually
reproductive is to see “this pleasure can serve no other purpose, have no other function,
than its own augmentation and proliferation” (183). In a model that differs from
Isherwood’s wholesale dismissal of and desire to commit violence to reproductive
heterosexuals, Rule does not comprehensively demonize heterosexuality or those who
embrace reproduction and marriage by conventional means. Reproductive couples do not
bear the responsibility of apocalypse here; rather, they are to be pitied in some instances
because they are merely following convention. Rule extends the narrative of naturalness
to indicate the primacy of lesbian relationships and the inadequacy of both marriage and
heterosexual procreation for some people, particularly Evelyn.
By way of illustrating her unwillingness to fully reject or embrace either the
homosexual and heterosexual lifestyle, Rule complicates dominant narratives that link
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childbearing with heterosexism. “I think one of the most offensive things in my work,”
explains Rule in a 1976 interview, “for people who are defensive about [homosexuality]
is that the people I write about who are homosexual, are not ghettoized, are not excluded,
are not strange, peculiar, sick people. That’s very scary” (Hancock 90).5 Rule’s effort to
normalize the experiences of lesbians in the face of a society unready to admit that
homosexuality is neither pathology nor blight is especially noteworthy. Another critic
points out that “Rule’s commitment to presenting non-sensationalised homosexual and
lesbian characters brought her similar problems with critics who appears to resist the
ordinariness of her fictional worlds, apparently preferring to see deviancy either
demonised or idealised, if they had to see it at all” (Sheridan 18-9). Gillian Spraggs calls
the novel “a book that challenged a wilderness of silence and malice” (117). Further in
the 1976 interview, Rule herself outlines her motivation behind writing Desert:
I wanted to write a book that dealt with what the world said was pointless,
purposeless, sterile. I wanted to write about how people worked, how people
loved, how people dealt with the land. And take those values that we get in
western culture. The claim, or the justification is, what you do is productive.
You marry and have children. You make a product that is important and you
transform the land into land that works for you. You grow your crops and you
produce a living. […] I wanted to write a book about activities, ways of life, that
had no justification inside our value system. (Hancock 95)
The “justification” for marrying and bearing children is reflective of Isherwood’s
5

Of her novels, Rule further states: “None of these people are carrying out a silverware ad notion of what it
is for one person to relate to another. I suppose the difficulty in understanding my fiction is, if you come to
it with a number of clichés about how people relate to each other, you will be in a world that doesn’t make
any kind of sense at all. You will say over and over, ‘People don’t do that, people don’t feel that…’” (90).
According to Rule’s own viewpoint, the unconventionality and unpredictability of characters are key to the
disruption of the normative behaviors accepted by the reading public.
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restrictive model of heteronormativity, and the invocation of transforming land speaks to
Kesey’s ideas about human manipulation of the environment. But the way Rule
represents it, the heterosexual way of life links marriage and childbearing with the
working the land into something productive, or, I would add, reproductive. According to
the narrative Rule lays out, the only ways to justify life are to manipulate the land and
produce children to carry on that husbandry. But it is not her purpose to supplant
heterosexism with an idealized form of lesbianism that is “sterile” or non-productive.
Rather, lesbianism is a representative of alternative and creative possibilities for leading a
productive life.
In adopting the “barren” and “sterile” Reno desert as the site for their liaisons,
Ann and Evelyn shift acknowledged notions of the natural world, expanding the
definitions of social norms as well as adequate and socially agreeable environments.
Alicia Barber, in her history of Reno, claims, “Reno possesses more sex appeal than any
town between New York and Hollywood” (qtd. in Barber, 136). Because of the divorce
industry (called the “divorce mill” because of its mechanical process and rapidity), 6 Reno
was home to a mishmash of populations: divorcees from all walks of life (including the
Hollywood stars of the times), cowboys and ranch hands, ranch owners, witnesses, judges
and attorneys. Barber notes that popular press saw Reno in terms of “scandalous fun,”
and as a “a playground for adult amusement” as well as housing “the possibility of
experiencing a romantic interlude around every corner” (136). These things seemingly

6

The Reno divorce industry is also known as “the ‘quickie’ divorce business” (Barber 54). Divorce
seekers need only establish a short, six-week residency in order to procure a divorce in the state of Nevada.
Besides this, the allowable grounds for divorce were lightened, and it became easier to divorce without
excessive evidence or reason. The loosening of the restrictions, particularly those sponsored and reinforced
by the state, associated with the institution of marriage is evident and important here. Longevity and
reproduction are no longer key in the divorce situation; dissolution and distance is.
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lowered the strict moral standards to which the rest of the country was held. It is not
overstating the fact, I think, that Reno is the unstructured and loose place that Barber
describes. A city that thrives because of its sex (brothels have flourished in the state
throughout the twentieth century) as well as its casino and divorce industries is a city that
owes its success to forms of behavior outside the proscriptive norms of American
mainstream society. That is not to say that lesbianism is a “vice” as gambling and
prostitution are often considered “vices.” Rather, consider the openness with which Reno
allows for “other” behaviors.
As far as natural environments go, the deserts of the American West, including
Nevada, provide a space for the extension and rearticulation of conventions. As an
ecosystem, the desert contains a unique and varied set of characterizations, ones different
from those with which Kesey (the forests and rivers of the Pacific Northwest) and
Isherwood (the valleys of Southern California) engage. In 1968’s Desert Solitaire,
Edward Abbey states that the Utah desert “is different”:
Not so hostile as the snowy peaks, nor so broad and bland as the ocean’s surface,
it lies open—given adequate preparation—to leisurely exploration, to extended
periods of habitation. Yet it can hardly be called a humane environment; what
little human life there is will be clustered and out in the oases, natural or manmade. The desert waits outside, desolate and still and strange, unfamiliar and
often grotesque in its forms and colors, inhabited by rare, furtive creatures of
incredible hardness, and cunning, sparingly colonized by weird mutants from the
plant kingdom, most of them as spiny, thorny, stunted, and twisted as they are
tenacious. (241-2)
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Perhaps when one imagines nature, one does not immediately think “desert.”7 On the
other hand, it is easy to say “forest” or “valley” and instantaneously link it with “nature.”
Conceivably, as Abbey’s explanation seems to indicate, this is because desert lands are
not obviously suited to human habitation and contain within their ecosystems “weird
mutants” and “rare, furtive creatures” not often seen in other environments. The mutant
and furtive creature are exceedingly apt metaphors for the divorcee or lesbian in the
desert of Reno. The openness of desert and the perceived hostility to other typical forms
of human life seem perfectly suited to the supposed abnormality of a woman seeking the
dissolution of her marriage and/or the companionship of another woman. Isolated and
somehow empty (though not in any unconstructive sense), the desert aids Ann and
Evelyn in their affair by broadening and releasing physical and linguistic borders.
But a purely anthropocentric model of the desert as useful to humans does not
neatly fit in Rule’s novel either. In a 1985 essay entitled “The Harvest, The Kill,” Rule
cautions that humans’ “basic trouble” is “[O]ur denial that we are part of nature, our
sense of superiority to it” (242).8 Always conventionally characterized as “barren” or
“infertile,” the desert functions in the novel as a (re)productive space. The desert’s
infertility, however, is neither death-dealing, symbolic of non-reproductively nor even
suggestive of negativity. The desert is not barren in the traditional sense of being lifeless
7

In an article about the postructuralist difficulty of interpreting traditional nature writing, Claire Lawrence
cautions against the assumption of naturalness, particularly in Edward Abbey’s postmodern representations
of the Utah desert: “The designation of the natural and the reading of the natural is always cultural. When
one enters an environment, one sees it through the filters of cultural knowledge and language. Desert
Solitaire has a lesson: if we unquestioningly adhere to the realistic conventions of traditional nature
writing, we run a risk of reproducing oppressive power structures” (165). It is a lesson that can be applied,
I think, to Desert of the Heart as well.
8
“We are related to what we harvest and kill,” Rule further argues, since “I am flesh, a flesh eater, whether
the food is carrot or cow. Harvesting and killing are the same activity, the interrupting of one life cycle for
the sake of another. We don’t stop at eating either. We kill to keep warm. We kill for shelter” (242). Rule
suggests here that we are all indicted within a cycle of production and consumption and that no one—no
human or animal—is separate from this cycle.
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and unproductive.9 I would argue that Rule’s desert is barren in the sense that is it open
to interpretation and that such an interpretation is boundary-less. During their desert
lovemaking session, Ann’s “free, inventive wildness” allows Evelyn to transcend her
humanness and provoke “every vague, animal desire in Evelyn that had been left
unnamed” (171). It is also freedom, “the freedom [Evelyn] wanted, an animal freedom
exposed to the emptiness of the sky and land and water” (171). Ann’s inventiveness is
productive, not reproductive, and affirmative because it offers Evelyn a new way of
looking at things (specifically, the desert and her relationship to it) as well as the openended, becoming-ness characterized by Elisabeth Grosz in “Refiguring Lesbian Desire.”
In fact, the desert’s lack of water is symbolic of the “simple fact” of ecology at
large: human’s potential for explanation of natural landscape can be without permanent
and rigid definition. The barren desert, left alone by those who refuse to or cannot see its
productivity, is not crowded with the expectation and definition usually ascribed to other
wild spaces. I quote two passages at length here to illustrate the importance of
interpretation of natural landscape to Rule’s characters. Through their semantic play and
debate, Ann’s feelings about the desert become evident. The passage comes from an
exchange with Evelyn during their first trip into the desert:
“[…] There was never water here, not fresh water.”
“But you love the whole damned world,” Evelyn said, “or so you claimed last
night.”
Ann smiled. “Yes, I do. The desert seems to me the simple truth about the
9

Or as Margaret Soenser Breen explains in her article on the biblical symbols in the novel, “The desert is a
landscape of self-address; it is the objective correlative of Ann and Evelyn’s love story, the inverted
narrative that remains for exiles from convention” and “Where fertility demands appropriation, Evelyn and
Ann’s landscape remains a sterile inviolable one, a wilderness that resists cultivation, that is itself selfsustaining” (202, 201).
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world.”
“What simple truth?”
“The earth’s given out. Men can’t get a living from it. They have to get it from
each other. We can’t have what we need, but we can take what we want. It’s true
everywhere. Here it’s easy to see.”
“I don’t agree,” Evelyn said. “Everywhere is not a desert.”
“But the desert’s beautiful,” Ann said. “Look.” (105)
The simple command to “look” at the desert illustrates the simplicity of taking this
semantic step. Nature can no longer supply what man needs so the turn to human-tohuman contact for those necessities is essential. Here, Ann reveals she takes what she
wants from Evelyn because an erotic relationship with the environment is seemingly
impossible. As Gillian Spraggs explains, the idea that Evelyn’s desire for Ann comes
“from a nature that is implicitly, but not quite expressly, constructed as flawed […] is a
small step in language to constructing her desire as ‘natural’—but a very large sideways
step in semantics” (127). After the two consummate their relationship sexually, “the
language of ‘nature’ becomes pervasive, a vocabulary that seeps into Ann’s discourse,
too: ‘wild, natural, insistent poetry’, ‘an animal freedom’, ‘an animal desire’, ‘like the cry
of some mythical water bird’” (Spraggs 127). Ann’s animality is tied into not just her
relationship with her surrounding—it is tied in Evelyn as well. Even if the earth is
somehow used up, Ann can still find erotic productiveness in her relationship with
Evelyn. In fact, Ann later admits to Evelyn, “It’s fertility that’s a dirty word to me,”
continuing:
I’m terrified of giving in, of justifying my own existence by means of simple
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reproduction. So many people do or try to. And there are the children, so
unfulfilling after all. And they grow up to do nothing but reproduce children who
will reproduce, everyone so busy reproducing that there’s no time to produce
anything. But it’s such a temptation. It seems too natural—another dirty word for
me. What’s the point? […] We’ll multiply in spite of ourselves always. We’ll
populate the desert. One day there will be little house and docks all along this
shore, signs of our salvation. (109)
Combined, these two passages spoken by Ann reveal what is at stake for Rule’s lesbian
characters: an appropriation of traditional notions of reproduction, fertility, and
perpetuity. Ann’s “dirty words” are “fertility” and “natural” because they are evidence of
a mindless, widely unquestioned, and implicitly heterosexist agenda. Related, the
desert’s lack of fresh water is actually a sign of ecological destruction. She reveals her
bias here, and it is not necessary a wholesale opposition to reproduction. Rather, she
reveals herself against a kind of mechanical reproduction that seems to be a trap into
which people fall if their lives go unexamined.
But it is not useful to imagine the desert entirely in terms of human exploitation.
It, like all other natural environments, is not merely waiting for humans to come and
legitimate it. Rather, as Rule points out, the desert is already queer. How Rule uses these
spaces for her queer characters is essential to the queer resistance of narratives of
heteronormativity. The desert, then, functions for Evelyn not just as a site of freedom but
also as the place in which she is both “a voluntary exile” from the geography of
convention and “a permanent resident” of her own making in a newly defined landscape
(115). Borrowing Marilyn Farwell’s claim that woman-centered narrative moments
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allow the space for changeable definitive boundaries, I would argue that the desert is not
a space of rigid, misplaced signifiers.10 It shifts meaning throughout the novel, becoming
adapted to both Ann and Evelyn’s changing desires. At first, Evelyn is uncomfortable in
the desert, distrustful of its vastness and isolation because she is initially imbued with the
larger meaning of the desert: “She wanted Ann to turn the car around and drive back to
Reno, which, alien and hostile, was at least human. There was no way Evelyn could
comprehend this unnatural, dead body of water, still, killing, blue” (106). The use of the
word “unnatural” does indeed coincide with notions of the sterility of the desert. It also
means for Evelyn the removal of the human element. “But there’s nothing here,” Evelyn
complains to Ann, meaning no human development and no recognized signs of nature,
i.e. trees. Her frame of reference and ability to interpret are limited. Before she
comprehends Ann’s relation to her, the desert is symbolic of dryness, sterility, and
dangerous loneliness. And, besides this, the desert is also, at least in the beginning, the
space she associates with the dissolution of her marriage.
Later, Evelyn comes to link the desert and the alkali lake with her sexual
encounters with Ann, making the spaces an important site of the naturalization of
queerness. Even though the desert frightens and confuses her at first, she later forgets
these feelings in favor of her desire to be alone and isolated with Ann. The remoteness
and openness of this particular oasis are the very reasons Ann chooses to bring Evelyn
there. “I like miles to myself,” Ann confesses, making it apparent from the very
beginning this oasis is to her the perfect location for the privacy she needs in which to

10

In her essay on homoerotic desire between women in heroic narratives, Marilyn Farwell labels a “space
of sameness” which allows for the appearance of lesbian desire in seemingly dichotomous stories (97).
“Such a concentration of one woman on another disturbs if not destroys Western dualisms,” explains
Farwell, resulting in “a space defined by fluid instead of rigid boundaries” (97).
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cull her relationship to the other woman (107). This causes Evelyn in turn to associate
the once-sterile desert with the security and openness of her lesbian relationship: “In that
great openness of water, desert, and sky, it was curiously private; but the security it
provided was, for Evelyn, a frail illusion. She was, nevertheless, grateful for it” (107).
After Evelyn initially rejects the possibility of a sexual encounter with Ann at this
particular moment and this particular oasis, she finds her notions of sexuality and
landscape simultaneously disrupted (and perhaps awakened). I quote the passage at
length here in order to emphasize the complexities of Evelyn’s response to these
disruptions:
She watched Ann wade out for the bottle of wine, that young, beautiful body she
had so carefully admired an hour ago to take her mind off the terrors of the
landscape. Its sudden erotic power bewildered and offended her, whose taste and
decorum usually governed her private thoughts as firmly as they governed her
public living. Evelyn blushed with impatience and embarrassment. Physical
response was no more significant than a hiccup, a sneeze, a twinge of gas,
functional disorders which caused discomfort but not alarm. If she were to
mistrust her own psychic health and morality every time she crossed her legs
during the ballet or a reading of a French novel, she would keep her psychiatrist
and a minister as busy as a hypochondriac keeps a doctor. It was not important.
To exaggerate a single kiss into significant guilt was a real loss of aesthetic
distance. (111-12)
The eschewal of Ann’s body and the “terrors of the landscape” are not incidental.11 Even

11

Later in the novel, Ann realizes she “could not leave the desert. In her human loneliness, the landscape
had become her home. And she found it hard to imagine leaving the Club. Already she felt herself
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in this early moment of Evelyn’s fear of both Ann’s eroticism and the desert, it is evident
that there is an explicit connection between the two. Despite Evelyn’s initial discounting
of her physical arousal at the sight of Ann’s body and her attachment to convention, her
desire to minimize her psychic and physical response is the first step to normalizing both
lesbian attachment and the arid landscape in her imagination.
The casino is naturalized for Ann much in the same way the desert is—as a
homeland for her, a place where, despite the definitions applied by other people, she is
fully at home. But it is a home that queers and ultimately denies the existence of Nature:
Why did she do it? At the center of this desert industry, symbol of it, she wanted
to take her place, for there was no nature. The apes could not have survived.
Only man could have invented a living independent of the earth, related to no
physical need, yet satisfying to them all. Out of his own nonanimal nature, he had
found a weakness, a faith by which he could survive. (96)
The absence of nature is, then, behind the impetus for the gambling industry. The casino
is “man’s answer to the poverty of the land” (184). Because this “poverty” exists, that is,
this absence of viable farmland that would produce some kind of goods, they have
eliminated even the need for land and have skipped right to the machines whose only
function is to make money. To Ann’s mind, humankind is so divorced of the natural
processes and accepting of them mindlessly like they accept procreation without
questioning, it is nonanimal. But that does not make the casino any less natural. Ann’s
acceptance of the casino’s meaning claims it for her interpretation of nature. Here again,

threatened with losing the visions she had there, which would mean losing the light she worked by” (150).
In some ways this reverses the earlier admission that man has to seek out other human beings to fulfill what
the earth cannot provide by attaching her being to the desert and the casino. However, she is
acknowledging how naturalized the spaces are for her.
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Ann reveals herself to be fully aware and in charge of the way the casino is perceived as
opposed to the way she sees it herself. The casino is also a haven for people from the
ordinariness of everyday life, indeed a similar mechanical-ness that Ann ascribes to
reproduction. And in the casino:12
…faces, unless she could look directly into them, were sinister and grotesque.
Something in the peculiar, artificial light, in the coolness of the air conditioning,
distorted the suntanned, summer sweating skin of perfectly ordinary people. They
were perfectly ordinary people, Ann reminded herself again and again. […] Part
of the excitement for the tourist was his feeling that he had crossed the moral
boundary of society as he crossed the threshold of a gambling casino. (133)
The casino, then, represents an escape for “normal” people from “normal” society; or, the
casino is a deviant entity. In contrast, the tourists would return home “to the good, green,
well-watered plains of the Lord to tell what they had seen, the coarse women, the
obsessed men, the deserted children, never guessing that these picturesque inhabitants
were tourists like themselves. They were perfectly ordinary people” (135).13
12

These “perfectly ordinary people” wish, like those who seek the casino in Michael P. Branch’s article on
the Silver Legacy Resort in Reno, to be drawn into believing in the naturalization of the casino’s
environment. The meaning of the casino, then, is an important part of evaluating the role of environment in
Desert. I include Branch’s work here as a means of explaining the placement of ecological concerns in the
context of an “artificial” environment. Finished in 1997, the Silver Legacy Resort Casino in Reno features
a painted dome, an “‘illusioneered’ sky,” that, according to Branch, adjusts notions of time and space in
order to create a “hybrid cultural artifact” that has the “dual imperative of containment and transcendence”
(277, 287). The casino effectively “secedes from nature to recreate nature in (and within) its own image”
(287). The casino’s dome, which simulates the movement of the sunlight, its air-conditioned, controlled
environment, and its manipulation of the past (through the manipulation of the casino’s 19th-century mining
town theme) reveals, as Branch points out, the casino’s ultimate objective: “to attract people inside, to
dissuade them from leaving” (291). Branch explains that the particular method of manipulating nature,
time and space reveals, “Americans are all too willing to ‘buy’ (in both sense of the word) artificial
representations of the natural world” (294). What Branch proves is that there is there is a fine line between
what’s natural and artificial in various environments. The manipulation of natural processes for profit and
enjoyment is not new. The Silver Legacy Resort is no less “natural” than the desert that surrounds them.
What makes it so is human interpretation.
13
Ann’s darker take on the casino comes about because at this point in the novel, she realizes she is in love
with Evelyn. The “ordinary people” are presumably heterosexuals, people with families and normal lives
133

But the relationship between Ann and Evelyn does not, in opposition to Lee
Edelman’s argument about queerness and the death drive in No Future, run counter to
narratives of motherhood and reproduction. Rather, it queers these narratives by opening
definitions of motherhood and childbearing and -rearing to include alternative forms of
adoption and family-formation and by reclaiming a femininity that forecloses the notion
of the passive vessel and opposes its definition in relationship to men. Evelyn, even in
her realization of her burgeoning lesbian desires, does not cease wanting to become a
mother and to realize her femininity. Ever focused on her career and disengaged from
her marriage, Evelyn appears in some ways to be a “masculinized” woman, but her
relationship with Ann actually reaffirms her longing to accept femininity and her own
womanly body in a way she is unable to with her husband, George. Ann too, in some
distant way, believes herself a mother to the foreign children she sponsors. Even Silver,
Ann’s one-time lover, is in the end pregnant by her new husband, but so much of her
affair with Ann coincides with the pregnancy that one might somehow suspect Ann of
impregnating Silver.
As a means of reinforcing alternative ways of being productive, like Isherwood’s
ending to A Single Man, Desert rejects “the paradigm of ending desire through death” by
allowing the novel’s lovers to live in the end and even become reflected in the plate glass
of the courthouse in which Evelyn’s divorce becomes final (Vice 124).14 Rule upsets the

on the “outside.” This should not, however, be interpreted as Rule’s allowance of the otherness of these
spaces and thus her reinforcement of destructive heterosexist tropes. She actually gives the casino another
meaning in the novel: otherness exemplified by the casino’s allowance for new definitions, transgressions,
and an escape from the “real” of suburbia. The capacity of certain environments, specifically the desert and
the casino, to work together and remake available logic is important to Rule’s reversal of heterosexist
conventions and naturalization of other interpretations.
14
The novel, which Vice is careful not to qualify as “utopian,” does present “a textual version of a
sameness in love which does not lead to the over-cancelling sameness, the dead-end, of marriage or incest”
(125). The ending, then, “means life, and uncertainty,” which points up Vice’s argument that Ann and
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life/death, natural/unnatural binaries so often promoted by heterosexism not just by
actively revising the meaning of natural spaces and embracing the eroticism of those
natural spaces (a concept expressed by Gaard as “erotophobia”) but also creating queer
family units that endure. Rule also endows certain heterosexual, reproductive characters
with suicidal tendencies while giving her queer characters more life-affirming attributes.
And Michelle K. Owen sees attempts at queer family formation as both “mundane and
menacing” because queer family units have a dual purpose, as her article’s subtitle
suggests: queering the normal and normalizing the queer (91).15 For Rule, resistance to
heterosexism and narratives of fecundity is not just about consummating lesbian desire; it
is as much about seeking alternatives to conventional behaviors. Rule’s queer nature
frees its purveyors to conduct themselves as they see fit. Those who queer nature or
naturalize queerness experience, at least on some level, an opening up of possibilities.
Institutions, clichés and conventions are extracted and challenged because they are, at
their core, invested in subduing difference and removing free will.
In not just naturalizing the aridity and barrenness of the desert but also the
artificiality of the casino, Rule refuses the simple equation between homosexuality and
non-reproduction. Challenging the notion of the naturalness of a grouping of lesbians,
Rule reflects the diversity of homosexual (and heterosexual experience), remaining not
ambiguous but open to interpretation.16 Consequently, in an essay entitled “The Question

Evelyn’s desire for each other is more life-giving than any relationship the “ends” in marriage (125).
15
The principle the dual purpose of queering the normal and normalizing the queer, Owen explains, lies in
the desire not “to simply deconstruct or valorize ‘family,’ thereby allowing the assimliationist/antiassimiliationist binarism to remain intact” (97). Owen is specifically addressing families headed by samesex couples in Canada.
16
As Monique Wittig points out in “One is Not Born a Woman”: “…by its very existence, lesbian society
destroys the artificial (social) fact constituting women as a ‘natural group.’ A lesbian society pragmatically
reveals that the division from men of which women have been the object is a political one and shows that
we have been ideologically rebuilt into a ‘natural group’” (9).
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of Children,” Rule argues, “It is fashionable in some circles to speak of children as the
blight of the heterosexual world, burdening those with more enlightened sexuality with
noise pollution, road hazards, and school taxes. One of the ‘benefits’ of a gay retirement
home is that one wouldn’t have to sit in a rocking chair next to someone with a wallet full
of pictures of grandchildren” (A Hot-Eyed Moderate 93). Rule’s argument is this: even
homosexuals, who through their sex acts cannot biologically reproduce, are interested in
having children. It is the homosexual act that does not result in procreation, not the
homosexual him/herself. Engaging with the contemporary rhetoric of the population
bomb, Rule cautions:
Before we [homosexuals] settle for being the smug answer to the population
explosion, let us acknowledge that we have parents among us, that many of us
have a sensibility which makes us particularly good with children, being less apt
to make rigid role requirements, more sensitive to their bewilderments and need
for reassurance, able to establish relationships with them that don’t have to be
rebelled against because we know, at first hand, the value of accepting difference
and are not allowed to forget it. (94-5)
Invoking Ehrlich’s idea of the population bomb, Rule refuses the tendency to associate
death with queerness’s relationship to reproduction.17 She instead opens up the
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Indeed, in an essay in A Hot-Eyed Moderate, Jane Rule aptly explains the troubling truth behind the
rhetoric of the population problem: “We hear a great deal about the ‘population explosion,’ but little about
the withholding of resources the waste and misuse of protein, the use of food as a tool of international
pressure. ‘Population control’ is targeted at women from groups considered expendable or ‘unfit’ on the
basis of income, class, and race” (267). In her 1970 novel This is Not For You, the main character, Kate,
echoes Rule’s ambivalence toward the narrative of population explosion: “The attitudes we were
developing and the decisions we were making were based on an older morality for populating those coastal
hills and inland valleys. Though the Jews had already been burned and the smog already sometimes
smarted our eyes, we were still prepared to be the victims rather than the heroines of a population explosion
so violent, its fallout of conformity so deadly that even the conservative Church would begin to question its
doctrines of moral sickness and health.”
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possibilities of a compassionate queerness that includes acceptance of differences and
fluidity of social roles. I include these two extended quotations in order to support my
own assertions about Rule’s motivations in writing and advocating for lesbianism and
queerness in general: at the same time she articulates a position critical of a rhetoric that
reinforces the links between heterosexism, production, reproduction, and manipulation of
the land, she is also challenging the idea that homosexuals are beyond not just the desire
to reproduce but also the inducement or ability.
But it is not just notions of natural spaces and structured environments that Rule
reconfigures. She also takes prescribed ideas about femininity and lesbianism and
reverses them in order to illustrate that the “natural” order of things is an arbitrary
construct. Or, as Adrienne Rich succinctly states, “Lesbian Existence comprises both the
breaking of a taboo and the rejection of a compulsory way of life” (“Compulsory
Heterosexuality” 27). By way of historical contextualization, I include here a brief
description of the lesbian via Frank Caprio’s 1953 interpretation. Caprio describes
female “sexual inversion” as a “problem” caused by women “becoming rapidly
defeminized as a result of their overdesire for emancipation, and that this ‘psychic
masculinization’ of modern women in causing them to become frigid” (189). Amongst
the “symptoms” of lesbianism is a desire to wear tailored men’s clothing and to smoke in
excess. Further, Caprio describes lesbianism as “the fashionable vice of the modern age,”
and it is often brought about by an abundant interest in one’s career, which causes “the
neurotically masculine women” to have unhappy and sexless marriages (190-1).18

18

Conversely, Caprio also maintains, “Defeminization doesn’t always lead to sexual repression, as cited
above. Neurotic masculinity in women may give rise to promiscuity (an unconscious repudiation of
femininity—a desire to enjoy the same sexual freedom as the male sex)” (193). In some respects and
despite its inaccuracies, this description could well illustrate Ann’s behavior—her relationships with Bill,
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Simone de Beauvoir in her 1963 essay “The Lesbian” includes the opinion that the
lesbian chooses “hard liquor, smoke strong tobacco, use language and take violent
exercise” because “in her eroticism she gets enough soft feminine sweetness” (231).
There is also this assertion:
The chief misunderstanding underlying this line of interpretation is that it is
natural for the female human being to make herself a feminine woman: it is not
enough to be a heterosexual, even a mother, to realize this ideal; the “true
woman” is an artificial product that civilization makes, as formerly eunuchs were
made. Her presumed “instincts” for coquetry, docility, are indoctrinated, as is
phallic pride in man. (231)
It seems, then, that as much as de Beauvoir wishes to debunk any notion of a natural
femininity, since femininity equals passivity and making oneself an object (which itself
speaks to an ironic assertiveness), it is nonetheless as de Beauvoir points out (somewhat
dubiously), “It is most important to emphasize the fact that refusal to make herself the
object is not always what turns women to homosexuality; most Lesbians, on the contrary,
seek to cultivate the treasures of their femininity” (239).19 That is, women become
“masculine” when they seek personal advancement and begin sporting the outward signs
of masculine dress.
Seemingly adhering to these accepted interpretations of homosexuality, George
tells Evelyn, “All intelligent women are latent homosexuals. I like you in trousers”
Silver, and Evelyn overlap.
19
De Beauvoir later argues: “Between women love is contemplative; caresses are intended less to gain
possession of the other than gradually to re-create the self through her; separateness is abolished; there is no
struggle, no victory, no defeat; in exact reciprocity each is at once subject and object, sovereign and slave;
duality becomes mutuality” (239-40). Her claim, and indeed the claims of others who are invested in
infusing certain relationships with utopic characteristics, that same-sex intercourse achieves “exact
reciprocity” has been discounted by various critics.
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(114). The markers of conventional femininity do not work for her, as she refuses “one
ill-fitting uniform after another of the world’s conventions. […] She could not be a wife
with a wardrobe for parades” (115). She prefers being called Dr. to Mrs. because “her
marriage had been more difficult than her Ph.D. to achieve and maintain” (10). In fact,
Evelyn credits her academic training with her lack of prudishness: “If she had never
actually made love to another woman, she was intellectually emancipated in all
perversion of the flesh, mind, and spirit” (111). “[B]y clinical definition,” Rule explains,
highlighting the dispassionate nature of Evelyn and George’s marriage, “she and her
husband were unquestionably female and male, fertile and potent” (70). They cannot
make a child together, however, and as Rule repeatedly demonstrates, cold, hard
definitions do not always produce the desired results. But she makes some effort to be a
“real” woman: “[I]f she could not bear a child, there were a hundred other conventions
through which she could prove she was a woman,” and those include, in the most
traditional sense, laundry, sewing, and other domestic tasks traditionally assigned to
women (119). The tensions between the innate characteristics and learned roles of
women are acute in Evelyn.
But Rule is careful to portray Evelyn’s failed marriage and divorce as neither
ideal nor even utopian mainly because Evelyn herself is never entirely convinced of
either the desire to act upon her feelings for women or the impulse to dissolve her
marriage to George. It might even be appropriate to say that Evelyn exists on a lesbian
continuum, to invoke Rich (“Compulsory Heterosexuality” 29). To do so would be to
place Evelyn on an always influx and sliding scale of sexual experience. And although
the lesbian continuum might not account for heterosexual sex, it could answer for
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Evelyn’s reluctance to divorce: she does not identify as a lesbian so keeping her marriage
intact could account for her reluctance to leave the label of wife and heterosexual and
potential mother in order to claim lesbian. Jani Scandura argues, in her piece on the
Depression-era Reno divorce industry and its narratives, “a Reno divorce can be
considered a product—indeed the product—of a modernity that had been built to ‘redo’
and ‘renew’ the institution of marriage” (244). One of these ways is through the liminal
and “unfinished” bodies of the divorcees-to-be as they awaited the finalization of their
divorces in Reno: “They stand in the middle of a process of building an institution
(divorce) that relies on a simultaneous unbuilding and rebuilding of institutions that
already stand (marriage, citizenship, gendered roles of production, renovation,
reproduction, and consumption)” (252).20 Divorce, at least initially, is not the ideal
answer to the dissolution of her marriage. Evelyn is careful about the semantics of her
situation with George, signaling a deeper concern for the state of marriage when it works
for certain people.21
In this way, Rule does not discount marriage indiscriminately or even demonize
those who choose marriage. In fact, partly due to her status as divorcee and her
unwillingness to indict George in any wrongdoing, Evelyn relays a personal guilt that she
believes is seated in her “nature”: “Surely she could not be judged for a nature her will
had never consented to. She had been good” (115). The struggle is apparent. Her nature
makes her an inadequate heterosexual and marriage partner and pushes her into Ann’s

20

Interestingly, Scandura also argues, “The threat of queer desire underwrites most Reno narratives” (258).
That is, whether male or female, the Reno resident seeking the divorce is always a suspect of queerness.
21
Or, as Gillian Spraggs puts it, “The marital relationship, the terrain prescribed for them by social
convention and conventional morality, has proved to be a ground where neither of them can flourish. But
divorce, however necessary, remains, as the book’s first paragraph describes it, a ‘voluntary exile,’ a
movement into unknown territory” (122).
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arms, but it is the role of Evelyn’s will that makes this struggle fraught. Evelyn’s
reluctance to label George at fault for the divorce signals her unwillingness to condemn
marriage as a category:
Adultery, cruelty, even desertion were diseases a marriage suffered and could
survive. The only incurable cancer was the inability of two people to live
together. And, as a charge, incompatibility, if it laid blame at all, required the
guilt of both partners. But legally incompatibility did not exist. And divorce was
not a private symbolic act. Like marriage, it was a social institution. Though she
wanted to protest, Evelyn recognized the irrelevance of her morality. (47-8)
What is at fault in the divorce is not the institution of marriage itself but rather the
character of George and Evelyn’s experience. Marriage does not work for Evelyn and
George together, but Rule does not suggest that marriage, altogether, is to be reviled.
And while Evelyn stops struggling with what she calls the “will and nature,” she
abandons her will finally.
Evelyn, then, transforms social fiction into self-actualization so that through
Evelyn’s reclamation of womanhood and femininity Rule again naturalizes lesbianism.22
That is to say, Evelyn, even in her rejection of heterosexuality and marriage to George,
forgoes markers of masculinity to fully embrace her female body. Tellingly marked by
her sexual relationship with Ann, the beginning of Evelyn’s awareness of her femininity
“was not a synthetic maternity as she had expected it to be” (Desert 161). Her
femininity, as dictated by convention, is not ruled by passivity or maternal feeling; rather,
it is manifest in the discovery of, “underneath the strict discipline she had imposed on her
22

In discussing the sexual politics of Rule’s work, Susan Sheridan reveals that Rule “has long been aware
that femininity was a social fiction which gave the lie to the most important aspects of her own life” (15).
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mind, an inventiveness” as well as the desire “to be charming, provocative, desirable” for
and to Ann (161-2). Their lovemaking becomes “instinctive” for Evelyn, and she
rediscovers she is “by nature, a woman. And what a lovely thing to be, a woman” (162).
Reclaiming her womanliness is not in contradiction to her lesbianism; rather, making
love to another woman is what ignites the femininity she lost in being married to George.
Later, she tells Ann: “‘I wanted children, I wanted to live in a house. I wanted to be a
woman.’ ‘Is that being a woman?’ ‘I thought so,’ Evelyn said, ‘but I was a very
conventional young woman, darling’” (163). While Evelyn recognizes the predictability
of her earlier desires, she does not fully rescind them.
As an offshoot of prescribed conventions of femininity, Rule dismantles and
rebuilds parenting and motherhood. Motherhood appears in divergent forms in Desert,
taking on a flexibility that one might expect from Rule, and in its most ideal forms, it is
manifested as choice, a conscious decision one makes rather than a logical conclusion at
which one is forced to arrive. It is also detached, often physically or psychologically,
without an enforcement that restricts personal freedom. Rule complicates familial
relationships by rearranging families to suit her character’s needs and by not passively
aligning biological parentage with decency and righteousness. Rule’s discussion of
mothers in the novel parallels Rich’s delineation between the two forms of motherhood:
In trying to distinguish the two strands, motherhood as experience, one possible
and profound experience for women, and motherhood as enforced identity and as
political institution, I myself only slowly began to grasp the centrality of the
institution, and how it connects with the dread of difference that infects all
societies. Under that institution, all women are seen primarily as mothers; all
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mothers are expected to experience motherhood unambivalently and in
accordance with patriarchal values; and the “nonmothering” woman is seen as
deviant. (“Motherhood in Bondage” 196-7)
Rich’s opposition between the experience and institution is useful to my discussion.
What Rule illustrates over and over is that when motherhood is a choice and does not
necessarily bear the markers of heterosexist or patriarchal cultures, it can be more lifeaffirming than motherhood that is institutionalized. The idea of motherhood as an
“enforced identity” appears in another essay by Rich in which she explains: “Through
motherhood, every woman has been defined from outside herself: mother, matriarch,
matron, spinster, barren, old maid—listen to the history of emotional timbre that hangs
about each of these words” (“Motherhood: The Contemporary Emergency” 261). The
idea of the enforcement of motherhood is a precursor to Rich’s “compulsory
heterosexuality,” and she invokes it to explain the unavoidable nature of childbearing for
well-behaved women everywhere. Kate McCullough, in an analysis of Rich’s Of Woman
Born, aptly points out Rich’s purpose is to critique the “naturalized image of the
heterosexual mother isolated within a normalized nuclear family unit” (109).23 In
Mommy Queerest, Julie Thompson also indicates the “utter superficiality of normativity”
as she evaluates the “[l]esbian performances of motherhood [which] never simply
reproduce heterosexual or bisexual enactments” (10).24 These critiques also help to

23

McCullough’s larger purpose is to examine alternative guides to pregnancy and motherhood in the
context of Rich’s critiques of patriarchy, heterosexuality, idealized motherhood and naturalization.
Tellingly, her discussion includes analyses of Cherrie Moraga’s Waiting in the Wing: A Portrait of a Queer
Motherhood and Rachel Pepper’s The Ultimate Guide to Pregnancy for Lesbians. McCullough illustrates
how Rich, despite the still apparent primacy and reinforcement of idealized motherhood, paved the way for
varying figurations of queer, lesbian, and feminist, woman-centered motherhood for some women.
24
Mommy Queerest takes on what Thompson labels the oxymoronic term “lesbian motherhood.” By
examining journalistic pieces from straight, feminist and lesbian presses, Thompson reveals the various
tensions in the discourse of lesbianism, family-building, gender expectations, and motherhood. She is
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expand my idea that queer possibilities and their evasion and eschewal of enforced
identities aid in the opening up of new definition of boundaries. Motherhood without
children or childbirth, through adoption and sponsorship, motherhood through sexual
congress, short-lived motherhood without the restrictions or entrapment of often deathdealing and limiting nuclear family arrangements—all are various mean through which
Rule engages in similar critiques of the institutionalized motherhood.
But the suggestion that Evelyn is the mother of Ann has a more sinister
appearance as well, especially when it is suggested that the two are somehow related, if
not biologically, at least metaphorically. The relation creates ambivalence in both, which
in turn points out larger questions about motherhood and futurity. Invocation of the
mother-and-child relationship can subsume the openness of queer possibility. In other
words, relational stability symbolized by the convention of motherhood suggests a
queering of queerness that reverses the purpose of queerness—the ever-shifting and open
possibilities—by replacing it with rigid stability and foreclosing the possibility of
transgression.25 This is where Ann and Evelyn’s mixed emotions on motherhood figure
in. They are concerned with the otherness of each other at the same time they see the
other reflected in themselves. To be free, and indeed to be a “free-lance lover,” is to also
concerned with the rhetoric, in both lesbian and straight presses, that makes lesbian motherhood a
contradiction and that naturalizes the heterosexual, procreative family: “While homosexuality is construed
as a matter of recruitment, heterosexuality is represented as the timeless essence of natural sexuality, even
as its is propagandized, inculcated, and enforced in various sectors of society such as religion, education,
law and the media” (35). The only way to rescript lesbian motherhood is to confront the heterosexist
account of both motherhood and lesbianism.
25
Judith Roof’s point that some lesbian novels “focus on the unfulfillability of desire—on the desire for
desire” allows for the characters in these novels to, in psychoanalytic terms, “avoid a mirror-stage temporal
paradox in favor of confounding post-mirror-stage history itself, by the denying the importance of origins,
even as the protagonists return to them” (167). Roof mainly analyzes Rule’s 1970 novel This Is Not For
You, but I find her idea of the “paradox of history” useful when applied to Desert of the Heart. Basically,
as the paradox is articulated, despite conventional histories’ need for total knowledge, lesbian fiction
disrupts the need for total knowledge by allowing desire to often go unfulfilled: “to desire is to desire not to
have a desire fulfilled; it is the desire for an unfulfilled desire” (169).
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be without origin. Ann’s desire to shatter Evelyn and break her apart is both her
acknowledgement that she is seeking an attachment, an origin, at the same time she is
decentering the notion of motherhood.
The same invocation and acknowledgement of motherhood threatens the queer
possibility of Ann and Evelyn’s relationship. Evelyn imagines herself protecting Ann as
a mother would. Upon first meeting Ann, Evelyn’s feelings of childlessness begin to stir,
but she recognizes it as narcissism: “And Evelyn had learned the even less flattering
names applied to the love a childless woman might feel for anything: her dogs, her books,
her students…yes, even her husband. She was not afraid of the names themselves, but
she was afraid of the truth that might be in them” (19). These names are likely related to
Rich’s list of names for childless, unmarried women that I included above, and it is
significant that Evelyn recognizes herself in these names. Ann, then, functions as
Evelyn’s allowance for feeling tenderness, not just toward another woman but also
another woman who is almost young enough to be Evelyn’s child.26 Ann’s own desire to
remain the “free-lance lover, proud craftsman of passion, cartooning cavalier against the
mystic rose and all colors blue” is at odds with her sudden attachment to Evelyn (126).

26

For example, Rule includes a flashback in which she recounts Evelyn’s experience during World War II.
With her husband away, Evelyn becomes the friend and close confidante of her neighbor, Carol. Under the
guise of doubt about the war, the two are “reluctant and superstitious about speaking about the future,” but
I would argue that the superstition is actually superseded by a refusal to confine the relationship to terms of
futurity (116). Carol is the only other woman besides Ann with whom Evelyn has shared intimacy, but the
intimacy takes on an interesting and very telling form. The night Carol learns of her husband’s death, she
comes to Evelyn as an infant, requiring rocking and nursing: “For this curled need in her arms could be the
end of waiting, months and years wasted in longing until, at last, the desire for comfort and nourishment
could be nothing more than a perversion of the flesh, a blind sucking” (117). Carol doubles as lover and
surrogate child. What keeps these women away from an acknowledgement of this highly sexualized
occurrence, particularly Carol, is their normalized attachments to their husbands and their desire for
children. With Carol (and with George away), Evelyn has “no role to play. There was no marriage. Not
now at this moment” (117). Relying upon the present moment, Evelyn is simultaneously freed from her
marriage and given a child to care for as well as a lover. To normalize their experience, Rule
acknowledges the likelihood that relationships like theirs were common during the war. But the
ambivalence toward motherhood, even motherhood in its most symbolic terms, remains.
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Ann is disturbed by her attachment because sex represents freedom and disentanglement
for her. That she would come to love Evelyn is inconceivable to begin with, and she
imagines smashing the image of Evelyn, then seeing “the shattered mother with slight
distaste or distant curiosity, a little disappointed, vastly relieved” (126). To need each
other is, ultimately, to need an image of themselves to which they can attest and refer.
The “mother” and the “daughter” are ambivalent because their feelings are at odds with
the expectations and threaten their freedom.27
But even with all this ambivalence toward the symbolism and naturalization of
motherhood, Rule does not foreclose their desire to have children. To do so would be
destructive of the definitional possibilities of Rule’s queer productiveness. It is
motherhood on their own terms, though. Besides Evelyn’s own continued desire for
children after her miscarriage, there is Ann’s desire to have children: “Ann might not
know what it was to have a child and want it to live, but she must know what it was to
want a child. Any woman knew that. And there was a generalization about womanhood
that even Evelyn could share” (70). Even if this particular generalization seems
destructive of any libratory purpose because it reinforces motherhood as a desirable and
necessary end, Rule is careful about how motherhood is manifest in her characters. Ann,
in particular, is a mother in ways that queer the multiple “requirements” for motherhood:
she does not conceive children through heterosexual intercourse; she does not “raise” her
children herself; and the children themselves take on various, remarkable forms. In fact,
as other critics have pointed out, Ann’s change apron is like a pregnancy, a “fetus in its
27

In Donna Deitch’s film adaptation of the novel, the two actresses who play Ann and Evelyn are pointed
different in appearance—one blonde (Helen Shaver), the other brunette (Patricia Charbonneau). The film
eschews the fact that the two resemble each other to the point of appearing as mother and daughter. Is this
because, when visualized, the discomfort of the possible incestuous connotations of the relationship (in
addition to the same-sex dimension) is too much for a mass film audience?
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seventh month,” leading to “her back burning, the veins in her legs aching with the drag
of sixty pounds of dead weight: the ironic emancipation of woman, martyred to nothing
but her own belligerence, surely” (96). In this arrangement, Ann’s burden is both her
freedom and her confinement. The cartoons she draws to sell function in much the same
way. Even if she does not reproduce in a traditional sense, her work is productive.
The “easiest and cheapest” way for Ann to have children is to sponsor them in
other countries: “They’re so little nuisance. A letter and a check a month is all they
need” (72). She is free to love them as she wants. But it is Ann’s justification that is
most interesting: “With all the surplus children in the world—they’re being dumped in
India and China the way we dump wheat—I figure motherhood should become a
specialized profession like medicine or law for people really suited to it” (72). Even
though Ann’s reasons border on justifying eugenics, she is queering motherhood as a
notion required of all women, everywhere. Ann further explains that sponsoring the
children is “[c]hildbirth without pain, Motherhood without guilt, Mother without child.
[…] I wonder if I could get that: ‘Mother without Child.’ If I got it, I couldn’t sell it”
(123). What Ann is suggesting is entirely radical. She upsets the declared semantic and
physical meaning of Motherhood, not just adopting the term for her own purposes but
also inserting the term within an almost entirely monetary. She claims one can be a
Mother by merely writing a check every month and that she is a Mother and not just a
sponsor. Motherhood is not a rigid definitive role for Ann.
In fact, Rule often acknowledges the fluidity of human sexuality in Evelyn,
Ann—whom it is important to remember is, by definition, bisexual—and Bill, Ann’s onetime lover. Even when Bill threatens to expose Evelyn and Ann’s relationship to the
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divorce attorney, he does so not because of a general abhorrence for and rejection of
lesbianism but rather because of his jealousy toward Evelyn. Bill’s is the most forceful
reaction that Ann and Evelyn’s relationship receives. Rule herself admits “the only valid
criticism” she got about the novel is “that there’s no hostility surrounding Evelyn and
Ann” (“What Can Be” 24). The reason? According to Rule, “So many people in those
days were trying to get sympathy for homosexuals by showing how mean everyone was
to them. I didn’t want to get into propaganda. I wanted them to say what they really
would say and feel what they would really feel. I consciously didn’t want to drag in a lot
of social pressure to overshadow that” (“What Can Be” 24). That is to say, Rule is
deeply invested in showing and supporting queerness as a means rather than an end. But
although Bill ultimately does not expose Ann and Evelyn’s affair, Evelyn generally
recognizes that “the world would not let them alone for long” because clearly:
marriage is the best life for a woman. Clichés were only a sin in literature. In
life, if they happened to be true, there was no intellectual campaign that would
defeat them. Did she think that marriage was the best life for a woman? Of
course. She believed it just as she believed that this huge, penny arcade was not,
as Ann would have it, only another of the mansions of God. As Ann would have
it. […] And she would not argue against marriage. She would say, “for the
while then.” And, if ever she wanted to marry, Evelyn would let her go. (213-14)
Perhaps this is a surprising thing to see from Evelyn, but we must remember not only
Evelyn’s strict ambivalence surrounding her divorce but also Rule’s unwillingness to cast
queerness as the only legitimate option.
In this way, queer sexuality does not become stable and accepted but rather

148

“uncontained and unpredictable,” as John P. Elia explains in his work on queer
relationships (80). He claims that on a “very practical level,” queer relationships are
often “extraordinarily difficult” because they “lack the ‘security’ and ‘anchor’ that are
features of so many relationships” (80-1). At the same time I feel Elia might be
overstating the instability and potential danger of queer relationships, I think his claim
holds some legitimacy, particularly if we consider it in context with the novel’s queer
relationships. Bill, it seems, despite his obvious love for Ann and his desire to marry her,
goes “from whore to homosexual back to Ann again. He was incapable of understanding
a woman who did not want to marry, who could not marry a man she loved” (34).28
When Ann and Bill become domesticated, living together for a brief time in Silver’s
home, Ann begins to chafe under the pressure of domestication because she thinks
marriage “just is wrong for some women” (41, my emphasis). Ann cannot be
domesticated not because Rule deems the entire category of marriage as invalid but
because Ann does not want to be “kept,” and “[s]he would struggle to get away, to be
born again into that live uncertainty of her single flesh” (42).
Particularly through the character of the bisexual Silver, lover to Ann and wed to
Joe and pregnant with his child by the end of the novel, Rule lends tolerance to those
willing to speak in both terms of institutionalized heterosexuality and motherhood as well
as queer sexuality. “Men were my profession,” admits Silver, “I always had a woman
until Joe” (41). Because she does not want to be “kept,” Ann poses a particular problem
28

Adrienne Rich provides an apt way of examining the relationship between Ann and Bill in her article
entitled “Motherhood: The Contemporary Emergency and the Quantum Leap”: “Gynephobia supposes the
eternal, universal guilt of women, and most women carry in us a learned, internalized version of that guilt.
Maternal guilt is perhaps the most familiar to many of us; but many also know the guilt leveled at the
woman who affirms herself, who is centered-in-herself, and who, in a woman-hating environment, dares to
love herself and other women. It is ironic, to say the least, that the first verbal attacked slung at the woman
who demonstrates primary loyalty to herself and other women is man-hater” (264).
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for Silver’s idea of heterosexual monogamy. Silver names Ann “Little Fish” because she
is slippery, wild, and not easily caught and because, as Silver claims, “You think God
made even the desert for you to swim in. But you want to be free” (43). But still, despite
her regard for Ann, Silver trades her free-wheeling lifestyle for the legitimation that
marriage will bring her (and because she is pregnant with Joe’s child). Unlike Silver,
Ann is not in a position to “make an honest woman” of Evelyn through the institutional
legitimation of marriage. But Silver’s admission that “the bride and the groom have the
privilege of at least fifteen minutes in which to contemplate what a sick, sick, fucking,
Christ-awful thing getting married is” signals something slightly sinister about the state
of marriage. Despite her reluctance toward and seeming abhorrence of matrimony, Silver
recognizes the value of its legitimacy in the eyes of the state (196). Because, as Joe
points out, “she couldn’t adopt [Ann], she wanted a little f-f-fish of all her own, one the
g-g-game warden couldn’t take away” (192). “Naturally,” Silver would want a child.
But part of Rule’s way of naturalizing queerness can be a little reductive at times,
specifically when she works to de-naturalize heterosexuality. Rule is invested in showing
heterosexuals and breeders as engaged in less than ideal lifestyles. It is the
heteronormative, traditionally reproductive relationships in the novel that are the most
death-dealing, and it is the heterosexist drive which colors all notions of the destruction
of not just nature but life itself. It is the heterosexuals and parents in the novel who are
death-dealing, despite their reproduction and tendencies toward futurity. Virginia
Ritchie, awaiting her own divorce at Frances Packer’s boarding house, attempts suicide
because she cannot imagine a life not married to her husband. Tellingly, Virginia’s
suicide attempt comes directly after Ann’s discussion about her own formulation of
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motherhood (the sponsorship of foreign children in need). Although the attempt is
unsuccessful and Virginia eventually recovers and returns to her husband and children,
Ann is enraged at Virginia’s foolhardiness. In response to the attempt, Ann angrily
explains, “I love life. Despair always makes me angry. It’s the one sin I believe in” (74).
To take one’s own life, especially out of despair at what Virginia experienced—anxiety
about her pending divorce and the separation from her children—is an outrage to Ann.
Irritated at the inadequacies of certain mothers, Ann wonders, “Why save Virginia
Ritchie’s life? I should have slashed deeper, made a decent job of it, let life out of that
house of petty horrors, the female body” (78). Ann’s cynicism is apparent here, and it is
tellingly in response to women who have lost control over their own bodies and their own
fates. Giving birth to children is yet another manner of losing control over one’s body,
since “[h]aving opened her thighs to that faltering hero, your father, having swelled and
ripened to your appalling birth, she has to love you. If she has eaten off your arm or your
leg, if she consumed you altogether, you must understand that she is nothing more than a
young animal herself, ignorant, clumsy, hungry. She has needs of her own. Of course,
she loves you; you’re one of them” (78, my emphases). This “young animal” is a reversal
of Ann’s own animality, and her fecundity is a mindless obligation. The mother’s
prescribed fecundity is destructive, unlike the productive barrenness represents by Ann’s
desert space. There is no choice here for either mother or child. It is their biological
determination, the fact that, despite the mother’s own needs and selfishness, the children
belong to her by way of biology and by way of force.29 “You’re one of them,” Ann

29

Through the relationship of Frances Packer, owner of the boarding house in Reno at which Evelyn stays,
and her “adopted” daughter Ann, Rule illustrates not just the possibility of a kind of disruptive motherhood
but also a parentage of convenience. Evelyn is sympathetic to Frances’s position as a “poor, guilty nonmother” of Ann who “worshiped a great neon cross that hummed above the church door, and waited, idling
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concludes, emphasis, I would argue on “them,” as if identification with breeding and the
institution of motherhood has condemned all.
To that end, biological parentage is referred to in terms of confinement and those
who bear children lose their autonomy, while queer relationships somehow always
remain libratory.30 After learning of Ann’s abuse by her father, dead by suicide for many
years, Evelyn imagines him as “[i]conoclast, petty devil, preaching anarchy and
practicing law, he had uprooted the tree, preyed on his daughter, not for her” (62).
Evelyn sees the injuries visited upon Ann by her father as inexcusable. But not only that,
Ann herself sees the responsibilities of biological parenting as an act that creates
entrapment for both parent and child. When her father was alive, “he had borne down on
her like the weight of gravity, had given her substance, had caged her in the knowledge of
her own flesh. While he lived, her world was the prison of his need” (76). But with his

among memories and wishes, to be redeemed by a dream out of Ladies’ Home Journal” (62). Frances’s
own confession of being a “very narrow, silly woman” and “not really a mother, not really a friend, just a
pair of hands and a familiar face” indicates her discomfort with the parental responsibility for a daughter to
whom she did not give birth (59). It is also indicative of awareness of the cliché that motherhood is only
achieved biologically. Her guilt and doubt comes from the combined awareness of her real and perceived
position as “non-mother.” Even though Frances realizes, “One thing he taught me, one thing Reno taught
me is that conventions can be a kind of trap,” she also forgets this because “I want Ann to be happy, so I
want her to have a beautiful, white wedding in a church. […] Thinking about a wedding is really just a way
of thinking about love, isn’t it? It’s love I want for Ann. I don’t think I really care very much how she gets
it” (60). Frances is in a kind of in-between space—not mother yet mother, unconventional yet still clinging
to certain conventions, not desirous of a stable, heterosexual marriage for Ann yet desiring it all the same.
The key is her awareness of these inconsistencies.
But it is her role as boarding house keeper and witness in divorce court that marks Frances as stuck in a
cyclical process of undoing marriage conventions by conventional means. It is a dreadful cycle to her, this
undoing, and the movement of the cycle is an endless, non-productive one that restricts liberty for
heterosexuals and breeders. Even Walter, her biological son, appears to Evelyn as one of the “anonymous
youngsters who lounged somehow comfortably in the restrictive chairs at the back of her lecture room day
after day, year after year, repeating and spreading themselves like perennials,” much like the students in
George’s classroom in Isherwood’s A Single Man (9-10). Certainly, there seems little hope at this point for
the redemption of Francis’s conventions. Without the security of marriage herself (she and Ann’s father
never married), Francis is dangerously close to completely losing her conventional being.
30
Janet and Ken are another example of a heterosexual couple with which Rule cautiously sympathizes.
They are “buying their child’s life on the installment plan without so much as a thirty-day guarantee,” and
when the child succumbs to his illness, Rule treats the event with compassion (24). Ann is outraged at the
unfairness of Janet and Ken’s loss, but she is at the same time disgusted by the financial rigmarole through
which the couple has to go because they are chained to their child.
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absence, she “was at least now a journeyman and could choose the need she served. It
was her own” (76). Here, with her father at least, reproduction becomes a mutually
realized trap between parent and child.
While the novel leaves the hopes of a long-term relationship between Ann and
Evelyn less definitive, the relationship is by no means discounted because it may lack
endurance. Because of this lack, their relationship reinforces Halberstam’s idea in In a
Queer Time and Space that heteronormative narratives favor longevity because of their
fixation on the future. But it is in the very consummation of this relationship between the
“mother” and her “daughter” that these notions of the queer family become even more
complicated. As many of the novel’s characters point out, Ann resembles Evelyn in a
way that makes them think they might be mother and daughter. They both acknowledge
this too, and Ann’s own justification for sleeping with Evelyn: “I’ve always made love
with women to prove to myself that they aren’t, after all, the mother I’m supposed to be
looking for, to prove that she doesn’t exist. So you could probably say my loving of you
is a perversion and a destructive one” (166-7). The theory is a telling one—Ann’s lesbian
relationships stem, by her own admission, from a desire to “destroy” her mother. But
Ann immediately discounts the Freudian theory behind her lesbianism. While Evelyn
believes herself confined to “a classic case history” in which she is “doomed to
inadequacy and sterility,” Ann points out that she is “not in a textbook” but is instead “a
human being” (167). The textbook and case histories imply convention while being a
human being suggests sexual freedom and queer possibilities. Whereas Wittig explains
in “The Straight Mind,” “[D]iscourses of heterosexuality oppress us in the sense that they
prevent us from speaking unless we speak in their terms,” Rule is still willing to speak in
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heterosexual terms even if only secondarily (25). Rule herself says something similar by
explaining, “As physical creatures, we react to sexual stimulus. So it’s probably true that
we are capable of responding sexually to either sex. Of course the predisposition for
reproduction is heterosexual so the majority of people move in that direction” (“What
Can Be” 25). That is to say, Rule is unwilling to give either heterosexual or homosexual
practice full credence. Instead, Rule values and legitimates both lifestyle choices and
identities.
In all the talk of deconstructing and challenging convention, Rule finally remains
an author largely invested in the destruction of binarisms and the institutionalization of
aspects of human life she believes should be opened and libratory.31 Through the
traditionally “barren” spaces of the desert and its lake, Rule rearranges notions of
naturalness with include the queering of the environment and the acceptance of lesbian
relationships. Besides challenging the established conventions of femininity that are
often intrinsically linked with biological motherhood and fecundity. With Christopher
31

I will here include a few more contemporary reviews that I think, either directly or not, get to the larger
historical question of Rule’s first novel. These reviews are meant to illustrate either that which Rule was
fighting against in the publication of her first novel or what she achieves, despite cultural expectations. The
reviews bring up issues I have either acknowledged or ignored in my own work, and I openly admit to the
latter fact. I will eschew it for the moment, though, in order to make clear the reception Rule’s fairly
controversial novel received in 1964. More than one reviewer notes the "haziness" or even ineptitude with
which Rule treats her male characters, particularly Ann's father and Evelyn's husband. This, I believe, is
not symptomatic of Rule's inability to write about men (in fact, her male characters in This Is Not For You
are often better written and developed than the female characters) but illustrates the secondariness of
relationships involving men to both Ann and Evelyn. One reviewer points out that “if Ann's name were
Albert, there wouldn't be any story at all,” meaning the lesbian relationship in the novel is merely incidental
(Levin). Or, as another reviewer puts it, “The Lesbian theme is of specialized interest at best” (Bresler).
Anne Penta is slightly more forgiving, stating, “This startlingly explicit novel of lesbian love is neither an
apology or indictment. It is an objective portrayal of love between two women,” but later in the review,
she suggests that the novel “is not recommended to those who find sexual perversion an uncomfortable
subject.” Clearly, the pathologizing of “sexual perversion,” even in fictional forms, was still valued. While
Donald Stephens sees the novel’s humor as its greatest asset, he also acknowledges the strength of Rule’s
use of landscape in her representations of characters: “the sterile landscape on a sterile landscape, the desert
of Reno which becomes the desert of the heart […] all work together to dissolve eventually into a whole
impression of the world as Jane Rule sees it in this book” (64). And despite the obvious preoccupation with
the “Lesbian theme,” the reviewers manage to acknowledge Rule’s effort in Desert in taking on the wide
range political and social norms.
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Salvesan’s apt interpretation, we get the impression that reviewers were not wholly
unsympathetic to Rule’s vision: “Gradually [Evelyn] realises her marriage has been a
‘long detour’ from her original nature. The conflict between what she knows to be
natural and what she believes to be right is worked out on the equivocal stages of the
Nevada desert and the gambling-club.” I include Salvesan’s contemporary review as a
way of finally acknowledging the work Rule did to challenge the associations of
lesbianism with abnormality and unnaturalness, reclaiming it, and queerness largely, to a
realm deemed libratory, open to interpretation, responsive to the wide range of notions of
the natural, sometimes slippery and not without its uncertainty but always life affirming.
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CHAPTER IV
“THEY’RE BORN ALREADY RULE AND MEASURED”: THE QUEERNESS OF
THINNESS IN MARGARET ATWOOD’S THE EDIBLE WOMAN
Whenever we treat women’s bodies as aesthetic objects without function
we deform them and their owners. Whether the curves imposed are the
ebullient arabesques of the tit-queen or the attenuated coils of artnouveau they are deformations of the dynamic, individual female body,
and limitations of the possibilities of being female.
—Germaine Greer, The Female Eunuch
The war between the sexes began with the sinking of male teeth into a
female apple. Pluto lured Persephone to hell with six pomegranate
seeds. Once she had eaten them the bargain was unbreakable. To eat
was to seal one’s doom. —Erica Jong, Fear of Flying
Please note that although men are made from dust, women are made
from ribs. Remember that at your next Texas-style barbecue!
–Margaret Atwood, “Making a Man”

In Margaret Atwood’s 1969 novel The Edible Woman, Clara, the constantly
pregnant friend of the novel’s main character, Marian, lives in a house that is littered with
“empty bottles of all kinds, beer bottles, milk bottles, wine and scotch bottles, and baby
bottles” (27). The invocation of the bottle reflects Clara herself—a vessel to be filled and
emptied continually. Usually thin, the pregnant Clara “looked like a boa-constrictor that
has swallowed a watermelon,” and her body, thusly described, is a grotesquerie (28). She
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is her pregnancy and the possibly “parasitic growth like galls on a tree, or elephantiasis of
the navel, or a huge bunion,” which Marian speculates she is growing inside her (121).
She ostensibly reproduces without thought, and languishes “as though she herself was
being dragged slowly down into the gigantic pumpkin-like growth that was enveloping
her body” (121).1 Of Clara’s passivity and loss of subjectivity, Marian observes, “During
the later, more vegetable stage of Clara’s pregnancy she had tended to forget that Clara
had a mind at all or any perceptive faculties above the merely sentient and sponge-like,
since she had spent most of her time being absorbed in, or absorbed by her tuberous
abdomen” (140). Clara even describes her own children (in a reversal of the Mrs.
Strunk’s valorization of Benny in A Single Man) in disparaging terms, likening them to
parasites. Using terms that could be mistaken for entities relating to nature, Clara always
employs with joyful disdain. The smallest baby is a “little leech […] all covered in
suckers like an octopus” and unwilling to detach itself from the weary mother (28). They
are also “barnacles encrusting a ship and limpets clinging to a rock” (33). In describing
them thus, Clara is ascribing to her children a false naturalness; they are not to be
associated with natural entities but rather they are perversions of them.2

1

But Joe, Clara’s husband, seems to understand the disparity between women’s “feminine role” and “her
core”: “[H]er feminine role demands passivity from her […] So she allows her core to get taken over by her
husband. And when the kids come, she wakes up one morning and discovers she does not have anything
left inside, she’s hollow, she doesn’t know who she is anymore; her core has been destroyed” (259-60).
That is, the woman’s autonomy is taken over by her obligations to husband, home, and children so that
there is nothing left for herself so that Clara herself is disembodied and challenged.
2
In fact, Clara’s oldest child, Arthur is in turn a “little demon,” a “little turd,” and a “furtive little
bastard.”He refuses to be toilet-trained (read: civilized), and his tendency to shit in the garden is interpreted
by his mother in this manner: “He’s a real nature-child, he just loves to shit in the garden […] He thinks
he’s a fertility-god. If we didn’t clean up this place would be one big manure field” (31). Clara’s attempt
to put a positive spin on Arthur’s disobedience only manages to create arbitrary definitions of the
civilized/unnatural and the natural because it turns out Arthur pees behind doors in the house as well.
Children are monstrous throughout the novel, particularly the landlady’s daughter, known only as “the
child.” A “hulking creature of fifteen or so,” the girl, as Marian observes, “I’m sure she’s quite normal, but
there’s something cretinous about the hair-ribbon perched up on top of her gigantic body” (Edible Woman
6). The mother displays her disapproval for Ainsley and Marian’s lifestyle because “whatever happened
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As Clara gives birth to more children, all evidence of her subjectivity dissolves “a
grim but inert fatalism” regarding her procreation (33). A “queen ant, bulging with the
burden of an entire society, a semi-person,” Clara is the embodiment of abject excess and
overreproductive fertility (122). Reminiscent of Doris’s “gross, insucking vulva” in A
Single Man and Ann’s repulsion for the recklessness of negligent mothers in Desert of the
Heart, Clara is a mindless breeder and consumer. The wastefulness of her procreative
lifestyle is evident not just in the above description of the bottles but also in Clara’s brand
of household management: “Her messiness […] was passive. She simply stood helpless
while the tide of dirt rose around her, unable to stop it or evade it. The babies were like
that too; her body seemed somehow beyond her, going its own way without reference to
any direction of hers” (34).3
Nonetheless, the obsession with Clara’s physical shape, the absorption of her
personhood into her abdomen, and her tendency toward waste are not incidental. The
novel centers of Marian McAlpin who, soon after she becomes engaged to the “wellpackaged” Peter, loses her ability to eat anything beginning with meat, then eggs, and
finally anything she pictures as once living. Working in urban Toronto4 for Seymour
Surveys, a market research company, Marian likes with her roommate Ainsley, who plots
and finally achieves pregnancy herself. At first, Marian appears to have the typical life of

the child’s innocence must not be corrupted” (7).
3
In this scene, Clara wears a maternity smock in a flower and vine pattern. Marian observes the dress and
imagines the vines coming alive, much like to the dangerous and deptive wallpaper pattern in the protofeminist short story by Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s “The Yellow Wallpaper.”
4
Examining the long and complex histories of the environmental or queer movements in Canada in the
1960s is beyond the scope of the present chapter. For further reading on Canada during the Cold War, see
Love, Hate and Fear in Canada’s Cold War, edited by Richard Cavell, Bryan D. Palmer’s Canada’s
1960s: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era, and Reginald Whitaker’s Cold War Canada: The
Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957 and Canada and the Cold War. See also Mary Louise
Adams’s The Trouble with Normal: Postwar Youth and the Making of Heterosexuality for a discussion
about rhetoric employed by Canada’s mainstream media to inform its youth about “normal” sexuality.
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a young woman in the 1960s: she has graduated from college to a mediocre job, is
engaged, and plans on leaving her job after her marriage. An affair with Duncan, a
graduate student, and her constant flight from her fiancée are the first signs that
something is awry in her life. She starts seeing Peter as a threat to her existence, and she
becomes disembodied and anxious about her impending marriage. Marian begins to
recoil at what she sees as prescribed roles for women, particularly those embodied by
Clara and Ainsley. The conclusion of the novel is the titular scene. Marian methodically
and carefully bakes a woman in the shape of a cake and offers it first to Peter, who flees
from her presumably never to be seen again. She then eats the lower half of the cake
herself, sharing the top half with Duncan.
As this culminating moment would suggest, the novel is bound up in the politics
of eating, both its action and its consequences. Through the metaphor of food, Atwood
recognizes the anxieties associated with consumption, through its multiple deployments,
for a marriageable woman in the 1960s. What is consumed in the novel, as well as how,
when, and why, reveals the tensions relating to both environment and sexual mores.
Most critics5 have read Marian’s inability to eat as a disorder, namely anorexia, that has

5

There have been many critics who have read Atwood’s novels through various interdisciplinary
perspectives, which highlight the complexities of Atwood’s subjects. Amongst the examinations that
utilize the clinical definition and cultural analyses of anorexia nervosa and its relationship to resistance of
patriarchy are: Elspeth Camerons’ “Famininity, or Parody of Autonomy: Anorexia Nervosa and The Edible
Woman”; Tracy Brain’s “Figuring Anorexia: Margaret Atwood’s The Edible Woman”; Murari Prasad’s
“The Edible Woman: Margaret Atwood’s Proto-Feminist Narrative”; and Alejandra Moreno Alvarez’s
“Subversive Literaure: Uses and Abuses of Food in Margaret Atwood’s The Edible Woman.” Emma
Parker’s “You Are What You Eat: The Politics of Eating in the Novels of Margaret Atwood” is a gloss on
the role of food in various works. Parker simplistically argues “eating is unequivocally political” and that
for Atwood’s heroines the “mouth also becomes an emotional center” (349, 359). I say “simplistically”
because Parker’s work addresses a wide range of the role of eating in Atwood’s novels and ignores the
complexities inherent in the politics of eating, the mouth, the stomach, and the choice of sustenance in
these various novels. For an article on the use of quantum physics in Atwood’s works, see “Science for
Feminists: Margaret Atwood’s Body of Knowledge” by June Deery. For a reading of Atwood through the
crime novel genre, see Lorna Irvine’s “Murder and Mayhem: Margaret Atwood Deconstructs.” And for a
look at The Edible Woman and its relationship to political feminism, see M. Prabhakar’s “Margaret
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been the result of a controlling and inescapable patriarchy. The idea is that Marian, unable
to cope with the pressures of her impending marriage or to escape the prescriptions of
postwar womanhood, begins to suffer from anorexia. It is the specific shape of Marian’s
apparent anorexia, or what I will call the queerness of her thin body, that forms the crux
of my argument.
In reading it with the tenets of queer ecocriticism in mind,6 The Edible Woman
becomes not just a novel about a young woman in the 1960s suffering from culturally
induced anorexia as a result of her revulsion for marriage and traditional female roles.
Introducing the possibility of queerness into the novel reveals a deep and abiding
response to forced gender roles, and an ecological reading reveals the destruction and
wastage wrought by the socially sanctioned consumerism for which heterosexual people
are accountable. Her concern, as she begins to be able to eat less and less, turns to
whether or not she is “normal,” and her attempts to convey traditional femininity go
awry.7 I read Marian’s “eating disorder” as a pronounced and self-aware embrace of

Atwood’s The Edible Woman: Guide to Feminism.”
6
Atwood’s work is no stranger to analysis by ecocriticism, as she often engages in analysis of human’s
tendency toward waste and want. In 1994’s Good Bones and Simple Murders, Atwood includes a piece
entitled “We Want It All” in which she describes the human impact on the earth in terms of wanting to both
preserve nature and completely use it up. “We were too good at what we did,” Atwood objects, “at being
fruitful, at multiplying, and now there’s too much breathing” (155). But it is not just reproduction to blame
but also our insatiable tendency to want more stuff for ourselves, including everything contained within the
natural world: “We want to take it all in, for one last time, we want to eat the world with our eyes. Better
than the mouth, my darling. Better than the mouth” (155). In the 1977 short story “Giving Birth,” the main
character, Jeanie, after having a child, observes from her hospital window the fragility of the natural world:
“…the entire earth, the rocks, people, trees, everything needs to be protected, cared for, tended. The
enormity of the task defeats her; she will never be up to it, and what will happen then?” (Dancing Girls
240). While this observation can certainly be read as affirmative of reproduction (her consciousness about
the stewardship of the natural world changes because she has a child to consider), the fact remains that she
is not empowered by her observation of the vastness of the natural world.
7
Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique contains a description of the split image of the woman of the 1950s and
60s: It “opens a different fissure—the feminine woman, whose goodness includes the desires of the flesh,
and the career woman, whose evil includes every desire of the separate self” (95). This career woman is
de-feminized because of her desire to be something other than a wife who pleases her husband sexually and
a mother who sacrifices her self for her children. She is made “devil” because of her “dream of
independence, the discontent of spirit, and even the feeling of a separate identity that must be exorcised to
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queerness and a resistance to the prescribed and naturalized roles of wife and mother.
Maggie Humm aptly points out, “Atwood parodies cultural definitions of the natural […]
while at the same time associating women, specifically mothers, with the eventfulness of
the natural world in recurrent images of amoebae and fetuses” (126). In her use of
“binary opposites […] exaggeration and inverted stereotypes,” Atwood “dismiss[es] an
easy essentialism in favour of a more complex account of female representation” (132).
Shannon Hengen reveals, “Being human to Atwood clearly implies acceptance of the
whole range of our physical, emotional, spiritual and intellectual state. To deny or splice
out any of that state is to amputate the self as it has been known so far, and so to stress
nature perilously” (“Margaret Atwood and Environmentalism” 74). To include the full
range of experience, and indeed to revise and resist the constraints of expectation is
engaging with the entirety of experience. “As whole creatures,” Hengen continues, “we
both affect and are affected by the larger environment in which we evolve, and her work
asks us to keep that interconnectedness firmly in mind” (84). This being said, Marian has
a fraught relationship with her job at Seymour Surveys, the market research firm.8
win or keep the love of husband and child” (95). What Friedan is suggesting, however implicitly, is that
this split cannot be contained or accepted in the same woman. Such a black and white division of “good”
woman versus “bad” woman plays an interesting role in The Edible Woman. Marian is described as so
“sensible” by her fiancée who clearly buys into this split image. She is pragmatic about marriage and
domesticity, Peter suggests, because she is willing (at least on the surface and in the beginning) to go along
with what he says and allow him to plan their lives. She will quit her job after marriage—it is expected of
her. In her response to Friedan’s book, Joanne Meyerowitz reveals that, through the “true stories”
presented by middle-class mainstream women’s magazines, women were often portrayed outside the home
in work environments. However, Meyerowitz reveals these women, successful as they might be in public
domains, conformed to “traditional gender distinctions”: “[N]umerous authors described their successful
subjects as pretty, motherly, shapely, happily married, petite, charming, or soft voiced” (233). All of this
added up to “a submerged fear of lesbian, mannish, or man-hating women” in these otherwise subversive
narratives (233).
8
One of the ways she resists fully engaging in the firm’s activities is by refusing to apply for their Pension
Plan, a sure sign of the restriction and confines of her job. After she signs that Pension Plan under a bit of
duress, Marian imagines a very different kind of environment: “Somewhere in front of me, a self was
waiting, pre-formed, a self who had worked during innumerable years for Seymour Surveys and was now
receiving her reward. A pension. I foresaw a bleak room with a plug-in heater. Perhaps I would have a
hearing aid, like one of my great-aunts who had never married. I would talk to myself; children would
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Marian’s particular department is made-up mostly of housewives who “don’t make much
but they like to get out of the house” (Edible Woman 14). A map above Marian’s desk
tracks the women involved in testing products, marking out the territory and prevalence
of consumers. But many of the foods she is asked to test or make questionnaires for are
unnatural, prepackaged and mass-produced. The convenience of these foods reveals to
whom the products are marketed—busy and overwhelmed mothers and housewives who
crave convenience and cost-effectiveness. As for the women who test the products,
“Those who get asked the questions don’t get paid at all,” and Marian suspects that
women participate in the surveys because “they like to have someone to talk to” (14).
But the artificiality of such foods is evident when the company dietitian, a woman with a
“Betty Grable hairdo and open-toed pumps,” asks Marian to test the canned rice pudding
(11-2). When asked whether the color of the rice pudding is “Natural, Somewhat
Artificial, or Definitely Unnatural,” Marian replies with discomfort, and it appears that
the prepackaged rice pudding is unappetizing. As much as the company claims to be
interested in what “real” people like from their consumer products, they are more
invested in maintaining and reinforcing stereotypes, particularly that of the consumerist
housewife. The research firm is primarily invested in not just marketing to women and
families the necessity of acquiring the products they are testing but also appealing to a
larger ideal: the good of womankind. Surveys about sanitary napkins are sent to women
with the incentive of “how they must all do their best to better the lot of Womankind—an
attempt to appeal, Marian reflected, to the embryonic noble nurse that is supposed to be
curled, efficient, and self-sacrificing, in the heart of every true woman” (116).

throw snowballs at me. I told myself not to be silly, the world would probably blow up between now and
then” (15).
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In fact, through her other female characters, Atwood challenges the naturalization
of various gender roles, that a “true woman” exists. Much of Marian’s anxiety is
centered on not just the rhetoric of motherhood and the consumerism linked with
household management but also the subjugation to which women are exposed because of
their biology.9 Discussing the “sexual division of labor,” Nancy Hartsock emphasizes the
ways in which social roles, rather than gender, determine the ways in which men and
women work. “Thus the fact that women and not men bear children is not (yet) a social
choice,” Hartsock argues, “but that women and not men rear children in a society
structured by compulsory heterosexuality and male dominance is clearly a societal
choice” (233). Women, like workers, operate in “a world characterized by interaction
with natural substances rather than separation from nature, a world in which quality is
more important than quantity, a world in which the unification of the mind and body is
inherent in the activities performed” (234).10 Specifically for Marian, the challenge

9

In Of Woman Born Adrienne Rich argues, “Women are controlled by lashing us to our bodies,” and the
two aspects of cultural motherhood lie within the physicality of the body: “the biological potential and
capacity to bear and nourish human life, and the magical power invested in women by men, whether in the
form of Goddess-worship or the fear of being controlled and overwhelmed by women” (13).
10
Additionally, Emily Martin argues:
Our lives have come to be organized around two realms: a private realm where women are most in
evidence, where “natural” functions like sex and the bodily functions related to procreation take
place, where the affective content of relationships is primary, and a public realm where men are
most in evidence, where “culture” (books, schools, arts, music, science) is produced, where money
is made, work is done, and where one’s efficiency at producing goods or services takes precedence
over one’s feelings about fellow workers. (15-6)
This leads to the fragmentation and binarization of the genders and included the subjugation of women
based on the assumptions of their intrinsic connections to the private realm and the affective and physical
body. Martin later asks us to consider “new birth imagery” that addresses the contradictory views of birth
“as concentrated life force [that] allows the mother to be either a passive vessel through which the force
flows or an active participant ‘riding’ the energy, [while] other views place women in an unambiguously
active role” (158). “Because their bodily processes go with them everywhere,” Martin further explains,
“forcing them to juxtapose biology and culture, women glimpse every day a conception of another sort of
social order. […] When women derive their view of experience from their bodily processes as they occur
in society, they are not saying ‘back to nature’ in anyway. They are saying on to another kind of culture,
one in which our current rigid separations and oppositions are not present” (200). Likewise, Rich indicts
the narrative that reinforces “Institutionalized motherhood” that itself “demands of woman maternal
‘instinct’ rather than intelligence, selflessness rather than self-realization, relation to others rather than the
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comes when she chooses thinness as a way of opposing the shape—both material and
cultural—of womanhood. The scene in which Marian purchases the ingredients for,
bakes, and eats the woman-shaped cake, highlights the process of making one’s ideal
woman and consuming her in an attempt to fully claim her. To make herself look more
like a man is to physically and psychologically refuse all that Peter and her impending
marriage stand for: heterosexuality, family-building, reproduction and the sickening
grotesqueness of pregnancy, motherhood; domesticity and the imperative to consume that
is ascribed to housewives; and an ignorance of one’s environmental impact. For Marian,
this final point is manifest in her realization of the interrelated subjugations of women
and the natural world, particularly animals.11 Images of entrapment and parasitic bonds
are used to describes heterosexual relationships, and Marian’s refusal to eat becomes
another facet of her resistance to the deception evident in reproduction and
consumption.12 This makes Marian’s awareness of and refusal to accept her position as
the hunted, the bait, and a consumable object in the novel a way in which she can express
her queer resistance to the traditional formation of gender roles and the domesticity of the
traditional nuclear family.
creation of self. Motherhood is ‘sacred’ so long as its offspring are ‘legitimate’—that is, as long as the
child bears the name of a father who legally control the mother” (42).
11
In The Good Nature Feminist, Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands points out, “Nature, in cultural feminism,
referred to the experience of reproduction, the continuity of generations, the creation of life, the inherent
bodily connection to the planet. Where men experience separation from biology, disdaining the body and
the material world (and oppressing women) en route to a necrophilic transcendence of nature, women, by
virtue of their reproductive labor, lived their lives through nature, through a grounding in the body and the
cycles of life” (11).
12
Discussing the issue of her ever-fluctuating weight, Isadora Wing, the main character of Erica Jong’s
1973 novel Fear of Flying, conveys: “Excess flesh was connected with sex—that much I knew. At
fourteen, when I had starved myself down to ninety-eight pounds, it was out of guilt about sex. […] I
wanted to feel empty. Unless the hunger pangs boomed resoundingly, I hated myself for my indulgence.
Clearly a pregnancy fantasy—as my husband the shrink would say—or maybe a pregnancy phobia. My
unconscious believed that my jerking off Steve had made me pregnant and I was getting thinner and thinner
trying to convince myself it wasn’t so. Or else maybe I longed to be pregnant, primitively believed that all
the orifices of the body were one, and feared that any food I took would seed my intestines like sperm, and
fruit would grow from me” (391-2).
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Recognizing the complex questions bound up in the consumption of food,
scholars of eating disorders note the cultural and social complexities influencing its
sufferers. In Unbearable Weight, Susan Bordo reveals a set of cultural contradictions
surrounding women and the politics of eating:
One the one hand, our culture still widely advertises domestic conceptions of
femininity, the ideological moorings for a rigorously dualistic sexual division of
labor that casts woman as chief emotional and physical nurturer. The rules for
this construction of femininity (and I speak here of language both symbolic and
literal) require that women learn to feed others, not the self, and to construe any
desires for self-nurturance and self-feeding as greedy and excessive. Thus,
women must develop a totally other-oriented emotional economy. […] On the
other hand, even as young women today continue to be taught traditionally
“feminine” virtues, to the degree that the professional arena is open to them, they
must also learn to embody the “masculine” language and values of that arena—
self-control, determination, cool, emotional discipline, mastery, and so on. (171)
Bordo argues that women have a prescribed dual role—one of the nurturer and emotional
compass, the other of detached and cool public figure—that often crosses into the realm
of eating and sexual and gender roles. To be anorexic in this particular environment
appears to be a negation of the former and an embrace of the latter. The anorexic is
caught between two other worlds: an unconscious, internalized refusal of consumption as
well as a deliberate and determined ideology that labels food wicked and unnecessary.
But I would argue that Marian’s refusal to eat is exactly that—a refusal. While all of her
internal signals, her embodied and interpolated responses, point toward helplessness and
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vulnerability, there is also a deliberate, if somewhat surprised, empowerment that comes
along with the refusal of consumption.
But there is another dimension to eating disorders that reveals the gender
ambiguity involved in self-starvation. I include here a brief but not exhaustive reference
to literature about eating disorders and what it reveals about the interrelated and often
paradoxical politics of gender and eating. Exploring anorexia as a “thought disorder,”
Noelle Caskey notes that anorexics think of “food in highly abstract and symbolic terms
which almost come to replace the act of eating itself” (183). Caskey also points out that
psychoanalysis labels anorexia an “oral impregnation phobia” (175). Kim Chernin’s The
Hungry Self reveals that despite the achievements of Second Wave Feminism, women are
still trapped in bodily, gendered expectations in which “[e]ating disorders express our
uncertainties, our buried anguish, our unconfessed confusion of identity. So far, in our
struggle for liberation, we have become women dressed in male attire and not yet, by any
means, women clothed in the full potential of female being” (36-7). Women turn to
men’s clothing in an effort to “work over and worry at and reshape these female bodies of
ours so that they can help us pretend we have managed to escape from being our mothers’
daughters and have, in our appearance at least, become their sons” (37).13
Anorexia in Leslie Heywood’s Dedication to Hunger is a “poverty of selfdefinition,” and whether physical, psychological or psychosomatic, it causes women to
feel that they are “lacking, insufficient, flawed as well as fetishized, commodified, loved,
and sexually desired—a devastating set of contradictions” (33-4). Heywood’s idea of
the “metaphysics of eating” is manifest in the marked “elimination of what is considered
13

Another interesting dimension to Chernin’s argument is that principal fear expressed by women who are
concerned about body size and physical appearance “has a great deal to do with being a daughter and
knowing that one’s life as a woman must inevitably reflect on the life of one’s mother” (37).
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stereotypically ‘feminine’ and a preference for ‘the masculine’” (64-5). Further, in Fat is
a Feminist Issue, Susie Orbach identifies the double-bind involving the sexuality of
thinness—at the same time the woman believes her thinness will make her more sexually
appealing to men, she fears the sexual power that thinness represents (79-80). “A curvy
body,” Orbach argues, “meant the adoption of a teenage girl’s sexual identity” (164).
Refusing food “straightens out the girl’s curves,” allowing her to have “a foot in both
camps—the pre-adolescent boy-girl and the young attractive woman” (165). Worried
about being seen, the anorectic becomes “reflected in the repeated theme of women’s
invisibility—wafer thinness is perhaps the quintessential expression of women’s
absence/presence. This forced invisibility leads in turn to a desire to be accepted and
noticed for just being, rather than for having to look and be perfect and fulfill others’
expectations” (169). And in The Hunger Artists, Maud Ellmann determines, “Selfstarvation is above all a performance” (17). Anorexia is a response to patriarchal
oppression in which women victimize themselves, since “they collude in their oppression
by relinquishing the perilous demands of freedom in favor of the cozy compensations of
infantilism” (2). Part of the anorectic’s impulse is the desire to regress, to become
something other than what oneself is. Further, Ellmann reveals the “incipient hostility to
fat” which is now the “hallmark of modernity”: “But nowadays the image of the fleshy
procreative body reawakens the Malthusian anxiety that fecundity is ecologically
unsound or, more specifically, that it produces hunger: and, as Eve Sedgwick has
observed, the moral imperative to ‘diet for a small planet’ has transposed itself, by sleight
of hand, to the clamorous demands imposed on women to ‘diet for a small swimsuit’”
(2).14 It is the “thin pubescent body, phallically firm,” argues Ellmann, that symbolizes
14

Indeed, Mark Bittman’s more recent and popular Food Matters: A Guide to Conscious Eating and
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the aversion to overproduction, and, I would also add, reproduction. As Ellmann
illustrates in her use of the phallic imagery of the body, the thin woman avoids the
overabundance of female sexuality, with her hips and thighs and curves, by making
herself look more masculine (3).15 Note also that in some severe cases of anorexia, the
menstrual period may cease altogether, making reproduction (or even the possibility of it)
that much more difficult. Even if the anorectic does not deliberately adopt a more
masculine looking body, there is at least a possible rejection of the infantilism that
perpetuates the patriarchal desire for the young female body.
Although they do not say it outright, taken together these authors suggest that the
underlying causes of anorexia and other eating disorders involve a queering of normative
gender roles. As Ellman’s reference to the Malthusian anxiety of the “fleshy procreative
body” would suggest, the refusal or inability to eat correlates to a larger set of cultural
norms. Consumption and reproduction is expected, but a refusal to eat is a denial of
those two cycles.16 From the desire to look less like a reproductive female to the rejection
Michael Pollan’s In Defense of Food: An Eater’s Manifesto contain mantras that dictate one should “Eat
food. Not too much. Mostly plants” (Pollan 1). Both Pollan and Bittman highlight the importance of the
ecological impact of overconsumption of food, and namely, in Pollan’s case, the industrial food complex
and its dependence on cheap fossil fuel which divorces American from the processes of food production
and thus makes less nutritious, often too readily available and cheap. Bittman asks us to rethink
consumption, identifying an intersection between our animal instinct, “coupled with our relative affluence,
almost unlimited availability, and marketing that encourages us to eat the food that’s most profitable for
manufacturers” that is behind the obesity problem as well as the increase in greenhouse gasses.
Interestingly, both agree that we should consume fewer animal-derived products, which for me has a
bearing on the rhetoric and politics of meat-eating and sexuality, which is something I develop later in the
chapter.
15
Because the act of eating always involves the other—“From the beginning one eats for the other, from
the other, with the other”—eating is, at its core, a representation of the “‘dangerous supplement’ to
heterosexual relations” (Ellman 53, 57).
16
Dealing with the way time functions in the novel, Alexandra Wolbert believes that the novel is deeply
invested in cyclical time, particularly as it relates to Ainsley’s menstrual cycle (173). Wolbert allows that
Marian’s sense of time is distorted and shifts throughout the novel, particularly in Chapter 12 in which she
contemplates her engagement and her future life. The shift into the present tense in this chapter is, for
Wolbert, a sign of Marian taking control of herself, and it is “Marian’s meditative pause about her deeds
and her future way of living” (175). Leslie Heywood identifies various psychological characteristics of
anorexia, amongst them “a disruption of the sense of linear time so that the present becomes the
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of traditional gender roles, which cast women as the commodified and fetishized objects
of patriarchy, eating disorders contain a dual purpose: the refusal of both physical and
material consumption, which brings on the environmental destruction wrought by
overconsumption; and the denial of traditional femininity—namely, the roles of wife and
mother—which contains the repudiation of the reproductive female and carries into an
embrace of more masculine shape.
Because Marian is a pursued and consumable object in the novel, I do not read her
opposition to eating as a way of removing herself from the basic animality of her
existence. Gayle Greene aptly points that there are two kinds of consumption in The
Edible Woman: “‘Consuming’ is a physiological process, the ingesting and digesting of
food, as in Marian’s reference to ‘her body’s consumption’; and it is a socio-economic
process, the purchases and use of commodities, in which Marian is implicated both by
being a young woman on ‘the market’ (to use her term for sexual availability) and by her
work as a market researcher” (97-8).17 The consumption of foodstuffs is the most basic
act all living beings, from humans to microorganisms, share. To eat it to engage with the
Other and in humans’ case, the non-human (plant or animal) world. Literally, eating is
the inclusion of another into one’s own body, of dissolving the borders between one and

synecdoche of the past and future and all of lived experience” as well as a “marked identification with the
masculine and simultaneous rejection of the feminine, along with a paradoxical attempt to accede to beauty
standards of thinness” (17-8). When Duncan says he wants to live forever because “you wouldn’t have to
worry about Time anymore,” what he means is that he will not be subjugated to the notions of time that
control his sense of futurity (Edible Woman 203).
17
The term “market,” for me, invokes many things, including Luce Irigaray’s chapter on “Women on the
Market” in This Sex Which Is Not One. Irigaray uses the Marxian study of the value to illustrate that
women on the market as commodities have little autonomy and value outside of the man’s estimations. In
a society that recognizes and supports the Commodification of women, Irigaray argues, the following
“presuppositions” exist: “the appropriation of nature by man; the transformation of nature according to
‘human’ criteria, defined by men alone; the submission of nature to labor and technology; the reduction of
its material, corporeal, perceptible qualities to man’s practical concrete activity” (184). Clearly, Irigaray is
arguing that the language of the market and Commodification of women also implicates man in the
manipulation and abuse of nature.
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another. For these reasons, the act of eating seems to already be queer since it involves
permeable boundaries and the taking on of another being. I would suggest, however, that
Marian’s removal from this scheme does not signal her denial of this most basic of
environmental engagements or of the queerness that eating symbolizes. Rather, Marian
recognizes that most insidious modes of abuse and overuse of the other-than-human
world as well as women come in the form of consumption. In the novel, consumption is
not nourishment or a respectful engagement with one’s environment; rather, it has
become about control and exploitation. To even engage in these cycles and acts means to
be indicted with these systems.18
Specifically, Duncan’s indictment of the cycle “production-consumption,” in
which Marian is an participant because of her job at the market research firm, reflects
Marian’s own resistance to the narrative which reinforces heterosexuality, procreation,
and abuse of natural resources.19 For Duncan, production-consumption represents a
cyclical and destructive process of waste and artificiality:
You begin to wonder whether it isn’t just a question of making one kind of

18

There is a perhaps less likely reason, but one I would still like to suggest, for Marian’s self-starvation.
Since the food supply is the central concern for the population bomb theorists, it seems likely that Marian is
removing herself from the competition. That is, if she does not eat, she cannot be to blame for the
population problem and the global lack of food.
19
The novel on the whole, Alan Dawe states, “is about what anyone—male or female, with or without a
college degree—can do to maintain his sanity and humanity in a plastic and over-packaged world that
exists in the second half of the century.” Dawe, in his introduction the 1969 edition of the novel, is the first
to suggest, “Marian and Duncan are in some elusive way the same character,” making anorexia’s motions
toward gender ambiguity much more significant. Whereas Brooks Bouson explains, “Duncan represents a
hidden aspect of Marian’s self. Occurring in the gap in the novel’s realistic surface, Duncan suddenly
materializes as if in response to Marian’s unacknowledged needs,” I would take it one step further—
Duncan is not entirely a separate human at all but rather another facet of Marian’s self (24-5). After seeing
him in the laundromat (read: Marian is rebelling against the notion that women are the washers of
clothing), Marian attributes their encounter and her kiss with him as “a kind of lapse, a blank in the ego,
like amnesia” (109). Her conclusion that he has “nothing at all to do with Peter” is telling—this is her
imaginary queer persona that exists outside of and away from Peter and his heterosexual deception. Further,
“Duncan’s disguise is, of course, amorphous ambiguity and anonymity,” making him the ideal companion
for (or, I would say, facet to) Marian’s challenged and resisting identity (Page 16).
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garbage into another kind. The human mind is the last thing to be
commercialized but they’re doing a good job of it now; what is the difference
between library stacks and one of those used-car graveyards? What bothers me
though is that none of it is ever final; you can’t ever finish anything. I have this
great plan for permanent leaves on trees, it’s a waste for them having to produce a
new lot each year; and come to think of it there’s not reason at all why they have
to be green, either; I’d have them white. Black trunks and white leaves. I can
hardly wait till it snows, the city in the summer has altogether too much
vegetation, it’s stifling, and then it all falls off and lies around in the gutters. The
thing I like about the place I come from, it’s a mining town, there isn’t much of
anything in it but at least it has no vegetation. A lot of people wouldn’t like it.
It’s the smelting plants that do it, tall smokestacks reaching up into the sky and
the smoke glows red at night, and the chemical fumes have burnt the trees for
miles around, it’s barren, nothing but the barren rock, even grass won’t grow on
most of it, and there are the slagheaps too; where the water collects on the rock
it’s a yellowish-brown from the chemicals. (The Edible Woman 155)
Here, Duncan is mirroring Marian’s distrust of fecundity. The barrenness, unlike the
desert of Reno in Rule’s novel, is man-made but nonetheless desirable to Duncan. Even
the most “natural” of processes—trees going new leaves every year—can be too
productive in its repetitiveness. In fact, leaves falling from trees are a waste. And while
some critics have read Duncan’s ramblings as nonsense,20 I quote this passage at length

20

In her article on the nonsense of The Edible Woman, read through the lens of Lewis Carroll’s Alice in
Wonderland, Glenys Stow defines the opposition of common sense and nonsense as thus: “common sense
is understood to mean an approach to events of life based on logic, sensory observation and natural law.
[…] Nonsense is generally understood as behaviour which is contrary to logic and which plays games with
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because it uncovers some of the most essential pieces of Atwood’s environmental schema
in the novel. Destruction is so insidious within Duncan’s vision that he is unable to
imagine the nonhuman without the human marker of pollution and artificiality. In
Northrop Frye’s 1971 account of Canadian imagination, the “garrison mentality”
signifies the “communities that provide all that their members have in the way of
distinctively human values, and that are compelled to feel a great respect for the law and
order that holds them together, yet confronted with a huge, unthinking, menacing and
formidable physical setting” (225).21 This distrust of the natural world, something Frye
sees as uniquely Canadian, breeds “a closely knit and beleaguered society” in which “one
is either a fighter or a deserter” (226). Duncan is somehow both. Duncan is not, then,
anti-natural because it is impossible to pint down what his perception of the natural is.
Rather than attempting to conceive of a pristine nature in his hometown, he sees the
process of mining as inevitable, and he acquiesces and even enjoys it. 22 Making one kind

the laws of nature and the reports of the senses, resulting in bizarre interpretations of life” (95). For these
reasons, I claim Atwood’s use of nonsense, her employment of “reversal, exaggeration, incongruity, and
arbitrary sequence” as queer (Stow 91). Many critics have also pointed the connection between Atwood’s
fiction and fairy tales. Sharon Rose Wilson suggests it has something to do with Atwood’s incorporation of
fairy tales in her work: “Preserved, baked in a witch’s oven, and eventually served as food, Marian is, by
turns, the Gingerbread Woman, Cinderella, Sleeping Beauty, Rapunzel, Goldilocks, Alice in Wonderland,
Little Red Cap, the Pumpkin-eater’s wife, Gretel, Fitcher’s bride, and, especially, the Robber Bride” (86).
Atwood’s awareness of fairy tales and her use of nonsense signal the important dream-like representations
of her novels.
21
I also want to mention Atwood’s own idea that nature in Canadian novels “is often dead and unanswering
or actively hostile to man; or, seen in its gentler spring and summer aspects, unreal. There is a sense in
Canadian literature that the true and only season here is winter: the others are either preludes to it or
mirages concealing it” (Atwood, Survival 49). Modern Toronto is a polluted, hazy, dusty and hot city, and
walking around is “almost like moving underwater” (26). Duncan says it is like “being in a fishbowl full of
dying pollywogs” (285). Duncan takes Marian to his favorite place in the city (in fact, they escape to it, as
he says), and it turns out to be a “field of tall weed-stalks whose stiff dried branches scraped against them
as they passed: goldenrod, teazles, burdocks, the skeletons of anonymous grey plants” (287). Everything
here is “so thick with green leaves and stuff you can’t see three feet in front of you,” but the place is also a
refuge for the winos (288). “They’re beginning to fill this place up with junk too, you know,” laments
Duncan, “beginning with the creek, I wonder why they like throwing things around all over the
landscape…old tires, tins cans…” (288).
22
While Ronald B. Hatch claims The Edible Woman does not discuss the function of land, he does call for
a recognition of Atwood’s ability “to break down the too easy assumption that the individual is a being
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of garbage into another kind has become the natural condition of the country.
Consumerism, in this case the conversion of ores into use by people, has made the logical
and intrinsic end of human’s destructive means.23
Duncan’s modification of the descriptions with which Marian presents him when
gathering consumer information for Moose Beer is indicative of his refusal to be defined
as a masculine consumer. He finds joy in reversing the meaning of the slogans of Moose
Beer when Marian is asked to pre-test it to men in the community. The Moose Beer
jingle reveals that the brand is deeply invested in reinforcing traditional notions of
manliness. Moose Beer is “[f]rom the land of pine and spruce,/Tingly, heady, roughand-ready” (21). “Real” men drink Moose Beer on “a real man’s holiday,” which
includes hunting and fishing. But Duncan, ever ready to subvert gendered expectations
and revise stereotypes, claims the phrase “Deep-down manly flavour” actually evokes
“sweat. […] Canvas gym shoes. Underground locker-rooms and jock-straps” (51). He
imagines the “tang of wilderness” not as an essence in the beer but as “a dog, part wolf,
part husky, who saves his master three times, once from fire, once from flood and once
from wicked humans, more likely to be white hunters than Indians these days, and finally
gets blasted by a cruel trapper with a .22 and wept over. Buried, probably in the snow.
Panoramic shot of trees and lake. Sunset. Fade out” (53). His reproduction of the image
is not productive—it is destructive. Duncan subverts the prescribed naturalness of the

entirely separate from his or her environment” and that Atwood’s embrace of the tenets of the ecocentrist
writers discards the anthropomorphic position that reinserts human beings into the wheel of life (181). In
fact, in Surfacing, “Evocative descriptions of the wild natural settings of this novel serve as counterpoint to
the empty and often hurtful exchanges between human characters” (Hengen, “Margaret Atwood and
Environmentalism” 79).
23
In a 1970 review of the novel, Millicent Bell points out, “We are prone these days to gloomy laughter or
comic despair as we consider our lives in consumerdom, the country where in the end we find ourselves
consumed—that is, converted into waste by the things we acquire, the goods and packaged ideas dispensed
along the supermarket aisles of our culture” (51).
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beer’s slogan and exposes the underlying artificiality of such phrases as “tang of
wilderness” by associating it the scripted and overused narratives.
As much as Duncan is invested in deconstructing notions of naturalized masculine
roles, Atwood uses Marian to critique the (re)production of femininity and the
naturalization of female behavior. 24 Atwood herself reveals in a 1978 interview that she
had a specific “model pattern” in mind when writing the novel that women were
supposed to take a “crummy job and marry away from it” (Oates, “A Conversation with
Margaret Atwood” 7).25 In fact, a look into contemporary conduct manuals and
textbooks reveals the gendered expectations that were circulating in print. In a 1958
textbook on advertising and selling entitled What Makes Women Buy, Janet L. Wolff
spells out the social, cultural, and psychological reasons behind women’s buying habits.
In the section “What Do Women Really Want?”, Wolff explains that women’s “natural
interests and enthusiasms” are developed in childhood and carry into adulthood, causing
them to be genuinely attracted to certain products which appeal to these “natural
interests.” Amongst the eight listed topics, the interests include: “(1) […] an absorbing
interest in home and family relationships and activities; (2) top interest in food is related
to practical problems and special emotional considerations; (3) home decorating is a high
natural interest with creative satisfaction and social value; (4) women’s interest in
personal appearance is characterized by desires for realness and for immediate results”

24

Susan Bordo spells out this notion by aptly claiming “there is no ‘natural’ body. Cultural practices, far
from exerting their power against spontaneous needs, ‘basic’ pleasures or instincts, or ‘fundamental’
structures of body experience, are already and always inscribed, as Foucault has emphasized, ‘on our
bodies and their materiality, their forces, energies, sensations, and pleasures’” (142).
25
Interestingly, Atwood also reveals in the interview, “Even in 1969, when the book was finally published,
some critics saw the view as essentially ‘young’ or ‘neurotic.’ I would mature, they felt, and things (i.e.
marriage and kids) would fall into place” (Oates 7). What these critics’ opinion illustrates is the gendered
expectations for Atwood herself. Written in 1965 when Atwood was 26, the novel (although not published
until 1969) represented for critics the work of a woman who had not yet embraced prescribed gender roles.
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(153). These “natural interests,” centering on the duties of reproduction and domesticity,
are juxtaposed with women’s “cultivated interests.” “Cultivated interests” originate from
necessity, such as “cleaning the house is woman’s work. Women find it necessary to
take an interest whether or not they like it” (189). Wolff’s contention that women hold
both innate and taught interests, in my opinion, is not meant to show women as complex
human beings. Rather, Wolff means to generalize about women’s needs and desires.
There is a set of interests in which women should take an interest and to do otherwise
would be going against expectation as well as nature.
Arlene Dahl’s 1967 advice book in the “art of femininity” also suggests “truly
feminine women have one basic quality in common. They like men” (Dahl 7). In Always
Ask a Man, Dahl does just that—asks men what the key to femininity is, and their almost
universal reply is that the key to femininity is to make a man feel important and submit to
him: “If you don’t give a man the chance to look after you, he’ll soon give up and let you
look after yourself!” (17). This version of femininity is not disputed. “The very fact that
you want to please men is a sure sign that your femininity is in working order,” and with
this “resource,” you can and will achieve anything—that is, if you can attract and keep a
man with your femininity (13). Helen Gurley Brown, in the popular manual from 1962,
Sex and the Single Girl, claims a similar definition for femininity. The “female female”
might “look like a Dresden doll and still hate men” (86). Hating men, Brown
emphatically claims, is not feminine. She also describes sexiness for a woman as
accepting “all the functions of a woman. You like to make love, have babies, nurse them
and mother them (or think you would). Being sexy means that you accept all the parts of
your body as worthy and lovable…your reproductive organs, your breasts, your
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alimentary tracts. You even welcome menstruation as the abiding proof of your fertility”
(65). What both Brown and Dahl describe as “true” femininity is inextricably bound up
not only with an undisputed worship of men and subjugation to them but also with the
“fulfillment” of what their biology dictates.
About a decade earlier, On Becoming a Woman, a conduct manual by Mary
McGee Williams and Irene Kane, was published. Despite the extent of the title, the work
is almost exclusively concerned with conveying information on how to attract, date,
marry, and keep men.26 In a chapter about how to get boys interested in you, the authors
contend, “Boys like girls, basically. They’re sitting around just waiting to be interested.
Nature is grand that way” (59). Along with the commandment that girls who attend
school should not skip breakfast, the authors include the following finding by pollster
Elmo Roper: “If I were to name one area as the single most dangerous spot in our health
picture—from the standpoint of proper eating and good nutrition, it would be the neglect
of breakfast by our teen-age girls, the mothers of tomorrow” (qtd. in Williams 78).
Startling first is the emphasis on breakfast alone, as if it is the only meal in the day that
should be eaten. The second surprising observation is the undisputed linkage between
teenage girls and their status as future mothers. “So there,” continue the authors,
“Speaking of mothers of tomorrow brings us back to you and love and marriage and that,
naturally, brings us back to boys. And getting boys interested” (78, my emphasis). The
“logical” connection between dieting, the conditioning of women for motherhood, and
young women’s desire to attract boys goes unchallenged here.

26

This is quite evident in the opening pages of the text in which the authors, when explaining menstruation
and reproduction, explain that only when “you know the deep, true love that a woman feels for a man,
when you experience the tremendous joy of comforting, sustaining and understanding a man you love,”
and, consequently, bear him children, will “you […] be acting the role you were created for” (22).
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Marian’s rejection of the shape of femininity is also a questioning of
naturalization of femininity at large.27 Marian believes Peter, after “clinically” running
his hands over her during their lovemaking, had read a marriage manual becomes “[I]f
you got something new you went out and bought a book that told you how to work it”
(162). Germaine Greer’s indictments of patriarchy, consumerism, and science focus first
on formulations of the female body that have caused the naturalization of various forms
of oppression, particularly the suppression of the physical body.28 In the chapter entitled
“Curves,” Greer contends that the “most popular image of the female despite the
exigencies of the clothing trade is all boobs and buttocks,” making the “cuddlesome”
female a more prized possession to men (33).29 Large breasts are a “millstone around a
27

Further, when asked whether she had to invent new forms in order to employ a “female mythology,”
Atwood notes the difficulty in avoiding the “mythology in which women are either Earth Mothers or—
well, the Angel-Whore syndrome” (Van Varsveld 67). Her solution to this dichotomy is to “transform [the
mythology], rearrange it and shift the values,” much like Molly Hite in The Other Side of the Story (Van
Varsveld 67). Referencing Atwood’s 1976 novel Lady Oracle, Hite argues that in telling “the other side”
in a confessional mode, Atwood’s main character “is immediately implicated in describing her own
situations under the gaze of others: of the people who variously constitute her according to their own
requirements” (127). Much of feminist criticism “has demonstrated that the decentering and destabilizing
tendencies of recent experimental writing have a great deal in common with the feminist project of
overturning culturally constructed oppositions,” enabling women who wish to write as feminists the
opportunity to rearrange the markers of hegemony (Hite 16). I would argue that in Atwood’s case
specifically, a rearrangement of mythology means an incorporation of a queer aesthetic as well as an
environmental one.
28
But, indeed Greer’s own edicts are marred by a distrust of homosexuality as a means of opening up
sexual possibilities: “Sex must be rescued from the traffic between powerful and powerless, masterful and
mastered, sexual and neutral, to become a form of communication between potent, gentle, tender people,
which cannot be accomplished by denial of heterosexual contact. The Ultra-feminine must refuse any
longer to countenance the self-deception of the Omnipotent Administrator, not so much by assailing him as
freeing herself from the desire to fulfil [sic] his expectations” (18). Later, she claims that homosexuality
emerges as a result “the inability of the person to adapt to his given sex role,” despite advocating for the
de-pathologizing of homosexuality (29). As much as Greer decries the nuclear family of the sixties as
destructive of women’s individuality, she is not willing to give up the ghost of reproduction and
childbearing. She concedes “the problem of the survival of humanity is not a matter of ensuring the birth
of future generations but of limiting it. The immediate danger to humanity is that of total annihilation
within a generation or two, not the failure of mankind to breed” (233).
29
She is equated with a possession here, a new appliance or a kitchen gadget. Germaine Greer’s
speculation that “the sexual sell was oversell” emphasizes her demand that women “prize this discontent as
the first stirring of the demand for life” (13). The motivation behind her influential The Female Eunuch
lies in her contention that “women must learn how to question the most basic assumptions about feminine
normality in order to reopen the possibilities for development which have been successively locked out by
conditioning” (14).
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woman’s neck,” which emphasizes their function and utility in view of the men who
reduce women to their parts.30 In the cases of dieting women, whether they are originally
thin or curvy, the end result is inducement “to appeal to a buyer’s market” (35). Marian
chafes under the expectations imposed by Peter, who constantly labels her “not like the
other girls,” as an understanding type, and by the other women in her life, who all appear
to be falling into the trap of femininity by either becoming pregnant, getting married, or
striving to attract the attentions of men with their exterior.
Marian’s discomfort with naturalized femininity manifests in several ways
throughout the novels, including her discomfort with Clara’s pregnancy. Confronted
with the “thick sargasso-sea of femininity” during an office party,31 Marian is repulsed by
and withdraws from the “peculiar creatures” who are her female coworkers. She is
disturbed by their “continual flux between outside and the inside, taking things in, giving
them out, chewing, words, potato-chips, burps, grease, hair, babies, milk, excrement,
cookies, vomit, coffee, tomato juice, blood, tea, sweat liquor, tears, and garbage” (181).
This version of femininity is horrifying to Marian and not just because, as Rich points out
in Of Woman Born, “patriarchal mythology” makes women the site of two contradictory
interpretations: “one, that the female body is impure, corrupt, the site of discharges,
bleedings, dangerous to masculinity, a source of moral and physical contamination, ‘the
devil’s gateway. On the other hand, as mother the woman is beneficent, sacred, pure,
30

Greer also points out that various terms applied to women and their genitalia reflect their connection to
certain foods: “honey, sugar, dish, sweety-pie, cherry, cookie, chicken and pigeon…[and if] a woman is
food, her sex organ is for consumption also, in the form of honey-pie, hair-pie, and cake- or jelly-roll”
(265).
31
Marian seems particularly sensitive to her surroundings, whether outside in the stifling urban
environment or inside the artificial coolness of the office building. Office buildings, which Jerry Mander
labels “sensory deprivation chambers,” pose a complex hindrance in modern society. In human-created,
artificial environments, the sense become dulled, and according to Mander, “[w]ith all organic life absent
and with the senses deprived of most possibilities for human experience,” the mere presence of other
human beings have created a “hot sexual environment” (65).
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asexual, nourishing; and the physical potential for motherhood—that same body with its
bleedings and mysteries—is her single destiny and justification in life” (13). The
paradox haunts Marian because these women are “objects viewed as outline and surface
only” (Edible Woman 181). But she is also horrified because she recognizes herself as
one of them: “[H]er body the same, identical, merged with that other flesh that choked
the air in the flowered room with its sweet organic scent” (181). The realization causes
her to yearn for Peter’s presence in the room, to be able to hold onto him. I would argue,
it is not because she needs to be rescued by a man; rather, to touch a man, to be in a
masculine presence, is to disassociate herself from the sea of femininity and to maintain
her true affiliation—that of maleness. Allowing herself to be consumed by the sea of
femininity is to give into “their fluidity sustained by somewhere within my bones,
without by a carapace of clothing and make-up” and to succumb to their compulsory
consumption (181).
In her short essay “The Female Body,” Atwood acknowledges that the female
body is a “hot topic,” but that the range of possibilities is wide and includes the
marketing, manipulation, personal connection, and reproduction of the body. Atwood
lists the accoutrements of dress for the female:
The basic Female Body comes with the following accessories: garter belt, panty
girdle, crinoline, camisole, bustle, brassiere, stomacher, chemise, virgin zone,
spike heels, nose ring, veil, kid gloves, fishnet stocking, fichu, bandeau, Merry
Widow, weepers, chokers, barrettes, bangles, beads, lorgnette, feather boa, basic
black, compact, Lycra stretch one-piece with modesty panel, designer peignoir,
flannel nightie, lace teddy, bed, head. (Good Bones 71)
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All these “accessories” are items that in some way alter women or make them more
visually appealing for a consuming audience. Purchasing these items incorporates
women in the act of consumption. Such sinister accessories as “chokers,” “spike heels”
and “boas” point up the dangerous materiality of these things. They are mostly objects
meant to pinch and trap the woman’s body, reshaping it to conform to men’s idealized
expectations. Marian sees advertisements for girdles and thinks, “The female form, I
thought is supposed to appeal to men, not to women, and men don’t usually buy girdles.
Though perhaps the lithe young woman was a self-image; perhaps the purchasers thought
of their own youth and slenderness back in the package” (98). This causes her to
remember the maxim that “no well-dressed woman is ever without her girdle,” and the
particular meaning of the word “ever” disturbs Marian. These products are the trick of
advertisements, made necessary and omnipresent for women by a detached body of men
who determine the “right” way for women to look.
The most telling moment of the specific male-centered expectation for women
comes when Marian visits the salon. Sofia Sanchez-Grant reads the scene as the “female
space [that] is not a place for women to fulfil their own desires, but a space created for
women to fulfil the desires of men” (85). Femininity and all its ideals and expectations
surrounding the appearance of femininity are “a male-assigned role, an act and an acting
out of feminine scripts, a masquerade. Indeed, femininity has been compared to
tranvestism, since, for a woman as for a transvestite, femininity is a role requiring ‘makeup, costumes, well-rehearsed lines…in order to be properly performed’” (Bouson 27).
Everything in the salon is pink and mauve and frivolous, and Marian feels “like a slab of
flesh, an object” (Edible Woman 229). It is not just the apparatuses of prescribed
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femininity that bears weight here; it is also the feeling of entrapment that troubles
Marian. Feeling “as passive as though she was being admitted to a hospital to have an
operation,” Marian is astonished by everyone else’s acquiescence to the forced alteration
(229). She lies like the Eliotic patient etherized upon the table, being acted upon rather
than acting for herself. Feeling “curiously paralysed,” Marian sits “fascinated by the
draped figure prisoned in the filigree gold oval of the mirror” (229). The artificiality of
the stylized hairdos, the nail polish, and the false eyelashes irks Marian, as does the
“assembly-line of women seated in identical mauve chairs under identical whirring
mushroom-shaped machines” (230). In this way, the salon resembles a factory in which
the raw female material is processed to form them in similar, artificial, doll-like shapes
with a similar destination—consumption by men.32
Besides the patriarchal demands placed upon women’s bodies, there are women
who seemingly voluntarily engaged in these compulsory acts as a means of snaring
mates. Atwood illustrates this through the “office virgins,” three girls with whom Marian
works and who appear are the stereotypes of helpless, young women in pursuit of a man.
All artificial blondes, they are virgins for varying reasons, but Marian lumps them
together to illustrate their inconsequentiality:
Millie from a solid girl-guide practicality (“I think in the long run it’s better to
wait until you’re married, don’t you? Less bother.”), Lucy from social quailing
32

Taking her cue from Atwood’s awareness of Betty Friedan’s, Coral Ann Howells proposes reading The
Edible Woman through this lens because it “is an imaginative transformation of a social problem into comic
satire as one young woman rebels against her feminine destiny” (39). The evocation of rebellion is
immediately evoked in Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique. Friedan explains in the book, first published in
1963, “I do not accept the answer that there is no problem because American women have luxuries that
women in other times and lands never dreamed of; part of the strange newness of the problem is that it
cannot be understood in terms of the age-old material problems of man: poverty, sickness, hunger, cold.
The women who suffer this problem have a hunger that food cannot fill” (71). Friedan’s “Happy
Housewife” myth gets at the crux of the issue—women, seemingly fulfilled by home and its objects,
husband, and children, are actually missing an essential piece of themselves and their happiness.
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(“What would people say?”), which seems to be rooted in a conviction that all
bedrooms are wired for sound, with society gathered at the other end tuning its
earphones; and Emmy, who is the office hypochondriac, from the belief that it
would make her sick, which it probably would. (16).
Marian witnesses the office virgins’ attempts to ensnare men and draw them away from
their jobs. Lucy, “trailing herself like a many-plumed fish-lure with glass beads and three
spinners and seventeen hooks,” attempts to attract the men who are “lurking, as ravenous
as pike” (118). They are the food themselves, the bait to be consumed by the men they
hope to trap, as well as hunters.
The hunter/hunted motif is also descriptive of Marian’s relationship with Peter.
At the same time it illustrates a larger cultural narrative that connects the subjugation of
women as well as animals.33 Coral Ann Howells points out the significance that “Peter
represents the law-giver and the hunter in Marian’s scenarios of violence, whereas she is
the escape artist identified with the spaces of the wilderness” (48). As the hunted, Marian
acquires a primitive, animal sense of survival, choosing flight from the hunter/oppressor.

33

In Atwood’s second novel, Surfacing, her nameless narrator has a similar attachment to animals. The
novel follows the narrator and three of her friends into sparsely inhabited Northern Canada to discover the
disappearance of her naturalist and biologist father. She not only empathizes with animals on the level in
which she progressively considers herself one but also as a conservationist concerned with animal welfare.
She begins to view American hunters, and eventually Americans in general, as careless and vicious because
“there is nothing inside the happy killers to restrain them, no conscience or pity; for them the only things
worthy of life are human, their own kind of human, framed in the proper clothes and gimmicks, laminated”
(129). It’s not just animals that should be killed; it is humans who do not look or act “properly.” Because
she has abandoned her child, a child she did not want in the first place, the narrator sees herself as an
outsider and “unnatural,” but she is definitely unwilling to go through childbirth again. The medical
profession, run by men, is another method for tricking women into thinking motherhood is natural despite
the fact that birth control comes in “handy green plastic packages, moon-shaped so that the woman can
pretend she’s still natural, cyclical, instead of a chemical slot machine” (79). Childbirth makes her feel like
“a dead pig, your legs are up in a metal frame, they bend over you, technicians, mechanics, butchers,
students clumsy or snickering practicing on your body, they take the baby out with a fork like a pickle out
of a pickle jar. After that they fill your veins up with red plastic” (79). This description underscores the
artificiality of childbirth and the subduing of women in a profession dictated by the patriarchy and
unnaturalness.
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Ainsley even accuses Marian of choosing clothes “as though they’re a camouflage or a
protective colouration” (6). During their engagement party, near the end of the novel,
Marian again shows her resistance to being consumed and pursued, specifically when
Peter tries to capture her with his camera. Susan Sontag claims, “There is an aggression
in every use of the camera” and “to understand the camera as a weapon of aggression,
implies there will be casualties” (7, 39). She cannot stand to have her picture taken by
Peter. In order to avoid becoming a casualty, Marian flees from the party. Marian again
refuses reproduction in the form of photography, and at the same time she refuses to
allow Peter to consume her through the camera’s lens. But we should not read Marian’s
flight from Peter, his camera, and the engagement party into the arms of Duncan as
giving into heterosexual desire. Rather, Marian is merely acting upon what her
appearance suggests—she looks, in her new hairdo, make-up, and evening dress, like a
prostitute. Duncan, however, recognizes the artificiality of the “feminine” costume she is
wearing, removes her girdle, makes her take off her make-up and then tells her she smells
“funny” (279). He wants her in a natural state, but their act of heterosexual sex is
followed by Duncan’s observation that “[t]here’s just altogether too much flesh around
here. It’s suffocating” (279). The suggestion seems to be that the act is unsatisfying for
both because what it threatens is the increase of flesh; that is, the possibility of
procreation. Marian is not Duncan’s first, and in admitting it, Duncan shatters Marian’s
last image of herself as feminine. In fact, his earlier claim that he might be a “latent
homosexual” or perhaps even a “latent heterosexual” is an admission of “the futility of it
all” (206). “[A]ll these scenes have been done already,” Duncan explains to Marian, “I
mean ad nauseam. They sort of get limp and sinuous and passionate, they try so hard,
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and I start thinking oh god it’s yet another bad imitation of whoever it happens to be a
bad imitation of, and I lose interest” (207). These women and all women, Duncan
realizes, are caught in the production-consumption trap themselves. Consuming images
in order to later produce them in imitation during heterosexual encounters is yet another
way getting trapped.
But the first mention of Peter’s camera comes during his hunting story, in which
he describes the gutting and disemboweling of a rabbit he and his friend (the
appropriately named) Trigger shot. Sontag links the act of photography with the
commercial symptoms of a consumptive society: “Needing to have reality confirmed and
experience enhanced by photographs is an aesthetic consumerism to which everyone is
now addicted. Industrial societies turn their citizens into image-junkies; it is the most
irresistible form of mental pollution” (24). But Marian’s other objection to being
photographed lies in her fear of being captured forever. This not only has the meaning of
being imprisoned in marriage to Peter but also, in her relationship to the timing of
queerness, she desires impermanence.
In her 1971 poetry collection Power Politics, Atwood includes a poem pertinently
entitled “She Considers Evading Him.” The poem reads like an addendum to Marian’s
constant flight in The Edible Woman, which Atwood characterizes as “evading, avoiding,
running away, retreating, withdrawing” (Gibson 25). The narrator contends, “I can
change my-/self more easily/than I can change you,” illustrating the conscious
modification of her own self through time and space (105). Her identity shifts from
natural entity (“I could grow bark and/become a shrub”) to primitive fertility figure to an
old, genteel, arthritic lady, before finally becoming a tragic figure of death with a “waxed
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farewell smile.” It “would be inconvenient/but final” the narrator concludes, tacitly
suggesting that death is the only alternative to the patriarchal implication of the various
available femininities. Several other poems in the collection also involve similar
testimonies to the required adaptability of women under the oppression of patriarchies
and heterosexual coupledom, including “At first I was given centuries.” In this poem, the
narrator takes herself through several historical periods—prehistory, colonialism, World
War II—to illustrate the intolerability of constantly chasing and giving herself to her
male counterparts (115). Atwood explains, in her essay entitled “Animal Victims,” that
Canadian stories “are about animals being killed, as felt emotionally from inside the fur
and feathers”: “And for the Canadian animal, bare survival is the main aim in life, failure
as an individual is inevitable, and extinction as a species is a distinct possibility”
(Survival 74, 79). Marian appears to tap into her primitive “flight or fight” response each
time she flees from something or someone that threatens to trap her. Like a rabbit being
hunted, Marian runs from Peter after dinner one night. Once caught and brought to Len’s
apartment, Marian hides under the bed, coming out “furred and tufted with dust,” literally
resembling the furriness of a rabbit because she knows she is now “involved” with and
trapped by Peter.
Because of her association with animals, it is significant that Marian’s resistance
to food begins with a refusal of meat. Maggie Humm points out, “Meat has begun to
signify to Marian the grotesqueries of marriage and masculinity […] the men enact very
openly their fantasies of violence and weaponry in the pursuit of women” (127). Bound
up in this violence is the andocentricity of language, so that the “violence and enormity of
this masculinity does not bespeak merely Peter’s individual appetite for physical pleasure
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but suggests as well the assaults of heterosexual relations” (Humm 148-9). Peter is a
“real” man because he prefers meat (roast beef and filet mignon), but watching him
“operate” on his steak, Marian visualizes the violence and subjugation of the once-living
animal Peter is now eating:
Watching him operating on the steak like that, carving a straight slice and then
dividing it into neat cubes, made her think of the diagram of a planned cow at the
front of one of her cookbooks: the cow with lines on it and labels to show you
from which part of the cow all the different cuts were taken. […] The cow in the
book, she recalled, was drawn with eyes and horns and an udder. It stood there
quite naturally, not at all disturbed by the markings on its hide. Maybe with lots
of careful research they’ll eventually be able to breed them, she thought, so that
they’re born already ruled and measured. (163-64)
Marian recognizes the very realness of the “hunk of muscle” in front of her. Without the
filter of the cellophane of the supermarket’s packaging, Marian is disturbed by the
anthropomorphized image of the “real cow that once moved and ate and was killed,
knocked on the head as it stood in a queue like someone waiting for a streetcar” (164).
But eventually she cannot eat eggs either because the yolk looks like “a significant and
accusing yellow eye” (174). Indeed, her refusal to eat animal products, meat and eggs,
and eventually even the pumpkin seeds (which are like the children of fruits) offered by
Duncan, she is voicing her own desire to live. Marian also conveys empathy for and
awareness of the natural world that is not exclusive to animals. Peeling a carrot, once she
is completely sworn off animal products, she realizes, “It’s a root […] it grows in the
ground and sends up leaves. Then they come along and dig it up, maybe it even makes a
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sound, a scream too low for us to hear, but it doesn’t die right away, it keeps on living,
right now it’s still alive” (Edible Woman 194). The rice in the rice pudding begins to
look like cocoons, and she thinks the air pockets in sponge cake are like “the bursting of a
thousand tiny lungs” (227). What each of these reactions adds up to is that Marian, in
imagining all the food as living, breathing things is imagining herself in their positions.
The description of Peter carving his meat brings to mind the influential feminist
tract, The Sexual Politics of Meat, in which Carol J. Adams proposes a “cycle of
objectification, fragmentation and consumption, which links butchering and sexual
violence in our culture” (47). The main argument of Adams’s work is that the rhetoric
and thematic premise that links the subjugation of women with the butchering,
mistreatment and eating of animals has its roots in an oppressive patriarchal culture.
Adams labels women and animals the “absent referent” in order to illustrate that “there is
fragmented flesh and there are kitchens in which it is found” (61). Adams’s own reading
of The Edible Woman centers on Marian’s turn toward vegetarianism (Adams reads her
refusal to eat as a pointed political and ethical turn toward not eating meat) which Adams
describes as “[d]omestic dynamics, a sexual war” and Marian’s intuited “link to other
animals, suggesting that a challenge to meat eating is linked to an attack on the sovereign
individual subject” (131). But there is another facet of Marian’s rejection of meat that
Adams does not take far enough: the convenience of supermarket purchases in which the
animal becomes the missing link in an economy of the quick-kill, ever-ready, convenient
meat product, “pre-packaged in cellophane, with name-labels and price-labels stuck on
it” (Edible Woman 164). In this manner, meat eating does not just evoke the dual
subjugation and violent division of women and animals; it also reproduces narratives of
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home economy and its link to convenience and rapid ecological destruction.
Another connection to animals comes in Atwood’s 1969 poetry collection The
Animals in That Country. She includes poems about hunted animals, which can be
doubly interpreted as subjugated humans. The narrator of the eponymous poem reveals,
“In that country the animals/ have the face of people,” and indeed are people at times (2).
The split occurs when the narrator argues in “this country,” the animals are truly animals
and always the victims of human violence and mishap (3). The split does not seem so
broad once one realizes there is a desire for possession of natural spaces and entities, as
revealed in the “The trappers.” The initiative of that poem lies in the desire “to make
each/tree and season an owned/territory” (35). Hunted and trapped natural entities,
particularly land and animals, like Atwood’s female characters, that refuse to be named
and owned make impenetrable and dangerous chaos for the decidedly male pioneer in
“Progressive insanities of the pioneer”:
If he had known unstructured
space is a deluge
and stocked his log houseboat with all the animals
even the wolves,
he might have floated.
But obstinate he
stated, The land is solid
and stamped,
watching his foot sink
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down through stone
up to the knee.
Things
refused to name themselves; refused
to let him name them. (38-9)
But the linkage between women and animals includes another, wider component—the
linkage of women with other natural entities that results in her further subjugation:
“Within a patriarchal economy women’s bodies may be counted as ‘a natural resource’
(by the same logic presumably that rape becomes an instrument of war) but they are also
expendable” (Howells 59). Certainly, this is how Peter relates to Marian, as she is the
“natural resource”—the “sensible,” obvious and obligatory choice for Peter’s marriage
partner at this point in his life.
But Peter, despite his pursuit of Marian, has homosocial tendencies and queer
desires when it comes to his male friends. Peter and his friends seem to form a
homosocial bachelor group and only succumb to marriage to women as a last resort. The
aptly named Trigger, Peter’s oldest friend, is getting married, and marriage is described
by Marian as an “epidemic. Just before I’d met [Peter] two had succumbed, and in the
four months since that another two had gone under without much warning” (22). Besides
this diagnosis of marriage, Marian depicts Trigger and Peter as the last remaining
bachelors, “clutch[ing] each other like drowning men, each trying to make the other the
reassuring reflection of himself that he needed” (23). Peter describes Trigger as “the last
of the Mohicans, noble and free, the last of the dinosaurs, destroyed by fate and lesser
species, and the last of the dodos, too dumb to get away” and Trigger’s bride as a
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predator (65). Peter’s prescribed response to the impending marriages of his friends is to
bed Marian under any circumstances. She imagines his choices of locations as always
prescripted and contrived. The field to which Peter takes Marian after one of his friend’s
marriages “was, I guessed, a hunting story from one of the outdoorsy male magazines; I
remembered he had worn a plaid jacket. The sheepskin I placed in one of the men’s
glossies, the kind with lust in pent-houses. But the bathtub? Possibly one of the murder
mysteries he read as what he called ‘escape literature’” (60). Marian cannot reconcile
these attempts at asserting his sexual prowess with any part of his personality, including
“a reckless, young-man gesture, like jumping into a swimming pool with your clothes on,
or putting things on your head at parties” (62). These spontaneous gestures do not suit
Peter because Marian knows he is only able to act with intent. Without the reinforcement
of his homosocial bonds and his queer family, Peter retreats into calculated prescriptions
of masculinity. His sex acts are performances of this masculinity, and Marian quickly
catches onto this. He is seemingly forced to take Marian as his bride. “[P]eople get
suspicious of a single man after a certain age,” Peter explains, partly as justification for
asking her to marry him, “they start thinking you’re a queer or something” (93).34
The queer relationship between Trevor and Fish, with Duncan as their “child,” not
only form a queer family unit, with two men at the head (Trevor is mother and Fish is
father), but also address queerness and the problems of sexuality and procreation in their
graduate theses. Trevor is exploring the “Womb Symbol” in Lewis Carroll’s Alice in
Wonderland. According to Trevor, “One sexual role after another is presented to [Alice]
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Marian imagines her family thinking similar things about her: “They had probably been worried she
would turn into a high-school teacher or a maiden aunt or a dope addict or a female executive, or that she
would undergo some shocking physical transformation, like developing muscles and a deep voice or
growing moss” (189).
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but she seems unable to accept any of them” (212). Rejecting lesbianism, maternity,
phalluses, and other gendered symbols, Alice also evidently displays an “obsession with
time, clearly a cyclical rather than a linear obsession” (212). What Trevor does not say
outright is that Alice is queer, although his reading certainly speaks to her ever-shifting
identity. But perhaps more interestingly is Fish’s thesis on “Malthus and the Creative
Metaphor.” He argues that there is a connection between the rise in birth rates and the
change in poetics in which “[p]eople get too narrow, too narrow, they’re specializing too
much” (215). “Man was in harmony with the purposes, the cyclical rhythms of Nature,
and the earth said, Produce, Produce. Be fruitful and multiply, if you recall,” Fish argues,
likening artistic creation to birth, but saying, “It’s the population explosion not the atomic
explosion that we must all worry about” (216-7). He further suggests that a cataclysm in
which all humans are killed is the only hope for a renewal of Nature. Through their
academic work and their lifestyles, Trevor, Fish and Duncan all represent an alternative,
modern family formation.
Ainsley’s own conception of the “modern” family initially goes against notions of
the nuclear family because she contends “the thing that ruins families these days is the
husbands” (38). After seeing Clara’s situation and somehow deciding to “correct” their
imperfect situation by becoming pregnant herself, Ainsley proposes a “new” kind of
family for herself—a father-less family. This might suggest Ainsley is willing to queer
the notion of family to include her definition. But Ainsley claims that having a child
“fulfills your deepest femininity” (39). But her homophobia, her fear of queerness, plays
out in her insistence that her child not be gay. As Rich points out, “Yet the fear that our
strength, or our influence, will ‘make our sons into homosexuals’ still haunts even
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women who do not condemn homosexuality as such, perhaps because the power of
patriarchal ideology still makes it seem a better fate for the boy to grow into a ‘real man’”
(211). Likewise, Friedan links the presence of the feminine mystique, like some
sociologists who have gone before her, with the feminization of male children. 35 In fact,
Ainsley undermines her own idea that women fulfill their femininity by bearing children
on their own once she realizes the doctors have “proved it scientifically” that male
children should have a strong Father Figure. Cries Ainsley, “If I have a little boy, he’s
absolutely certain to turn into a ho-ho-ho-homosexual!” (197). But Ainsley is also a
contradiction in terms. For all her talk about the naturalness, righteousness, and the
authenticity of pregnancy, Ainsley only buys into a superficial version of fertility.
Ainsley sees pregnancy as a calling to her true nature, but, as we discover from her
textbook-learning and psychology courses, she is merely following the prescriptions of
modern notions of femininity and fertility. Marian observes that Ainsley appears to have
a “layer of blubber on her soul” and that she will soon “be fat all over,” the very opposite
of Marian herself (173). Seeing it as her mission to change society’s prudery surrounding
sex and birth, Ainsley embarks on the mission to get pregnant under the guise of fulfilling
an innate feminine necessity. Talking about the symbolism of wedding flowers, Ainsley
rails against people’s hypocrisy: “Nobody wants to admit they’re really fertility symbols.
What about a giant sunflower or a sheaf of wheat? Or a cascade of mushrooms and
cactuses, that would be quite genital, don’t you think?” (191). Besides the fact that
35

Most notably among them Philip Wylie, whose famous rant, 1943’s Generation of Vipers, argued that the
“momism” and the over-coddling of children by ineffectual mothers had caused an entire generation of
male children to turn into sissies. He declares that “MOM is the end product of SHE,” and his disparaging
description of this monolithic MOM includes an indictment against her morality and political aptitude:
“Mom’s first gracious presence at the ballot-box was roughly concomitant with the start toward a new alltime low” in amongst, other things, “moral degeneration, civic corruption, smuggling, bribery, theft,
murder, homosexuality, drunkenness, financial depression, chaos and war. Note that. The degenerating
era, however, marked new highs in the production of junk. Note that, also” (184, 188-9).
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Ainsley perversely pursues Len, who is described as a “sort of seducer of young girls,” to
become the father of her child, she is also portrayed as child-like (30).
All of Ainsley’s innocence cannot cover up her true intentions because she is “in
reality a scheming superfemale carrying out a foul plot against [Len], using him in effect
as an inexpensive substitute for artificial insemination with a devastating lack of concern
for his individuality” (130). Ainsley is the sexualized child, a contradiction in terms
because at the same time she attempts to attract Len with her purity, she does so in order
to bed him. Describing how “innocent” Ainsley can look, Marian notes, “she has a pinkand-white blunt baby’s face, a bump for a nose, and large blue eyes she can make as
round as Ping-Pong balls” (7). The calendar in which she tracks her fertility has a
“picture of a little girl in an old-fashioned dress sitting on a swing with a basket of
cherries and a puppy” (88). Ainsley performs her child-like innocence as a way of
snaring Len. Choosing inert innocence, Ainsley becomes like a “pitcher-plant in a
swamp with its hollow bulbous leaves half-filled with water, waiting for some insect to
be attracted, drowned and digested” (78). Despite the fact that Len decidedly pursues
Ainsley, as she makes herself the bait, she is also the hunter in this particular scenario.
What she is actually doing, however, is definitively calculated and premeditated.
“Natural selection” takes on a different meaning when Ainsley is choosing the father for
her child. Marian sees Ainsley’s pursuit as a kind of unethical hunt, like Peter’s hunt of
both the rabbit and herself: “It’s like bird-liming, or spearing fish by lantern, or
something” (72). When Ainsley accuses Len of having “uterus envy,” she is reversing the
Freudian notion of penis envy. Her efforts to justify her pregnancy at “perfectly natural
and beautiful” are converted by Len into “Nauseating!” and “You’re unclean!” (172-3).
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Since criticism on The Edible Woman labels the final scene of the novel, in which
Marian bakes a woman-shaped cake, chases off Peter, and shares the cake with Duncan,
as the moment of greatest thematic weight to Atwood’s feminist (or protofeminist,
depending on whom you ask) premise, I take my cue from previous critics in discussing
the ending at length. Critics debate about whether Marian’s inability to eat is a conscious
choice, a way of demonstrating her agency, or, as others suggest, a manifestation of her
disembodiment, her body’s reaction to the cultural forces that forcefully inscribed
femininity on her. I would argue that Marian’s starvation is self-imposed, even though
Atwood is careful to include Marian’s frequent feelings of helplessness. This
conditioning has lead previous readers to believe that Marian is merely a foil for society’s
woes, that she herself is not and cannot be capable of choosing to not eat. While Alan
Dawe labels the ending “ambiguous but somehow triumphant” (a view with which I am
apt to agree), Catherine McLay brusquely concludes, “A cake is a cake, an edible; a
woman’s a woman; not edible. The dark voyage, downwards and inwards, is over. She
has returned to life and to consuming” (138). Sharon Rose Wilson has a more libratory
interpretation of Marian’s cake-eating, based on her reading of fairy tales:
No longer trapped in a tower, burrow, or forbidden chamber, but thinking of
herself in the first-person singular again, Marian faces the ‘horrors’ of both
disordered life and apartment and penetrates through layers to discover another
floor to reality. By baking, decorating, serving, and consuming the cake-woman
image she has been conditioned to project, Marian announces, to herself and
others, that she is not food. (96)
T.D. MacLulich’s contention is that Marian eats the cake only symbolically, “accepting
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her femininity by incorporating the feminine cake-woman or cake-child into herself. It
could even be argued that Marian is symbolically impregnating herself, or at least
accepting the possibility of pregnancy.” Fellow Canadian author Jane Rule says the cake
is not the “profound symbol” that other critics have labeled it. Rather, it is “a resolving
trick more than anything else,” which signals the book’s entire tendency toward being
“the puff pastry it claims to be—a treat of wit and invention” (44, 45). What each of
these interpretations reveals is the incorporation of others into Marian’s moment of
discovery: she announces she is not food; she is accepting of pregnancy; and she is open
to once again become consumer. They ignore the subjective revelation that Marian’s
cake-eating exposes: she bakes for herself an ideal woman and eats first the lower half,
cakey sexual organs and all, symbolically and literally taking another woman into her
mouth. Eating the genital region of the cake woman is not just a sexual performance; it
also signifies the demolition of the symbolic woman’s reproductive organs.
The decision to bake a sponge cake is indicative of her wish that the cake absorb
the desire that has been temporarily displaced by the encounter with Duncan. The
deliberateness with which she bakes and shapes the cake suggests male-centered
consumption occurring in the salon scene. “You look delicious,” she says to the cake,
“Very appetizing. And that’s what will happen to you; that what you get for being food”
(298). Seeing she needs some kind of “test” to give Peter, apparently to see if he will
stay with her, Marian turns consumer again. To the last, she clings to the idea that
Duncan is the “mutation” and Peter “just a normal human being like most other people”
(299). She is unconvinced of Peter’s “normalness” though, and her attempt to provide
Peter with a surrogate woman which he can consume fails. This is because she has
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already claimed the cake woman for herself. Ainsley accuses her of “rejecting your
femininity,” as she is uncomfortable with Marian’s expression of her queer desire (301).
She begins to think of herself “in the first person singular again,” and I would argue this
is because she has firmed her queerness by eating the cake woman (306). That Marian
feeds Duncan the cake is also significant. Duncan’s participation in the cake-eating is
merely his compliance with Marian’s queerness. Marian, despite the fact that she has
regained her appetite and presumably is not worried about assuming the shape of
femininity, responds with disbelief to Duncan’s contention that “Peter wasn’t trying to
destroy you. That’s just something you made up. Actually you were trying to destroy
him” (309). Duncan claims that Marian has returned to “so-called reality” by again
becoming a consumer. Perhaps it is the strict biology fact that Marian, in order to live,
must begin to eat again. Or that her decision to stop eating has actually done little to
straighten out her curves or subvert her femaleness. Perhaps eating here has something to
do with the fact that she has survived the hunt. As Atwood observes, in Canadian stories,
“The survivor has no triumph or victory but the fact of his survival; he has little after his
ordeal that he did not have before, except gratitude for having escaped with his life”
(Survival 33). Having evaded Peter’s snares, perhaps Marian is only able to insert herself
back into the kitchen and bake for a different man. The imposition of a new order seems
impossible at this junction, although the attempts have been courageously made.
The Rabelaisian carnival of which Bakhtin writes is also appropriate to mention
here. The disruption of hierarchy and imposition of a new order is that for which Marian
is striving. But the carnivalesque has its limits in Marian’s. Like the “frenzied
armadillo” at the zoo that Duncan describes, Marian seems doomed to repeat the patterns

196

from which she has been running the entire novel. Duncan notes, “[A]ll caged animals
get [frenzied] when they’re caged, it’s a form of psychosis, and even if you set the
animals free after they go like that they’ll just run around in the same pattern” (101).36
Through the act of baking the woman-shaped cake and consuming it, Marian makes a
final attempt at marking out her queerness. The Bakhtinian conception of eating marks
the grotesque body’s “open unfinished nature, its interaction with the world” (281).
Bakhtin also claims that the grotesque or exaggerated body is the body “in the act of
becoming” since it involves “[e]ating, drinking, defecation, and other elimination
(sweating, blowing the nose, sneezing) as well as copulation, pregnancy, dismemberment
and swallowing up by another body” (317). Marian, in her own pursuit of becoming,
actually avoids these acts because they stand for something more than the remaking or
taking on of another body; they stand for all the social naturalization which has caused
her revolt in the first place. But it is Marian’s act of eating the cake’s lower regions that
brings me to Bakhtin’s concept of the lower bodily stratum. In the edible woman’s case,
it is not just the bowels but also the genitals.
Atwood’s conscious engagement with gender politics and women’s social history
is evident throughout her work, and in particular in The Edible Woman. In the
introduction to the 1980 edition of the novel, Atwood discloses that she had not only
“been speculating for some time about symbolic cannibalism” but also, having read Betty
Friedan and Simone de Beauvoir “behind locked doors,” she sees the book as
36

Atwood herself observes, “It’s noteworthy that my heroine’s choices remain much the same at the end of
the book as they are at the beginning: a career going nowhere, or marriage as an exit to it.” The novel is, in
fact, an anti-comedy because “the wrong person gets married. And the person who embodies the restrictive
forces of society is in fact the person Marian gets engaged to” (Gibson 21). Perhaps that is to suggest that
Marian’s methods are ineffective in the end.
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“protofeminist rather than feminist” (Atwood, Introduction). The Edible Woman
certainly contains moments of protest, particularly as it relates to Marian’s disgust toward
prescribed and naturalized roles for women. Marian’s refusal to eat is first a protest
against the shape of femininity—to refuse food is to straighten her curves, in the hopes of
looking and becoming more like a boy. Both Clara and Ainsley are unnatural
perversions. Marian queers herself against these two by refusing to take in food, and by
finally symbolically eating out the cake woman. Marian’s refusal is also a protest against
the linked subjugation of women and animals, as meat consumption in particular
replicates the abuse of women and animals by patriarchy. Besides fleeing from situations
in which she sees herself as food—the hunted animal and the bait for Peter—Marian
adopts Duncan as a means of protesting against the cycle of restrictive and destructive
process of production-consumption.
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CONCLUSION:
ACTIVISM, POLLUTION & IDENTITY POLITICS
Who has decided—who has the right to decide—for the countless
legions of people who were not consulted that the supreme value is a
world without insects, even though it be also a sterile world ungraced by
the curving wing of a bird in flight? The decision is that of the
authoritarian temporarily entrusted with power; he has made it during a
moment of inattention by millions to whom beauty and the ordered world
of nature still have a meaning that is deep and imperative.
—Rachel Carson, Silent Spring
All this garrulous attention which has us in a stew over sexuality, is it not
motivated by one basic concern: to ensure population, to reproduce labor
capacity, to perpetuate the form of social relations: in short, to constitute
a sexuality that is economically useful and politically conservative?
—Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, An Introduction

After Ken Kesey published Sometimes a Great Notion, he abandoned writing for
about two decades until 1986’s Demon Box (notwithstanding the writing he did while in
jail on drug charges) to form the Merry Pranksters and travel the United States,
experimenting with LSD. Christopher Isherwood continued to publish after A Single
Man, exploring Vedanta specifically. Though he lived openly with his partner Don
Bachardy for more than 30 years and became a kind of grandfather of the gay rights
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movement, Isherwood never had a public coming-out. Desert of the Heart remains Jane
Rule’s most well-known novel despite many subsequent publications, including 1975’s
Lesbian Images. She became after an advocate for gay rights in Canada and spoke
publically until her death in 2007. And embarking on the fifth decade of her career,
Margaret Atwood continues to publish in all genres. Her 2003 post-apocalyptic novel
Oryx and Crake, which won the Booker Prize, explores the disastrous consequences of
human manipulation of animals’ genes and disease.
I mention these biographical instances as a way of illustrating how the authors in
this dissertation continued to deal with issues of environment and sexuality. After
publishing their work in the 1960s, they all but abandon the combined issues of queer
ecology taken up at that moment during the Cold War. It seems the postwar period
provided the ideal moment for exploring the intersection of sexual politics and humans’
relationship to the environment. The connection of concerns about population and
resource and land usage after the Second World War exposed other issues about the way
sexuality and naturalness were imagined. In many ways, this dissertation attempts to
forge and iterate that connection. And while the juncture of concerns might not have
been explicitly explored publicly or in an activist frame, the cultural moment that
uncovered the social justice issues surrounding the deployment of meanings of
naturalness was crucial to our current queer ecocritical analyses.
In some ways, the threat of nuclear warfare so prevalent during the height of the
Cold War pointed up the dual concerns of population and environmental destruction.
Nuclear annihilation signified the utter destruction of all life systems and the total
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simplification and eradication of life on earth. Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, published
in 1962 and considered by many the touchstone of the modern environment movement,
invokes the “heart of America” in order to tell the story of the poisoned environment.
“The people had done it to themselves,” Carson argues: “Nature has introduced great
variety into the landscape, but man has displayed a passion for simplifying it. Thus, he
undoes the built-in checks and balances by which nature holds the species within bounds”
(3, 10). Michel Foucault, in the first part of his influential study of sexuality, The History
of Sexuality, sees the “atomic situation” as a way for nations to threat the “biological
existence of a population” rather than its “juridical existence” (A History of Sexuality
137). “[P]ower is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the
large-scale phenomena of population,” Foucault explains, highlighting the implied
connection between population and species subjugation (137). In both of the
descriptions, the authors lay ultimate blame on human folly since we are the creators of
our own problems, whether relate to our environment, populace, attitudes toward
alternative sexualities or the demolition of entire ecosystems.
But moving into the 70s, the delicate alliance between environmentalism and gay
rights began to dissolve. Rather than saying the 60s were this utopic moment of
revolution and redefinition, when cultural classifications were comprehensively
deconstructed, I mean to suggest that as both the environmental and gay rights
movements developed into the next decade, their agendas changed. That is not to suggest
that there ever was a concerted effort on the parts of the pre-gay rights movement,
homophile societies like Daughters of Bilitis and the Mattachine Society and
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conservationists in associations like the Sierra Club to come together and examine the
institutional and social pressures that consolidated to create a discourse that defined
naturalness so narrowly. Instead, I wish to point out the divergence of the focus of both
movements to demonstrate that authors like Kesey, Isherwood, Atwood, and Rule were
preserving something of the original dialogue of heterosexism and anti-naturism that was
at the crux of certain Cold War literary explorations.
Coming out of the 60s, the key link between population problems and
environmental pressures was beginning to waver. In the mid-70s, Paul Ehrlich and John
Holdren came up with the I=PAT formula. The equation links environmental impact with
population, how many goods each person uses, and the pollution caused by those goods.1
But it was also a bit of a retraction from Ehrlich’s conclusion in The Population Bomb
because it acknowledges there can be no simple correlation between the number of
people living on the earth and the way the environment is affected. This going some way
in unfastening the ties behind the state’s affiliation with the naturalized, heterosexualized
nuclear family. Ehrlich and Holdren’s formula is based around five things they take to be
“demonstrably true,” amongst them that “‘[e]nvironment’ must be broadly construed to
include such things as the physical environment of urban ghettos, the human behavioral
environment, and the epidemiological environment” (1212). The emphasis here is on the
human relationship to and usage of the environment, rather than, as it had previously
1

In correcting the I=PAT equation, Hynes proposes a “split” in the use of resources, accounting for the
difference between luxury goods and services and those needed for survival. The humanistic approach to
the equation, Hynes suggest, would take into consideration not only environmental conservation but also
consumerism since “[w]e have no national net consumption reduction rate, no concept of consumption
replacement rate, no mainstream nonprofit environmental organizations whose mission is zero economic
growth or zero consumption growth” (47). In other words, Hynes would acknowledge the diversity of
American families, cultures, and communities.
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been for earlier environmentalists, the preservation of wilderness spaces.
From the Human Ecology Symposium formed in 1968 to the first Earth Day
celebrated on April 22, 1970, the focus of environmental groups shifted from how to keep
the wilderness (primarily in the western United States) untamed and free to how the
consequences of our initial impact, primarily in the form of air and water pollution, was
effecting human populations. As Kirkpatrick Sale points out, a “newer understanding”
for the environmental movement in the 1970s
was for the most part anthropocentric, on the one hand regarding forests as a
source of timber, rivers as a source of electric power, animals as a source of food
and power, and on the other hand believing in the sanctity and health of the
human habitat above all else. Thus, the issue of pollution became primary,
concerned as it was with the protection of the human species and all it had to
touch and ingest. (27-8)
Thus, “nature,” as popularly understood, began to drop out of the vision of the
environmental movement. Rather, a closer focus on temporality was instituted—how the
way current human communities were being impacted by earlier interventions with
nature and how one should and could preserve what was left of the wilds for future
generations.
As the gay rights movements (with the Stonewall Riots in 1969 often marked as
the touchstone of the movement) became more visible, its focus shifted as well. Instead
of it being a action defined by the goals of homophile organizations, which emphasized
gays’ relationship to the heterosexual world and how one might achieve a “normal life,”
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the gay rights movement became about identity and solidarity. Coming out of the closet
became the catchphrase and the objective, and John D’Emilio argues, “The shift suggests
an alteration not merely in attitudes—a willingness to acknowledge the presence of a gay
subculture in American cities—but also a change in social reality, the rapid maturation in
postwar America of a stable gay world that could no longer escape detection” (Sexual
Communities 139). Additionally, Estelle B. Freedman and D’Emilio identify the “logic
of consumer capitalism” as having “pushed the erotic beyond the boundaries of the
monogamous couple as entrepreneurs” (325). The gay rights movement did challenge
the primacy of the nuclear family, restrictive gender roles and the institution of marriage,
but it did so with the goal of forming a different kind of society.
While the goals of both the environmental and gay rights movements pushed
away from each other as the Cold War period moved into the 1970s, there are important
moments captured in literary explorations during the height of the Baby Boom and the
move into suburbia. From Kesey’s examination of the meaning of masculinity and its
connection to wilderness spaces to Isherwood’s use of a homosexual man to examine the
encroaching hoards of heterosexuals to Rule’s questioning of the barrenness of the desert
and the lesbian relationships to Atwood’s critique of the consumerism and reproduction
inherent in traditional female gender roles, the literature of the 1960s demonstrates there
are still important discoveries to be made about the meaning and acceptance of
naturalness.
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